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Abstract 
Purpose 
This research examines the cross-sectional effect of intellectual capital investment, 
financial measures of market and company specific risk, industry membership and 
corporate governance on the extent of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital 
(VDIC) in a sample of 443 FTSE All Share Index company annual reports for the year 
2003/2004. 
Methodology 
The extent of disclosure is measured by a disclosure index (DI) based on intellectual 
capital (IC) attributes included in the narratives and illustrations of the annual reports. 
The research predicts that agency costs are mitigated by VDIC and that the benefits of 
signalling IC may outweigh competitive and proprietary costs that may be more 
prevalent in innovative and technological companies; furthermore, that effective 
corporate governance measures enhance VDIC particularly in those companies found 
to have a higher level of intangible assets (IA) in their resource base. 
Findings 
The results suggest that companies associated with less financial risk, reduced debt, 
higher levels of liquidity and accompanied by growth are characterised with higher 
levels of VDIC. Although less significant, the results on market risk indicate a 
positive influence on VDIC. Furthermore, the extent of VDIC in annual reports is 
enhanced when large companies operating in high-tech and innovative industries are 
characterised by investments in employees; in contrast, companies associated with 
research and development processes tend to be more secretive with respect to VDIC. 
The results suggest that companies that are able to maintain adequate governance 
systems through segregation of executive and non-executive duties and to a less 
extent through the presence of experienced non-executive directors exhibit higher 
levels of disclosure. 
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1.1.0. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the increase in intangible assets (IA) in the equity 
of companies has led to complexity in financial reporting. Intellectual capital 
(IC) reporting has been mired by traditional financial statements not effectively 
reporting the existence and value of these IA. Compounding the issue as 
reported by Lev and Zarowin (1999 p. 383), book values in financial statements 
are largely unrepresentative of equity. This complexity may explain the equity 
market's focus on both quantitative and qualitative disclosures included in the 
annual reports. As the proportion of IA increases in the equity of companies, 
the uncertainty attached to its financial reporting increases. Companies invest in 
IA resources to leverage the competitiveness of their organisations. There 
appears to be a broad acceptance that inimitable IC resources applied to 
generate innovativeness in products and services are the key drivers of 
competitive advantage, growth and market value. Incentives exist therefore for 
companies to develop those characteristics that set themselves apart from their 
competitors and to signal their competitiveness. There has been a steady shift 
by investors and analysts towards analysing qualitative disclosures in particular 
for companies whose value remains hidden from the market. 
In response to these demands for information, companies formulate 
policies that identify and report IC that is generated by the organisation. These 
policies maintain and disclose important sources of IC including research and 
development (R&D), sources of innovation and skilled human resources. 
However, investment in IA attracts a certain element of risk. The process of 
development of IC and the realisation of increased returns and share price value 
are lengthy and uncertain. As such, communication of these IC processes to the 
public may be essential if this uncertainty is to be mitigated; however, 
companies face significant hindrances in their attempts to disclose the existence 
of IA. Companies have grown increasingly aware of the importance of 
disclosing IC and the perceptions that credible favourable disclosures have on 
the market. As such, narratives and qualitative reporting has been applied in 
disclosing IC in addition to explaining in part the difference between market 
and book value. Insufficient IC information may be problematic with respect to 
the market's identification, analysis, valuation and therefore differentiation of 
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superior and inferior market participants. The onus is therefore on companies to 
make this information available. Some may expect standard setters and 
regulators to take a leading role in encouraging voluntary disclosure of 
intellectual capital (VDIC); however, their roles are restricted by the inherent 
nature of IC that makes its identification, measurement and reporting complex. 
IA are more associated with this complexity than other types of assets such as 
physical and financial assets due to the high uncertainty in their value, ill- 
defined legal and ownership rights and the lack of active markets to provide 
reliable value estimates (Lev 2001). Thus, as regulators are unable to set 
minimum reporting standards, the onus is placed on companies to provide the 
necessary conduit for these IC disclosures; the annual report, that takes the form 
of words, sentences, pictures and diagrams, has been gaining importance as a 
means of communicating this IC. Whereas, the traditional reporting model 
places focus on quantitative audited financial statements, the approach adopted 
by this research examines quantitative, qualitative, narrative and non-narrative 
disclosures. 
Companies recognise the importance and economic benefits to be 
derived from a well-managed disclosure policy (Williams 2001). As this IC is 
not visible, the existence of adequate structures for identifying, measuring, 
managing and reporting IC may be invaluable. Corporate governance 
mechanisms may assist in ensuring transparency and accountability through the 
provision of complete and credible IC disclosure. Furthermore, this process is 
likely to be influenced by the nature of the management culture and their risk 
attitudes towards IC investment, the nature of the business, its industry 
membership and the existence of monitoring and controlling mechanisms. This 
accountability and transparency may result in the disclosure of such categories 
of IC as structural capital (SC), relational or customer capital (RC) and human 
or employee capital (HC). Additional disclosure is likely to reduce uncertainty 
about future prospects of a company and to facilitate a more precise valuation 
of the company (Botosan 1997). It has been suggested that the culture, style and 
composition of the governing bodies that report on the financial position and 
provide additional information in the narratives of the financial statements may 
be as important to financial markets as the information actually reported. Such 
additional information may supplement mandatory regulations with voluntary 
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disclosure to ensure information asymmetry is reduced between internal and 
external stakeholders and that equity risk is minimised. 
Although market forces may lead to IC disclosure due to demands by 
external forces, the absence of a framework for IC, the historical nature of the 
financial reporting framework, the necessity to disclose credible information, 
the threat of loss of competitive advantage and the risk of litigation from 
inaccurate reporting has restricted the level of IC disclosure. As such, these 
additional disclosure costs render markets less efficient particularly in risk 
assessment, equity valuation and resource allocation. VDIC may reduce 
information asymmetries that may otherwise be exploited by internal agents 
and external analysts by: - reducing information acquisition costs, establishing a 
recognised IC framework, reporting IC in the narratives, ensuring corporate 
governance measures provide accurate information, reducing disclosure costs 
and by providing benefits for the signalling of company competitive advantage. 
This research acknowledges that credible disclosure provides better decision 
making for all stakeholders by reducing the gap between the market's valuation 
of IC and the intrinsic value. IC disclosure in particular breaches the gap 
created by the "hidden value". Credible disclosure provides an alternative 
means of assessing value not incorporated in the balance sheet. Such disclosure 
provides transparency and accountability in the governing body by providing 
more information on the processes involved in developing competitive 
advantage through investment in IA. This research investigates how the 
creation, management and disclosure of IA influences financial reporting and 
investigates the determinants of IC disclosure in terms of the interaction of 
heterogeneous asset and governance firm characteristics. Specifically this 
research considers the investment in IC, the effectiveness of the firm's 
corporate governance mechanisms and its structures of accountability. 
Moreover, this research shows that by adopting the RBV approach, investment 
in and disclosure of IC enhances competitive advantage. At the same time, 
systematic risk increases as a function of the investment in IA that might 
typically be expected to be associated with higher fixed costs. 
Previous literature has examined the separate effects of resource 
attributes on IA disclosure (Archambault and Archambault 2003 and Citron et 
al. 2005), the role of such disclosures as signals (Bozzolan et al. 2003 and 
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Garcia-Meca et al. 2005) and the possession of intangible resources and their 
impact on firm performance (Hayton 2005). Taken together the results of prior 
empirical studies are suggestive of investment in intangible resource and their 
disclosure through transparent governance structures as being mechanisms to 
secure competitive advantage. A theoretical framework is suggested linking 
disclosure with the firm's asset base, specifically investment in IC and the 
effectiveness of the firm's corporate governance mechanisms and structures of 
accountability. This research then goes on to examine the likely impact of 
disclosures, once made, on the risk profile of the firm, with the expectation that 
disclosure will reduce the risk attributed to the equity. Furthermore, the 
theoretical framework proposes an association between investment in IC and 
membership of an innovative and technological industry. Industry membership 
is examined as a representation of the firm's asset base. Innovative industries 
may be characterised by higher levels of intangible resources and 
manufacturing companies may be characterised by more resources that are 
tangible. These propositions are tested using a cross-sectional analysis of a 
large sample of disclosures made by United Kingdom (UK) firms. 
Disclosures of intangibles are a function of the firm's competitive 
strategy and the requirement to signal the presence of assets likely to create 
competitive advantage to capital markets. Sustained competitive advantage is 
defined as delivering sustainable above-normal returns (Peteraf 1993) and is 
likely to be achieved because of the possession of unique assets. According to 
the theory of competitive heterogeneity such assets might be tangible, but 
possessed by one firm and not another as a result of monopolistic market 
conditions. In contrast, according to the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), 
and in particular, the knowledge-based view of the firm Grant (1996), sources 
of sustained competitive advantage are located in assets that cannot be 
purchased in a market. The RBV explains the competitive advantage of 
organizations in terms of bundles of resources (Amit and Schoemaker 1993 and 
Rumelt 1984), which are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
(Barney 1991). Super-normal profits consistent with the organisational aspects 
of sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991) arise from the firm and 
include specific assets, managerial economies of scope and organisational 
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mechanisms of co-ordination (Penrose 1959, Teece 1980 and Coff 1997)1. As 
the firm invests in assets such as specialised production facilities, trade secrets 
and engineering experience (Teece et al. 1997) over time (Dierickx and Cool 
1989), tacit knowledge is embedded in technically complex routines. According 
to the knowledge-based view, sustained competitive advantage arises from such 
routines (Spender 1989 and Nonaka 1991). Such assets typically have 
intangible characteristics and accordingly the RBV approach is adopted here as 
a tool for analysing intangible disclosures, typically linked to firm value 
creation. 
These intangibles coupled with firm-specific capabilities provide 
sustained competitive advantage through quality services and products and 
through frequent and value creating innovation. Competitive advantage is 
sustained through a lowering of transaction costs through trust, relational 
capital, coordination and communication with external stakeholders for the 
support of superior performance. In building this corporate culture, these 
management processes are matched by an increase in the risk attributable to 
R&D activities. The risk associated with intangible asset generation through 
R&D activities is on average three times greater than the risk associated with 
investment in property, plant and equipment (Lev 2001). This risk is indicative 
of uncertainty and may be mitigated by reducing asymmetric information 
through greater disclosure of intangibles. Not all R&D activities lead to 
intangibles; not all intangibles lead to sustained competitive advantage; 
nevertheless, both the competitive advantage derived from successful R&D and 
the in-place firm strategies that mitigate the inherent risk in R&D activities may 
be conveyed to the markets through disclosure. 
Intangible, as opposed to merely heterogeneous resources may therefore 
be more likely to be disclosed to the capital market as signalling devices. The 
monopolistic possession of tangible resources, for example a telephone cable 
network, is likely to be well known by competitors, investors and regulators 
and is therefore less likely to be the subject of further elaboration in the annual 
report. Conversely, the creation of RBV intangibles, for example investment in 
Investment in strategic human resource assets (Mueller 1996 and Wright et al. 1994) is a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for realised super-normal profits, since the employment 
of such assets simultaneously leads to the creation of internal rent appropriation possibilities. 
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organisational and technical processes, is likely to be less well understood by 
capital market monitors, creating a potential moral hazard and information 
asymmetry problem; the logical solution to which is enhanced accounting 
disclosure. Moral hazard and information asymmetry problems may be 
exacerbated by the mendacious but unverified claims of inferior firms to have 
made equivalent investments to their competitors, thereby staking a claim to 
inequitable shares in superior profits. There is thus a quality signalling rationale 
(Akerlof 1970, Spence 1973 and Healy and Palepu 1993) for disclosure of 
investments in intangibles. Toms (2002) uses this approach to link quality 
signalling using accounting disclosure to the RBV. More fundamentally, where 
such investments have occurred, in the absence of disclosure there is no 
alternative mechanism for the capital market to adjust returns to reflect the 
abnormal profits associated with sustained competitive advantage. 
Relatively little explicit use has been made of RBV in accounting 
research in general and with reference to intangible disclosures in particular. 
There are however, some interesting results associated with certain resource 
attributes of the firm. Intangible disclosures need to be informative with respect 
to the outcomes of the R&D projects. Generally, information contained in the 
annual report of R&D activities does not normally provide any new or vital 
information due to commercial prudence (Nixon 1997 p. 274). However, the 
conclusions in Nixon (1997) suggest that management views disclosure of 
R&D expenditure as key to capital market valuation in particular, for certain 
key industries, intangibles have become a key source of competitive advantage 
and more especially in the service and innovative industries (Marc et al. 2003). 
Archambault and Archambault (2003) and Citron et al. (2005) find a 
strong positive association between disclosures and the number of SIC codes in 
the firm indicating the extent of firm diversification (Verrecchia 1983) that may 
lead to increased disclosure as companies seek to obtain a greater set of 
resources (Zarzeski 1996). These indications of positive association between 
the scope and complexity of the organisation's activities and disclosure are a 
useful starting point for a wider application of the RBV framework in 
conjunction with the signalling approach. Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) 
investigated signalling to analysts and concluded that better disclosures might 
be expected for companies operating in the financial sector. According to 
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signalling theory, such companies require the confidence of their customers to 
do business, and transparency is a key factor in gaining confidence. Bozzolan et 
al. (2003) endeavoured to explain intangible disclosures using signalling 
theory. The investigation centred on high-tec industries that invest heavily in 
intangibles; the results were indicative of the promotion of competitive 
advantage through disclosure of R&D and technological development 
processes. However, a significant limitation on any likely relationship between 
signalling incentives and disclosure is the notion of competitive cost. This 
results in competitors increasing their competitive advantage as a result of 
disclosure of information i. e. trade secrets, processes, products and reduces 
future earnings of the disclosing firm. Competition may restrict full disclosure 
of IC because it may lead to a potentially unfavourable change in future 
earnings (Dye 1985 and Guo et al. 2004). 
Based on the discussions raised in this introduction, the next section 
presents the research questions that will be investigated in this thesis. Reference 
is made to agency theory, signalling theory and RBV. The RBV bases its 
argument on the existence of potentially valuable assets that are difficult to 
replicate. This characteristic inhibits firms within the same sector accessing 
information and R&D on new developments. These barriers to imitation may be 
created through IC's unique characteristics, legal protection, complexity, 
difficulty of replication and high levels of financial and human resources 
required for its development. The applicability of this approach is based on the 
unique resources that IC provides a company. The RBV highlights the 
competitive advantage of companies as based in their unique constellation of 
resources, tangible capital, human resources and organisational processes 
(Barney 1991). The resources that have been found to be especially valuable are 
those that are rare, durable, imperfectly inimitable, and non-tradable (Barney 
1991 and Dierickx and Cool 1989). These resources include structural capital 
(SC), relational capital (RC) and human capital (HC). SC is generated mainly 
by unique R&D investment, RC by unique relations with customers and 
stakeholders and HC by a skilled, experienced and innovative workforce. 
Management may follow a policy of maximum disclosure of IC where 
these intangible resources are prevalent. The market is expected to respond, 
more so, to new research than to the development of existing products, 
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processes and services. Performance measurement of R&D and unique product 
and service development activities is gaining increased importance because the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these activities not only determine a company's 
competitive advantage, but its very survival. Applying RBV to an environment 
where it is difficult to replicate IC, management may voluntarily disclose IC to 
illustrate their competitive edge and restrict voluntary disclosure in areas where 
no competitive advantage exists. In a market where barriers to imitation are 
high; duplication is restricted; successful projects may signal growth and VDIC 
may positively influence shareholder wealth maximisation. 
On the other hand, where barriers to imitation are low and duplication of 
new technologies is commonplace, management recognises the need for secrecy 
due to proprietary costs. The existence of disclosure costs adequately accounts 
for this behaviour in the disclosure decision. However, where barriers to 
imitation may be high the potential competitive costs linked to proprietary IC 
may be reduced. The RBV fits well within this framework; being unique, IC 
resources may be patent protected, may require large financial and human 
capital resources, may take a lengthy process to develop and may be specific to 
certain processes, departments, companies or industries thus providing 
mitigating circumstances that may render disclosure costs minimal. 
1.1.1. Research Questions 
This research has identified the following key elements that require further 
investigation. The questions listed below are derived from the gaps that have 
been identified in the literature. 
(a) What are the resource attributes that tend to lead to competitive 
advantage reporting? 
(b) What are the market and financial risk characteristics that lead to 
IC reporting? 
(c) What resource attributes lead to technologically innovative 
industries disclosing more IC? 
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(d) Which corporate governance mechanisms promote IC 
disclosure? 
These questions are addressed below in section 1.1.2 in which a 
research objective is established for each research question. Four areas have 
been identified as significant in influencing IC disclosure; investment in IC, 
firm specific and market risk, industry membership and corporate governance. 
The questions have been modelled according to the RBV and signalling theory. 
Organisational resources may be instrumental in defining disclosure policy; 
these resources are represented by both tangible and intangible assets. 
Intangible assets have been associated with generating the competitive 
advantage of the organisation. Investment in these intangible resources varies 
from industry to industry and may thus be a determinant of the variation in IC 
disclosure patterns. The risk attached to investment in these intangibles may be 
expected to increase with an increase in the portion of resources attributed to 
intangibles. Lack of knowledge of the existence of these IC resources may 
create asymmetric information. However, it may be that effective corporate 
governance may mitigate this risk by ensuring organisational IC is adequately 
communicated. Furthermore, being intangible and complex to measure and 
report, possession and disclosure of the existence of these assets may be 
necessary for generating and maintaining competitive advantage. 
1.1.2. Research Objectives 
The main objective is to examine the effect of specific company characteristics 
on the extent of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital (VDIC) for a sample 
of 439 UK companies selected from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
Financial Times Securities and Equities (FTSE) All Share Index for the year 
2003/2004. Companies were selected for the year 2003/2004 as this was the last 
year before introduction of International Accounting Standards (IAS). This 
environment was suitable for examination of voluntary disclosure of IC given 
the impact that mandatory disclosure has on voluntary disclosure. Very little if 
any mandatory IC regulations existed in the UK during this period. The 
Financial Times publication was assessed as suited to the needs of this research 
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as it provides all listed companies in fitting alphabetical industry category; 
companies within industries are similarly listed alphabetically. This research 
establishes the current practice of reporting IC by UK listed companies by 
identifying the quantity and quality of IC attributes and IC categories reported 
by each of the selected companies. By documenting and analysing the current 
overall pattern of IC reporting among UK listed companies, this research 
empirically investigates the hypothesised influence of several independent 
variables on the extent of VDIC. 
(a) The influence of competitive advantage resources on the level of 
IC disclosure is determined by the financial measures of 
investment in IC as reported in the annual reports. Companies 
are investigated to determine whether this investment in 
competitive advantage resources is associated with VDIC. 
(b) This research places focus on the firm financial and market risk 
characteristics of companies and determines their influence on 
VDIC. 
(c) IC disclosure trends are identified with respect to industry 
membership; industries, representative of the variation in 
organisational resource base, are grouped into various 
classifications to determine the influence of particular industries 
on VDIC 
(d) The final objective is focused on corporate governance 
mechanisms. Their influence on the monitoring and control 
mechanisms of board appointments, board structures and 
procedures is evaluated in the light of VDIC. 
These objectives focus on current issues that are important to the 
continued development and study of IC. The focus on IC investment examines 
the influence of the drivers of IA growth on VDIC. IC disclosure may be 
influenced by market and financial risk, in particular the uncertainty that may 
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be associated with future cash inflows emanating from IC investments. The 
management and governance of the company may influence the IC reporting 
framework in identifying, measuring and reporting IC. Companies within the 
same industry may follow selected reporting trends that meet the market's 
demand for comparable information amongst companies with similar economic 
activities. Technologically innovative activities may be expected to take place 
in certain industries. A classification of these industries may explain the 
variation in VDIC. Conflicts of interest within organisations require monitoring 
and control, the effectiveness of the board of directors in its function may 
influence the level of transparency and accountability and therefore the extent 
of VDIC. 
1.2.0. Identification, Measurement and Reporting 
The literature has suggested the little progress that has taken place in IC 
research has been due to the slow development of identification, measurement 
and reporting. The unique characteristics of IC particularly its intangible nature 
renders these processes complex and as such may continue to restrict the nature 
and depth of the development of the field if these issues are not addressed. 
Practitioners need to understand commercial terms for IC and management 
need to understand the definitions of IC referred to in academic research. A 
common ground favours the introduction of an IC framework that may mitigate 
the problems associated with the measurement of the construct of IC disclosure. 
Content analysis has been one technique that has been applied to account for IC 
attributes disclosed in annual reports. This research applies a quality-adjusted 
content analysis based on the comprehensiveness and competitiveness of the IC 
disclosure, consistent with the current shift in reporting as the importance of 
narratives, non-narratives and illustrations in communicating intangibles 
continues to grow. A differentiation is made within this research between a 
qualitative and a quantitative disclosure. 
An IC attribute in the annual report does not measure the context, 
comprehensiveness or richness of information but identifies its disclosure or 
not. An ICCA attribute disclosure is defined by this research as the competitive 
advantage in signalling a unique product, service, process, IP, relationship or 
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human resource. This measure accounts for the context, comprehensiveness or 
richness of information reported. Two indices are developed in this research, 
the unweighted index and the weighted index representing IC attributes and 
ICCA attributes respectively. The ICCA disclosure index focuses on the 
difficulty in replicability of IC that is attributed to barriers to imitation. In this 
manner, the weighted and unweighted indices can be evaluated and compared 
in ascertaining whether the quality-adjusted index reflects the significance of 
competitiveness. Companies compete by erecting barriers in order to maintain 
their demand-side advantage or cost-side advantage (Abernathy and Clark 
1995). Generally, any advantage generated from standard and tangible asset 
investment is easy for competing companies to imitate (Webster 1999) whereas 
that gained from IA is more unique, firm specific and more difficult to 
replicate. IA investments are often company specific making it difficult for 
companies to imitate. Hayton (2005) argues that IC offers a unique source of 
advantage that facilitates entrepreneurial activities by reducing the risk and 
increasing the returns from investment in innovation and venturing. Usoff et al. 
(2002) and Drucker (1993) identified the increasing role IC plays in creating 
value by achieving a competitive advantage in the market place; knowledge is 
attributed as the dominant economic resource for competitive advantage. 
1.2.1. Accounting Investment in IC 
The question that arises is why companies that invest in IC are more likely to 
disclose IC attributes in narratives, non-narratives and illustrations in the annual 
report. It may be that if companies were to disclose IC, it would be those that 
are most disadvantaged by the current financial reporting framework that places 
little emphasis on reporting market related equity. Given the intangible nature 
of IC and the inability of accounting regulators to mandate IC disclosure, few 
financial measures exist that can be regarded as truly representative of the 
actual IC value incorporated in equities. The historical nature of accounting 
figures limits their application in this respect. Nevertheless, the literature has 
illustrated that managements' efforts to attain competitive advantage have 
driven the investment in R&D considered a major driver of Intellectual 
Property (IP) and IA growth, driven the investment in and retention of human 
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resources in the development of HC and driven the investment in customers, 
suppliers and markets in cultivating RC. This increase in IC investment remains 
largely hidden, compounded by the complexity of measurement and reporting 
these investments may be invisible to both current shareholders and prospective 
investors. This complex relationship may be the cause of the lack of empirical 
research to support the assertion of the influence of R&D, growth, IC intensity 
and market value to book value with VDIC. Large more financially liquid 
companies may be able to spend more on competitive advantage resources and 
may signal this fact to the market through additional voluntary disclosures. In 
this manner, the total value of the company, both tangible and intangible may 
be captured in the share price. These potential explanations need to be 
confirmed through empirical tests on the hypothesised influence of financial 
measures on IC. No prior empirical evidence exists in the literature with respect 
to the association of financial measures of investment in IC and VDIC. 
1.2.2. Financial Measures of Risk 
The literature has in general acknowledged an association between successful 
R&D, Intellectual Property (IP) development and investment in HC with 
profitability; no link has been established between these indicators of IC and 
risk. Although capital market theory holds that investors are interested in risk 
and return, no direct investigation has considered whether management react by 
increasing VDIC when faced with higher levels of market or financial risk. 
Organisations with a larger proportion of their resources based in intangible 
assets may be associated with higher risk levels. More voluntary disclosures 
may enable easier assessment of the risk, return and the future prospects of such 
equities; disclosure may reduce the asymmetry between the organisation and 
the market. The processes of R&D, IC development and innovation require 
significant investment before any returns come to fruition. Such uncertainty 
leads to higher risk levels. The entrepreneurial and risk attitudes of 
management may influence the culture and philosophy of the organisation in 
facilitating an environment that is conducive for innovation and technological 
advancement. It is therefore important to know whether high-risk companies 
are associated with higher or lower levels of VDIC. 
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Certain actions by management may mitigate this risk, where VDIC 
reduces the uncertainty attached to future growth prospects, employee relations 
or market opportunities. Certain management actions or lack thereof may 
exacerbate the risk attached to the equity through mal-practice, non-disclosure 
of IC and therefore increasing asymmetrical information, incompetence, 
entrenchment practice, self-dealing and self-interests. Shareholders' monitoring 
activities may ensure that management do not expose the company to undue 
risk, further that company policies and procedures are followed in guiding 
management decisions. Shareholders may encourage VDIC to reduce the risk of 
uncertainty. Although markets are aware of the existence of IA, without 
sufficient information, placing a value on this IC is limited, due to the 
complexity and inability to forecast future growth. 
Signalling of ICCA attributes that may generate future profits mitigates 
the risks associated with competitive pressures that are generally associated 
with reduced VDIC. On the other hand the financial resources required for the 
investment in IC may not be available to all, it may be that companies 
associated with more financial and insolvency risk may be unable access such 
resources; such risks may lead to less VDIC. The literature has been 
inconclusive as to the nature of the relationship between risk and disclosure. 
The empirical relationship may be unknown, as no previous IC study has 
examined risk in this context. Given the risk/return relationship, characteristics 
associated with the development of IC may provide above average returns in 
line with competitive advantage however, the risk and time associated with new 
service and product development may reduce the attractiveness of such 
opportunities. 
1.2.3. Industry Membership 
Companies appear to follow reporting trends that are dependent on their nature 
of business and economic activities. It is expected that VDIC may also be 
exposed to the same financial reporting characteristics that determine these 
trends. Technologically innovative companies firstly, may apply more IC in 
their operations and secondly, may disclose such IC in their annual reports. The 
nature of the industry and disclosure attributes may define the association; a 
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significant association between disclosure and manufacturing companies is 
revealed in Cooke (1992), with more voluntary and mandatory accounting 
attributes disclosed by manufacturing companies than by non-manufacturing 
companies. Whereas Cooke (1992) measures general disclosure, this research 
measures IC disclosure as such the levels of disclosure may differ. 
In addition, disclosure has been found to vary with the complexity of 
operations between industries. The trend of this variation ranges from basic 
resource orientated companies to highly complex and specialised companies 
including manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The major business operation 
determines whether, as is the case for financial, utilities and raw material 
industries, more disclosure regulations should apply. These regulations arise 
due to the nature of trade and the level of public exposure, environmental and 
political pressure in these industries. Some companies may follow a herding 
behaviour in which some companies are the first to disclose and others follow 
this trend in a second wave of disclosures. 
Consistent with the RBV approach, industry is utilised to differentiate 
companies based on the level of investment in tangible and intangible assets. 
There is a need therefore to establish the differential effects of various 
industries reporting trends on the VDIC. This is important for two reasons: to 
identify which industries have higher and lower levels of VDIC and secondly to 
identify the industry characteristics that influence these levels. The research 
therefore tests the hypothesis that different industries require different IC 
disclosure policies. From a practice perspective, standard setters and regulators 
can identify the industries that may require additional mandatory disclosure of 
IC and in addition, investors can identify secretive and potentially high-risk 
industries. 
1.2.4. Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The focus on corporate governance is appropriate as disclosure and agency 
costs are inextricably linked; shareholders apply disclosure as a monitoring 
mechanism. The corporate governance function is responsible for formulating 
the strategic focus of the organisation. The important critical decisions involve 
monitoring management and accounting for the investment in IC (Keenan and 
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Aggestam 2001, p. 265). Additional disclosure may lead to a reduction in 
information asymmetry. Corporate governance may mitigate the risk due to 
agency costs. Corporate governance has become known as a significant force in 
predicting and explaining management behaviour in general disclosure studies. 
This research extends these investigations by establishing the existence of such 
a relationship within VDIC. Generally, corporate governance mechanisms 
influence management behaviour by providing incentives and punitive 
measures to achieve the desired attitudes and behaviour. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) reported that the board of directors is the 
highest internal control mechanism responsible for monitoring management's 
activities. It may be that if management is about running the company, then 
corporate governance mechanisms may ensure that the business is run properly 
(Tricker 1984, p. 7). Several specific board characteristics and actions can be 
hypothesised in predicting an expectation in disclosure policy: the constitution 
of the board itself including the nature of individual board members; the 
number and nature of non-executive directors appointed; the percentage of 
equity held by management, the separation of executive roles and the 
procedures and processes that the governance function oversees. Given the 
increased international call for transparency and accountability, investors 
expect corporate governance mechanisms that are designed to protect the 
interests of all stakeholders and therefore for management to accurately report 
the true financial position and business performance. 
1.3.0. Contribution to the Area 
This research adds to the accounting literature by firstly providing an up-to-date 
analysis of the IC reporting practices of UK listed companies. No study could 
be identified in the UK that used a multivariate statistical analysis to evaluate 
the impact of the nature and the number of the selected variables on VDIC. In 
this context, the impact of VDIC in the UK is therefore unknown and it has 
been discussed that few VDIC studies have been conducted internationally. 
Second, the extent and scope are new to the area of study as new methods have 
been applied and new frameworks developed including the voluntary disclosure 
framework (VDF), Intellectual Capital Framework (ICF) and theoretical 
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framework (TF). New independent variables have been introduced extending IC 
disclosure studies by increasing the count from an average of 3 to 18 company 
characteristics. 
Third, the application of new sampling, attribute counting, statistical 
and analytical tools particularly in the development of a measure of competitive 
advantage through a weighted disclosure index and a measure of the extent of 
disclosure through an unweighted disclosure index, adds to the development of 
IC management and reporting studies. Thus, the competitive advantage index 
adds a new insight in the measurement of VDIC. In this respect, this research 
adds to IC content analysis studies by including diagrams and non-narratives to 
mere narratives in providing the first attempt at a methodological recording of 
the extent, content and style of IC and ICCA disclosure. Previous studies have 
ignored the inclusion of non-narratives and illustrations in compiling the 
disclosure indices. A gap therefore exists in our knowledge in respect of 
limitations on the extent and scope of prior studies. 
Fourth, this study makes significant advances in the area of IC 
disclosure studies based on studies conducted in previous research that have 
been identified as limited in depth, scope and number of company 
characteristics investigated. The introduction of empirical tests to IC studies in 
the scale of this research has significantly added to the IC field; this research 
contributes to knowledge by pioneering the way forward in IC research on 
several fronts. The nature, size and extent of coverage of the data are unique to 
IC studies. The methodology, methods, quantitative and qualitative techniques 
applied in data analysis, statistical tests, parametric and non-parametric tests 
and data set analysis into transformed data are some of the fronts on which this 
research contributes to knowledge. This research therefore contributes to the 
growing literature on IC internationally and sets the foundation for further study 
within the UK. The contribution is made through a measure of disclosure, in 
developing various frameworks and in recording the extent to, and manner in, 
which, IC is disclosed through voluntary narratives, non-narratives and 
illustrations in the annual report. 
In addition, a contribution is made by examining systematic links 
between the proportion, use and disclosure of IC attributes and the value of IC 
content in equities, market and firm specific risk associated with equities, 
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industry membership 
mechanisms. 
1.4.0. Research Outline 
and the effectiveness of corporate governance 
The remaining part of this thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 
discusses the literature review, establishes the VDF and the TF and develops an 
ICF by defining SC, RC and HC. This is the first time that such a VDF has been 
developed; the identification and differentiation of voluntary IC attributes and 
mandatory IC attributes has not been established within the UK. The chapter 
discusses how each of the company characteristics identified in the literature 
review is developed into testable hypotheses that are based on the TF. The 
variables investigated include size, growth, risk, IC investment, industry and 
corporate governance. Size and growth are introduced from the general 
disclosure literature. Risk, IC, industry and corporate governance are 
introduced as the focus of this research due to their potential influence on 
management's disclosure policy. 
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology; it explains the sampling 
procedure adopted and, how the IC attributes are identified, selected and coded. 
The chapter explains how the annual reports were scored and discusses the 
arguments for and against the weighting of the items disclosed. The final part of 
the chapter provides a descriptive specification of the statistical methods that 
are applied to test the relationship between the company characteristics and 
VDIC. Chapter 4 introduces the results of the empirical investigation and 
discusses the data set used to test the hypotheses in Chapters 4 to 8. It discusses 
the frequency analysis, disclosure index (DI) and weighted disclosure index 
(WDI), the descriptive statistics and IC and ICCA attribute disclosure at the 
industry and company level. This chapter also looks at the empirical analysis on 
the investment in IC. This research develops four hypotheses that are associated 
with management's investment in IC. The first two represent investment in HC 
and SC, consisting of investment in employees and in R&D respectively. High 
technology and innovative industry classifications are developed consistent 
with industries associated with IC intensive operations (SC, HC and RC) to 
provide the two remaining IC investment variables. Chapter 4 to 8 discusses the 
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results of the statistical analysis with view to identifying the influence of 
investment in IC, influence of financial and market measures of risk, the effect 
of industry membership and impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
VDIC reporting practices respectively. The results of the empirical tests, both 
parametric and non-parametric are evaluated. 
In Chapter 5, this research develops three hypotheses that are associated 
with financial measures of risk. The empirical tests determine whether there is 
any significant association with VDIC. Furthermore, the tests determine why 
the level of market and firm specific risk influence the disclosure of IC. Risk 
variables introduced are associated with financial risk, gearing and liquidity and 
investigate the influence of the financial structure of the company including the 
influence of the ability to meet long and short-term debt commitments. An 
additional risk variable introduced is market risk that relates to the influence on 
disclosure levels of asymmetrical information. In Chapter 6, this research 
introduces the development of the four industry variables. The classifications of 
these industry variables differ as two variables introduced are based on a 
dichotomous scale, one variable introduced is based on a standard industry 
classification and the final variable is based on a detailed codification that 
provides a classification for up to 9000 business operations. Companies are 
classified into industries based on business operations. These operations vary 
and include highly complex and high-tech companies, whose equity is made up 
of intangible value, tangible asset intensive companies, manufacturing and 
service companies and innovative and high technology companies. 
Chapter 7 develops four corporate governance hypotheses. This research 
examines the influence on VDIC of remuneration to both the executive and the 
influence of dual roles in senior board positions. The next two variables 
examine the influence of cross directorships and the proportion of equity held 
by the executive. Chapter 8 presents the results of the full model that combines 
variables included in the focus on IC investment, financial measures of risk, 
industry membership and corporate governance mechanisms. This chapter 
examines the combined influence of these determinants on the level of IC 
disclosure. Chapter 9 is the summary of the entire project. It starts by surveying 
this research and comparing the results of the current research with the previous 
research based on UK data and on data from other countries. It then goes on to 
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discuss the implications of the results. This is followed by an overall conclusion 
based on the research objectives, a discussion of the limitations of this research 
and finally some further areas for research are suggested. 
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2.1.0. Introduction 
This chapter incorporates the literature review and the development of a VDF 
that determines existing mandatory regulations and their influence on the 
proposed ICF. The mandatory regulations are based on the UK legal 
framework. This chapter develops an ICF by defining SC, RC and HC based on 
various applied frameworks. The origination of the framework is examined and 
its development is chartered by examining the justifications for its varying 
applications. The literature review places focus on the theoretical implications 
of VDIC by examining empirical studies conducted within both general and IC 
disclosure studies. The TF is applied to determine how each of the company 
characteristics identified in the literature are developed into the respective 
hypotheses. The variables investigated are associated with size, growth, IC 
investment, risk, industry membership and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Size and growth are drawn into this research from the general disclosure 
literature and the latter four characteristics from the research objectives 
generated in section 1.1.2. 
Table 2.1 presents the analytical framework for this research. This 
analytical framework combines the investment in IA, equity risk, industry 
membership and governance characteristics. By combining the RBV and 
signalling approaches to intangible disclosures the analytical framework 
illustrates on the vertical axis, the resource base of the firm as represented by a 
continuum, which at one extreme consists of explicit and easily replicable 
resources and at the other consists of tacit and very difficult to replicate 
intellectual and similar IA. On the horizontal axis, the signalling incentive is 
represented by a continuum, which at one extreme consists of basic non- 
technological activities, low risk equities, manufacturing companies and limited 
governance mechanisms likely to lead to minimum disclosure; at the other, 
complex technologically innovative activities, high equity risk, non- 
manufacturing companies and strong governance mechanisms likely to lead to 
full disclosure. 
Table 2.1 forms the basis for assessing and developing testable 
hypotheses to explain the disclosure of IC. The interaction of investment in IC 
on disclosure is presented in Table 2.1. At lower levels of IC investment, 
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companies are expected to provide low VDIC as illustrated by quadrant 1; the 
resource base of the company is predominantly replicable. Quadrant 2, 
illustrates that a replicable asset base regardless of investment in IC may lead to 
low VDIC; however, as the IA resource base increases through IC investment, 
management may increase the level of IC disclosure in accordance with 
signalling theory as they communicate the existence of IA resources consistent 
with quadrant 3 and 4. High disclosure is expected in quadrant 3 where the high 
investment in IC is complemented by the existence of a significant amount of 
IA in the resource base. Table 2.1 illustrates that an increase in IC investment 
may be expected to result in VDIC as management reduce information 
asymmetry through signalling IA resources. 
The interaction of risk on IC disclosure is presented by an analysis of 
tangible and intangible resources. Companies with firm specific assets that are 
not easily duplicated are likely to have higher market risk due to asymmetrical 
information associated with complexity of measurement and reporting of such 
IC. Firms with a majority of replicable assets as represented by quadrants 1 and 
2 are expected to have lower levels of VDIC as these assets are observable. As 
the resource base of the firm becomes significantly more IA based, market risk 
is expected to increase resulting in higher levels of IC disclosure as represented 
by quadrants 3 and 4. Quadrant 3 illustrates that an increase in market risk may 
be expected to result in an increase in IC disclosure as management reduce 
information asymmetry through signalling IC information. 
The analytical framework examines the relationship between industry 
membership and IC disclosure. Industries are classified into basic non- 
technological activities and complex technologically innovative activities. In 
Table 2.1, as illustrated by quadrant 1, basic industries have the lowest level of 
IC disclosure as they have the least IA in their resource base. However, those 
companies that do invest in IC are expected to provide additional IC disclosure 
as illustrated in quadrant 2. Technological companies are expected to have 
higher levels of "hidden value" and as such, they may disclose more IC relative 
to basic resource companies as illustrated by quadrants 3 and 4. Furthermore, 
management of these companies may be expected to signal the existence of IC 
particularly when they operate in complex sectors whilst conducting 
technologically innovative operations. 
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With respect to governance mechanisms, in quadrant 1, the asset base is 
explicit and governance mechanisms are weak, the lowest disclosure outcome is 
predicted. In quadrant 2, where the asset base is explicit and governance 
mechanisms are strong, disclosure is the same as in quadrant 1. 
Notwithstanding more effective governance mechanisms, the asset base does 
not dictate truthful disclosure, since the firm has no IC related to competitive 
advantage. In quadrant 4, where the asset base is tacit but the governance 
mechanisms are weak, disclosure will reach intermediate levels. In quadrant 3, 
where the asset base is tacit and the governance mechanisms are strong, 
disclosure will be at its highest, because although possessing similar asset bases 
as quadrant 4, firms governance mechanisms are likely to overcome 
managerial reticence about disclosure, induced for example by concerns about 
the competitive costs of the disclosures. Competitive advantage may be 
enhanced where the IC resource cannot be replicated due to barriers to imitation 
that may provide protection from proprietary costs. This competitive advantage 
is sustainable if the advantage resists erosion by competitor behaviour 
(Bharadwaj et al. 1993). Nevertheless, despite these potential benefits, 
companies do not always disclose IC; constraints to voluntary disclosure take 
different forms. Costs of competitive disadvantage, agency costs and costs of 
data collection and processing that may be higher for IC due to its intangible 
nature and inherent problems of identification, measurement and reporting. 
Moreover, as corporate governance mechanisms improve transparency, 
accountability may improve; as such, it may be that companies with substantial 
resources may be able to dedicate more resources to the controlling and 
monitoring function. 
2.2.0. Voluntary Disclosure Framework 
The setting of this research is placed within the context of a Voluntary 
Disclosure Framework (VDF). The identification and differentiation of 
voluntary IC attributes and mandatory IC attributes has not been established 
within the UK. International studies on VDIC have not conducted this review as 
IC has been generally unregulated and therefore all attributes have been 
considered voluntary by most studies. The emphasis of this section is to 
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conduct this appraisal; firstly to identify those IC attributes that are considered 
to be mandatory in terms of disclosure by a LSE UK listed company and 
secondly to provide a conceptual framework of the environment in which 
management make their decisions and formulate their disclosure policies. A 
review identified several regulations that may influence VDIC. Firstly, 
mandatory regulation of IC is almost non-existent; regulators and policy makers 
are aware of the complexity involved in identification, management and 
reporting thereof and are making strides in developing alternative means of 
reporting intangibles. This research identifies subsidiary names of a company as 
potentially conflicting with previous IC frameworks. Subsidiary company 
names were included under the external structure within Guthrie (2001) and 
Sveiby (1997) IC frameworks. Subsidiary company names should be disclosed 
in compliance with the Companies Act (1989), and are therefore excluded in 
the ICF as defined by this research. The existence of only one mandatory IC 
attribute provides evidence of the lack of regulation of IC within the UK 
context. Furthermore, it may be pure coincidence that disclosure of company 
names is mandatory as these disclosures are more likely aimed at providing the 
full identity of a company in compliance with the Companies Act (1989) rather 
than as a source of communicating the existence of IC. 
This research therefore proposes the operational definition of a 
voluntary disclosure IC attribute as any IC information, narrative or non- 
narrative, financial or non-financial, illustrations, diagrams and graphical 
presentation contained in the annual reports. These should not be required to be 
disclosed by the Companies Act (1989), the European Community (EC) 
Directives (Fourth and Seventh) (1978 and 1983), the Statement of Standard 
Accounting Practice 13 (ASB 1989), the Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 
(7,10 and 11) (ASB 1994,1997 and 1998) and the listing rules (Financial 
Services Authority 2000) issued by the LSE. This lack of IC regulation has 
been brought to the attention of regulators, who have taken steps to mitigate 
this limitation in financial reporting of IC by introducing various proposals. The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW 2003) 
published a document on "Information for Better Markets: New Reporting 
Models for Business" that considers the benefits of information communicated 
in words with respect to the valuation of intangibles in the modem economy. 
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Recently, the UK government through the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
proceeded with the proposed Operating and Financial Review (OFR) 
requirement for UK listed companies. Due to the narrative nature of IC 
attributes investors, analysts and academics favour increased accuracy in these 
reports and therefore welcome the requirement that directors are now expected 
to exercise the same level of care in relation to the OFR as is required in the 
financial statements. Although more persuasive rather than mandatory, 
Accounting and Standards Board (ASB) (2003) does recommend the reporting 
of IA not reflected in the balance sheet and on measures taken with respect to 
future performance. In addition, the OFR recommends additional voluntary 
intangible disclosures on corporate reputation, brands, IC, R&D, customer 
relationships, market position/dominance, HC policies and practice (Davison 
and Skerratt 2007). Although this legislation becomes effective on 1 April 
2006, it reveals that regulators are aware of the increasing reliance by the 
market on narratives in disclosing IC. Reliance on the financial statements 
alone has become less informative as a measure of company potential largely 
due to the lack of disclosure of quantitative IC information therein; as such, 
markets are unable to accurately value the IC embedded in the equity of the 
company. External or market valuation has therefore been accepted as a 
satisfactory method of self-regulation. Generally, regulators have provided an 
environment in which market forces determine the value of IC and its potential 
growth opportunities. 
This view however, is in contrast to the proactive stance taken by 
Strategic Management Accounting that emphasises the importance of 
companies to evaluate, appraise and measure their own IC (Tayles et al. 2002). 
This alternative view to IC management is supported by Mouritsen (1998), who 
suggests that IC valuation should be conducted internally as the company, 
relative to the market, has more insight into the internal capabilities (Tayles et 
al. 2002). Accountants on the other hand have proposed the market approach in 
which voluntary disclosures have been accepted as the best substitute; however, 
these disclosures have been fraught with drawbacks including 
misrepresentation and financial scandals. Particular risks may include 
inaccurate and inconsistent narratives leading to lack of confidence in the 
system. It appears that there has been little improvement in the legislation of IC 
29 
disclosure. Thus, the complexity of measuring, managing and reporting IC may 
be the underlying reason for the inability of regulators to identify and 
implement adequate IC disclosure requirements. Regulators have thus relied on 
the market to regulate companies. Most attempts at regulating IC have fallen- 
short, comprising mainly voluntary requirements set out in various publications. 
Only recently, as an alternative to regulating quantitative disclosure, have 
regulators begun examining the potential of qualitative disclosures in conveying 
the IC information not provided in the financial statements. Therefore, the 
credibility of narrative disclosures has become important. Parameters with 
respect to ethical and accurate reporting have been proposed to ensure that 
directors maintain consistency between the narratives and the financial 
statements. These parameters must comply with a uniform and acceptable 
framework of IC categories, if the accuracy, the content and the 
comprehensiveness of VDIC is to be enhanced. 
2.3.0. Intellectual Capital Framework (ICF) 
The absence of an international framework on IC presents an additional 
problem that further compounds the complexity in identifying, measuring and 
reporting IC. This section examines the importance of the development of an 
ICF, the importance of defining IC attributes and classifying them. No globally 
accepted IC definition exists because being intangible, IC remains difficult to 
both measure and report. The development of the IC attribute definition and 
classification within academia and practice has been at a slow pace. The term 
IC was first advanced by Galbraith in 1969 (Bontis 1998 and Feiwal 1975, cited 
by Hudson 1993). As early as this, IC was considered to be more than just 
"intellect as pure intellect" but rather to incorporate a degree of "intellectual 
action"; as such, IC is not only a static IA per se, but also an ideological 
process, a means to an end. This section examines the development of ICF; the 
selected ICF is developed from various IC classifications; consideration is 
given to attributes that constitute mandatory disclosure as identified in the 
VDF, these are eliminated from this research. There are currently several 
classifications for identifying IC. The first was proposed by Brooking (1996, 
p. 13) in which IC was described as the combined IA that enable the company to 
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function. The components of IC included market assets relating to customers 
and markets, human centred assets relating to skills embodied in employees of 
the organisation, IP relating to patents, copyrights and trademarks, and 
infrastructure assets relating to technologies, methodologies and processes that 
include management philosophy, corporate culture, information systems and 
financial relations. Further developments by Brooking and Motta (1996) 
classified IC into SC, RC and HC. Subsequent authors including Bontis (1996), 
Darling (1996), Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996), Saint-Onge (1996), Roos et al. 
(1997, p. 30), Stewart (1997), Bontis (1998), Bontis et al. (2000), Sveiby (1997, 
p. 12), Edvinsson and Malone (1997, p. 52) and Dzinkowski (1999 and 2000) 
developed IC frameworks in various directions to suite their particular research 
and country of study. Several significant studies have taken place using the 
contemporary classification scheme for IA derived from Sveiby (1997, p. 12) 
who classified IC into internal structures (organisational capital), external 
structures (customer/relational capital) and employee competences (human 
capital). A definition was proposed by Stewart (1997, p. x. ) who defined IC as 
intellectual material "knowledge, information, intellectual property, 
experience" that can be put to use to create wealth. Edvinsson and Malone 
(1997, p. 10) developed a definition encompassing only two of Stewart's (1997, 
p. x) categories, these include IC related to SC and HC. Edvinsson and Malone 
(1997, p. 10) identified the complex nature of IC by providing a metaphor in 
which the "roots" of the tree are compared to the IC of the company that 
determines the prospects for the future, further that the "roots" are invisible but 
form the basis for the value of the company. This intricacy has limited the 
identification of an appropriate measure, compounded by the lack of adequate 
regulations, reporting of IC has been inconsistent internationally. 
Feiwal (1975, cited by Hudson 1993) and Stewart (1997) focus on IC as 
a process that creates wealth, rather than as a static resource. Both require 
action and application for the IC process to achieve its objectives. Stewart 
(1997) identifies four sources of IC including information relating to the 
knowledge resources of a company, IP, IC information that can be defined as 
knowledge and experience that can be used to create wealth. Stewart (1997, 
p. 79,105 and 142) definition of IC forms the basis of the definition of IC for 
this research. The majority of studies in the literature have applied the Sveiby 
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(1997) framework that is based on the Stewart (1997) framework. The areas 
identified by Stewart (1997) are further summarised into three IC categories 
comprising SC, encompassing IP, RC and HC in a subsequent study by Stewart 
(200 1, p. 13). This IC framework has been applied by Guthrie and Petty (2000), 
Guthrie (2001), Ch'ang and Yastreboff (2003), International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) (1998, p. 7), the Australian Society of CPAs and the 
Society of Management Accountants of Canada (1999, p. 14), Abeysekera 
(2001), Guthrie (2001) and Sveiby (1997). The emergence of these and other 
definitions has slowly enabled companies to begin identifying their IC 
attributes (Stewart 2001, p. 314). Identification, has led to maintenance of IC 
particularly when such IC illustrates a sustained competitive advantage. 
Measurement of IC has remained elusive for both practitioners and academia 
due mainly to the intangible nature of IC resulting in little management or 
reporting thereof. Based on the various aforementioned country frameworks 
this research develops a UK ICF (Table 2.2. ), that is consistent in classification 
(SC, RC and HC) with the original format (Brooking 1996) and the framework 
developed by Sveiby (1997). 
Table 2.2 IC Framework 
Internal External Human Capital HC (7) 
Structural Capital SC Relational Capital RC (8) 
(8) 
1. Patents 9. Brands 17. Know-how 
2. Copyrights l O. Customers 18. Training 
3. Trademarks 11. Customer loyalty 19. Level of education 
4. Management 12. Distribution channels 20. Vocational 
philosophy qualifications 
5. Corporate culture 13. Business 21. Training and 
collaborations development 
6. Management 14. Licensing agreements 22. Entrepreneurial spirit 
processes 
7. Information systems 15. Favourable contracts 23. Innovativeness 
8. Financial relations 16. Franchising 
agreements 
Source: Guthrie and Petty (2000) 
This framework was based on the Intangible Asset Monitor that is one 
of several models reported by Man and Adams (2004, p. 20). The number of IC 
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attributes in each of these models varies, however the ICF is practical for this 
research and the categories of the ICF form part of three sub-groups of IA 
consistent with the convergence of frameworks into these three main categories 
SC, RC and HC (Stewart 1997, Sveiby 1997 and Lev 2001). IA and IC are 
viewed by Lev (2001) as interchangeable. He describes IA as non-physical 
resources of value derived from discounted future benefits generated by 
innovation, discovery, unique organisational designs and/or human resource 
practices. Lev (2001) uses the terms IA, knowledge assets and IC 
interchangeably, arguing that they differ only in their discipline of origin - IA 
for accountants, knowledge assets for economists and IC for managers and 
lawyers. Further confirmation of this basic structure of the framework is found 
in Edvinsson and Malone (1997) who see intangibles as the "hidden 
capabilities" of an organisation and consider them as deriving from two key 
sources - HC, structural or organisational capital and customer or relational 
capital (RC). A variety of IC frameworks are summarised in the research by 
Hayton (2005) in which four dimensions of IC are reported comprising market, 
human centered, intellectual property (IP) and infrastructure assets. 
Two approaches to studying IC have emerged in the literature. These 
approaches have had an impact on the types of IC frameworks and definitions 
applied. The first approach is qualitative using mainly comparisons between 
countries and industries. The second approach, although comprising only a few 
studies, is empirical research, and examines the extent of IC disclosed and the 
significance of various independent variables. Qualitative studies have had less 
precise IC definitions as opposed to the empirical research that has tended to be 
more specific regarding the IC framework and the definition of the IC 
attributes. Nevertheless, a common theme to both approaches is the consistency 
in the overall classification of IC into SC, RC and HC. These classifications, 
although not identical, carry the same IC content. However, IC (such as patents, 
copyrights and trademarks) may be regulated by other rules that may require 
disclosure in different media, including the press, industry journals, labour 
union circulars and other company publications etc. These regulators may 
include financial services, copyright law, patent law or other and may lead to 
legal reporting obligations. 
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Abdolmohammadi (2005), Guthrie et al. (1999,2004 and 2005), Bontis 
(2002), Edvinsson and Malone (1997), Edvinsson (2002), Stewart (1997) and 
(2001), Roos et al. (1998), O'Donnell and O'Regan (2000), Tseng and Goo 
(2005) and Andriessen (2004) developed IC frameworks similarly based on the 
groundbreaking work of Sveiby (1997). These further developments continue to 
convey IC standards as Human (HC), Organisational (SC) and Relational 
Resources (RC). The latest revised version of this framework presents IC as 
three categories comprising of internal (SC) (6), external (RC) (6) and human 
(HC) (5). Guthrie and Petty (2000) who proposed this classification suggest that 
IC should consist of RC pertaining to the competency level of customer and 
supplier relations, SC relating to the enterprise process competency and R&D 
activities, and HC comprising of human and organisational competence. Based 
on this discussion, SC is defined as the experience, the knowledge and the 
expertise that is embedded in the policies, processes and procedures of the 
company; these include IP, trade secrets, formulas and manuals. RC is defined 
as the knowledge and expertise that is embedded in the relationships between a 
company and its stakeholders in particular customers, suppliers, providers of 
finance and regulators. Additional considerations require relationships to be 
maintained on public issues such as reputation and social responsibility. HC is 
defined as the knowledge, experience and expertise of employees; it comprises 
several physiological factors that shape individuals' learning experiences and 
perceptions. These factors include genetic inheritance, education, experience 
and attitudes about life and business. 
Within the ICF of this research, ICCA is defined as the SC, RC and HC 
incorporated in a company's policies and procedures that provide a competitive 
advantage over competitors who due to barriers to imitation may not apply or 
replicate such competitive advantage. Nevertheless, despite the many 
definitions, it appears that IC needs to be defined in context due to its complex 
nature. The lack of regulation has not led to a concise, concrete and positive 
definition of IC, rather it has resulted in the employment of lists as illustrated 
by Roos et al. (1998), Edvinsson and Malone (1997) and Sveiby (1997) and 
classifications to describe IC. As a result, this research refers to and concurs 
with the findings of Chatzkel (2002) who suggests that all definitions are valid 
and that it is up to the user to select the definition that works best to meet a 
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particular set of circumstances. This view is adopted by Marr and Chatzkel 
(2004, cited by Huang et al. 2007), who suggest that no more IC definitions are 
required rather, that the clarity of communication is critical. Huang et al. (2007) 
develop an a priori taxonomy in IC that provides a reference point for internal 
or external IC communication by developing a classification of IC derived from 
published research. This classification (Huang et al. 2007, p. 4) is consistent in 
categories with the ICF of this research. 
2.3.1. Structural Capital (SC) 
This section discusses the various components of SC and the benefits of 
possession and signalling of such attributes in the organisation. Various prior 
studies have examined the extent of SC disclosure in the annual reports; this 
research reviews these results comparatively with respect to country studies and 
IC categories. SC refers to company procedures, frameworks and structures. SC 
includes in its first category patents, copyrights, proprietary process, 
methodologies, trademarks, trade secrets and other IP that may be purchased 
outright or developed internally through R&D activity. Some companies may 
disclose capitalised R&D in the form of IA on the balance sheet in compliance 
with mandatory regulations. These IA do not form part of the ICF for this 
research. 
The management and reporting of IP is determined by the management 
philosophy that forms the second category under SC. The philosophy adopted 
by management may assist in directing the company, choosing projects and 
maintaining the strategic choices and may be influential in determining 
resources to be applied in IC investment. In conjunction with management 
philosophy, the next categories of SC, corporate culture, leadership and 
communication are components that facilitate a creative, directed and 
productive workplace. This suggestion was proposed by Abdolmohammadi 
(2005) in a longitudinal content analysis of 284 US companies in which the 
study supports the significance of a relationship between SC including IP and 
disclosure. SC attributes are considered the link that supports the inclusion of 
corporate governance mechanisms as independent variables and or as measures 
of management philosophy and corporate culture. Leadership is a unique HC 
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attribute that may be found in management structures. A dominant leader may 
have a profound effect on an organisation particularly as market perceptions of 
his influence may affect a company's market value (MV). 
The fourth category, management processes includes expansion of 
company capacity, improvements in the business model, functional distribution 
and/or communication networks, effective quality management procedures and 
overall increases in efficiency. Efficiency measurements such as labour, capital, 
structural, speed of process, process quality and product/service quality can be 
applied in evaluating management processes. The fifth category, information 
systems, technological systems, web transactions, computer software and 
operating systems relate to the management of IC information. Networking 
systems, electronic data interchange and telecommunication infrastructure are 
also included under SC. The sixth and final categories are financial relations 
and include favourable financial relations and terms with all stakeholders. 
Further, best practice processes, supportive cultures and efficiency are terms 
associated with this group of attributes (Bontis 1998). A wide range of studies 
(Table 2.4) investigated IP disclosure in different settings with varying results. 
Guthrie et al. (1999), in Australia, who found some disclosure of IP; Bozzolan 
et al. (2003) in Italy found 30 per cent disclosure was related to SC; Goh and 
Lim (2004) in Malaysia found 36.6 per cent internal capital and in a 
comprehensive study, Vergauwen and Allem (2005) investigating the 
Netherlands, France and Germany found significant incidence of IP disclosure. 
In South Africa however, April et al. (2003) found the least management 
emphasis on the reporting of copyrights, patents and rights probably being due 
to the expectation that mining companies have few if any IP. Comprising 
mainly of internal capital, possession of SC is expected to lead to more 
efficiency, supportive cultures and established policies and procedures. 
However, different levels of SC disclosure are expected in different industries 
(April et al., 2003) and different countries (Vergauwen and Allem, 2005). 
2.3.2. Relational (Customer) Capital 
Following the approach in 2.3.1 above this section examines the individual 
components of RC and then reviews prior studies on the disclosure of RC 
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attributes. RC consists of the knowledge of customer relations and marketing 
channels. Brands are instrumental in generating customer loyalty and in 
increasing and maintaining market share. Brands are thus included under RC 
due to their relation building characteristics with customers and their ability to 
influence customer-buying patterns. The second category consists of the 
customers themselves, new customers, customer lists, customer items, customer 
satisfaction, sales by segment or region, market shares, order book, long-term 
sales contracts and information regarding customer relations would all 
constitute voluntary disclosures of RC. These attributes are mainly associated 
with company sales and may be measurable as changes from year to year or in 
comparison with industry averages and competitors. Customer loyalty is the 
next category formed by customer retention, customer service, customer 
support and market share which are all concerned with management efforts in 
retaining and expanding the customer base. Distribution channels classified as 
the fourth category provide access to markets for goods and services. The next 
category, business collaborations incorporate all partnerships and joint 
ventures. Partnerships and joint ventures provide management with 
opportunities to work together with other entities in producing products or 
services that neither could produce individually. Licensing agreements, 
favourable contracts and franchising agreements form the sixth, seventh and 
eighth categories respectively. These generally provide specific rights to the 
company for the supply of services, goods, capital and labour including 
favourable contracts for the development of combined strategies. 
A few studies identified RC as a significant disclosure attribute in some 
countries (Table 2.4). Brennan (2001) in Ireland, identified customers and 
business collaborations as the main IC attributes reported. Although only 11 
companies from knowledge based industries were examined, the study 
did 
examine all categories of IC as such the result of RC being the most reported 
IC, may be more relevant than previous studies that examined only one 
category. In South Africa, April et al. (2003) found a similar reporting practice, 
with business collaborations and customers featuring amongst the most reported 
RC attributes. In a comprehensive Italian study, Bozzolan et al. (2003) 
identified RC as the most reported IC attributes. The limitation for this study 
was the small population of only 30 large listed companies as was the study 
in 
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Malaysia, in which Goh and Lim (2004) found further evidence, indicating that 
companies here report more RC than SC or HC attributes. The sample here was 
restricted to only 20 companies; nevertheless, there appears to be significant 
evidence that RC remains the single most reported IC category. Generally, RC 
is associated with increasing and maintaining market share. It may be expected 
for this reason that the reporting of RC is important for companies pursuing 
growth and expansion strategies. 
2.3.3. Human Capital (HC) 
The final IC category examines the level of disclosure of HC components, 
competence, skill and experience of employees. A high level of education in the 
work force, diversity of employees and relevant work experience enhance a 
company's prospects whilst ensuring higher labour productivity. HC attributes 
may take the form of diplomas or certificates obtained from recognised 
institutions, certification of work force characteristics such as productivity and 
or product or service quality by third party analysts and third party accreditation 
through various educational qualifications including the average number of 
degrees awarded to employees. Management may make annual report 
disclosures that illustrate procedures such as in-house training or external 
training courses being conducted to increase the level of expertise within its 
workforce. Other indicators may be the attainment of certain standards in terms 
of departmental or individual achievement, value added per employee and 
employee compensation. 
The literature on HC has dominated single category studies, various HC 
attributes have been examined with mixed results being reported (Table 2.4). 
Differences have been attributed to terms of definitions and stage of country 
development. In an HC investigation, Subbarao and Zeghal (1997) analysed 
120 annual reports of a sample of listed companies from the USA, Canada, 
Germany, UK, Japan and South Korea to compare HC disclosure. Using 
content analysis, frequency, and word count analysis they examined five broad 
categories of training, value added by employees, workforce diversity and 
social responsibility, employee relations and employee compensation. The 
results indicated that benefits and pensions were the most frequently disclosed 
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due mainly to the overlap with mandatory requirements whilst value added per 
employee was the least reported. Employees who had special contributions to 
the company were also featured. The comparative analysis disclosed differences 
in the information disclosed from country to country with US companies 
disclosing more profit sharing information than European companies, the 
number of people employed and employee compensation while very few 
disclosed such information in Asia. The results of this study are based on one 
category of IC, HC; furthermore, the sample size per country is limited to 20 
companies. In addition, no account was taken for the effect of industry 
membership, or the effect of cross-cultural differences or differences in 
corporate governance or legal systems. 
Further studies illustrate that not only are there differences between 
countries but that differences can also be found within industries. Following 
Subbarao and Zeghal (1997), Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) selected 30 of the 
largest companies for content analysis of HC reporting practices in Sri Lanka. 
The method used in this study was similar to that of Guthrie et al. (1999). A 
frequency and line count was made, and the descriptive statistics tabled. The 
study was confined to HC indicators only. The study was limited to only 20 
companies and only the largest suggesting that results may not be representative 
of all Sri Lanka listed companies. An examination was conducted on the 
disclosure patterns of HC reporting observed in the Sri Lankan sample, and a 
second comparison was made of the differences in disclosure patterns between 
Sri Lanka and Australia. It was found that companies with the largest market 
capitalisation tend to lead the way insofar as the voluntary reporting of IC is 
concerned. This conclusion may be biased; no small companies were included 
in the samples; differences in HC practices between Sri Lanka and Australia 
may be attributed to differences in corporate governance structures, 
management practices, industry norms and cultural traditions. Entrepreneurial 
spirit was the most frequently reported attribute of HC in Australia (Guthrie et 
al. 1999 and Guthrie and Petty 2000), as opposed to the featuring of employees 
in Sri Lanka. In contrast, entrepreneurial spirit was one of the least reported 
items in Sri Lanka. Work related knowledge was the second most important HC 
attribute in Australia, whereas in Sri Lanka value added by employees ranked 
second. Differences in the knowledge of the definitions and the terminology of 
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IC, the stage of economic development, existence of structures to identify, 
measure and report IC may contribute to these differences in results. A similar 
study was conducted on HC by Olsson (2001) who examined the annual reports 
of the 18 largest Swedish companies that were selected based on market 
capitalisation from the Swedish stock market. She developed a list of five 
elements to ascertain the level of HC: education and development, equality, 
recruitment, selection of employees and comments by executive officers about 
personnel. The study found that, in 1998, none of the 18 companies reported 
more than seven per cent of HC information as a proportion of total information 
in their annual reports. Furthermore, the information that was reported was 
found to be highly deficient in either the quality or the extent of the disclosure. 
In this study, results are again restricted to a small sample of only large 
companies and the analysis of only one category of HC. It may be important to 
analyse all the categories of IC simultaneously due to the inter-relatedness of 
SC, RC and HC. Different results have emerged in the literature as to which HC 
characteristics management favour to disclose. Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) 
in Sri Lanka found value added by employees as a more frequently reported 
attribute in contrast to Subbarao and Zeghal (1997) who found it least reported. 
This study differed from those of Brennan (2001) and Olsson (2001) in terms of 
the representativeness of the sample size and the analytical rigour employed in 
reviewing the results. Olsson (2001) restricted the scope of the review to only 
certain parts of the annual report excluding key areas included by Abeysekera 
and Guthrie (2005). These studies have concentrated on one IC category, single 
sector/industry and results indicate generally a low IC reporting culture. 
Management may disclose IC by signalling their superior HC attributes such 
disclosures may be determined by the type of industry and may be channelled 
through selected sections of the annual report. Superior HC attributes may 
include management's ability to negotiate through political, social, industrial or 
economic pressures. The ability to foresee and adapt to the changing 
environment may be measured through successful innovations, innovation in 
production, service or process that results in new software, patents, ventures or 
developments. 
The results on disclosure of IC have been mixed with some authors 
reporting a higher level of disclosure of SC, other authors reporting on HC and 
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still others on RC. The results have been generally country and industry 
specific. The number of HC specific studies is large in comparison to other 
categories indicating the importance of the human element in organisational 
dynamics. However, various definitions may render results incomparable 
particularly at the national level as developing and developed economies place 
different emphasis on different IC attributes within the specified IC categories. 
Section 2.2.0 established a VDF and section 2.3.0 presented the ICF in which 
each of the classifications of HC, SC and RC are established for the UK 
context. The next section combines the RBV approach and signalling theory in 
addition to agency theory and proprietary cost hypothesis in developing a 
theoretical framework for this research. 
2.4.0. Theoretical Framework 
Various studies in the IC field have been reviewed to determine the suitability 
of the adapted ICF and to examine the methodology, the theoretical 
perspectives and the results of the studies. The next section 2.5.0 develops the 
hypotheses and models that are subjected to the empirical tests. This section 
summarises the theories applied in this research based on predicted 
management behaviour. The theoretical foundations for this behaviour are 
based on agency theory, signalling theory, RBV and proprietary costs 
hypothesis. 
The literature has identified five motivational factors as driving 
management's disclosure decisions and five factors that may constrain 
disclosure (Graham et al. 2005). The first is explained by Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991), who suggest that voluntary disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry between uninformed and informed investors and thus increases the 
liquidity of the equity in the market, both by reducing information risk and the 
inherent risk of the security. The second factor relates to the availability of 
information to analysts; Lang and Lundholm (1996) argue that not all 
management information is revealed and therefore analysts may invest in 
information collection costs, however as voluntary disclosure lowers the cost of 
information acquisition management may be motivated to increase the amount 
of information available to analysts. 
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The third motivational factor examines management performance. 
Healey and Palepu (2001) suggest that the risk of replacement due to poor share 
price performance encourages management to apply disclosure to reduce the 
likelihood of undervaluation and the need to explain poor performance. 
Moreover, Trueman (1986) argues that when management performance is 
above average, management may have an incentive to signal this performance. 
The fifth motivational factor emanates from the limitations imposed by 
mandatory disclosures that ignore non-financial indicators of future earnings 
(Graham et al. 2005). Management may therefore be motivated to disclose that 
which has been omitted by mandatory disclosure. 
On the other hand, management may be restricted in their voluntary 
disclosure policy; as such, the first constraint identified by this research relates 
to management's reservations on setting a precedent that may not be 
sustainable. Verrecchia (2001) refers to this constraint as the commitment cost 
of increasing voluntary disclosure. The second constraint relates to the threat of 
litigation that may induce management not to disclose IC (Skinner 1997) and 
that can potentially reduce management's incentives to provide forward- 
looking information which if materially misstated may result in litigation costs. 
This limitation arises from the inherent uncertainty of IC and the resultant share 
price discounting that may take place if disclosures are not credible. The third 
constraint explains why management do not provide full disclosure as it is 
understood that some disclosures may jeopardise the company's competitive 
position in the product market (Verrecchia 2001). This limitation is therefore 
associated with proprietary costs. 
The fourth constraint is associated with agency costs and asymmetric 
information that may result in reduced disclosure as management attempt to 
perpetuate and entrench their positions (Berle and Means 1934). Finally, the 
fifth constraint is motivated by management's need to reduce political costs. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 1986) suggest that political costs reduce 
voluntary disclosure as management shy away from undue attention from 
regulators. Given the aforementioned motivations and limitations of voluntary 
disclosure identified in the literature, this research examines the theoretical 
basis applied in these potential explanations. In terms of the theoretical 
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approach, this research refers to Abeysekera (2006) who outlines the 
development of a theoretical framework underlying IC disclosure. 
Theories that have been considered include legitimacy and stakeholder 
(Guthrie et al. 2004, Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005), signalling (Bozzolan et al. 
2003 and Garcia and Martinez 2005), resource based (Barney 2001), agency 
(Bozzolan et al. 2003 and Garcia and Martinez 2005) and information 
asymmetry (Amir and Lev 1996). Although the IC literature illustrates the 
application of various theoretical approaches, the general disclosure literature 
has indicated an overall close association with agency and signalling theories. 
The number of different theoretical approaches in prior studies may 
indicate that a consensus has not been achieved. It is expected nevertheless that 
various conflicting forces influence management who are contractually bound 
as agents of the company but who may not necessarily behave as such at all 
times. This section examines the theoretical underpinnings of the three potential 
disclosure outcomes maximum, partial and minimal disclosure and appraises 
the role played by voluntary disclosure at the corporate level. This research 
proposes that companies' pursuit of a maximum disclosure policy may be 
explained by signalling theory. A minimal or no disclosure policy may be 
explained by proprietary cost theory. Where mitigating factors exist however, a 
partial disclosure outcome may result from barriers to imitation limiting the 
perceived potential disclosure costs. 
This research adopts a positivist approach by developing several 
hypotheses based on selected theories to explain observed management 
behaviour. This approach consists of the undistorted recording of observations 
obtained through efficiency-driven methods of investigation and the use of 
precise terminologies and classifications in the documentary process (Chia 
2002, p. 7). Observational rigour is applied using systems of cross-referencing 
that provide the necessary form of "quality assurance" in this process of 
knowledge production. Thus, positivism represents one of the more recent 
attempts at synthesizing rationalism and empiricism. It provides the most 
widely held epistemological position within the natural and social sciences, as it 
combines logic, rationality with empirical observation (Chia 2002, p. 7). 
This research extends positive accounting theory by observing and 
examining the influence of investment in IC, financial measures of risk, 
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industry membership and corporate governance variables in more detail. The 
model for this research is based on the premises of positive accounting theory 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978 and 1986). Positive accounting theory is the 
branch of accounting theory that attempts to explain management behaviour 
and accounting policy choice decisions by considering the economic 
consequences of particular decisions, with regard to incentive and reward 
schemes put in place to motivate and reward them (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). The theory utilises economics, in particular agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) to explain and predict observed behaviour. Explanations of 
accounting behaviour are important, as any changes of accounting practice 
depend on existing political and economic forces (Gould 1977). 
The research model in Table 2.3 summarises the theoretical approach 
applied by this research. The first theoretical approach proposed by this 
research is agency theory that may explain management behaviour when 
objectives are not aligned with those of shareholders. Management may limit 
disclosure in a bid to protect and sustain their positions. Agency costs are 
expected to be high; disclosure is limited. 
Table 2.3 The Research Model 
Disclosure 
Outcomes 
Voluntau' 1)ic1osure framework 
(VDF) 
Theoretical 
framework (TF) 
1 alininzurn cüiscIL sure (high disclosure cost) Agency Theory 
2 Pay riid disclorurc (high disclosure cost mitigated 
by barriers to imitation) 
Proprietary Cost 
Hypothesis 
3 tluaimuwn disclosure (low disclosure costs) Signalling Theory 
4 Maximum disclosure (low disclosure costs) Resource Based View 
Source: The Research Model 
The second approach predicts management behaviour in the presence of 
proprietary costs that generally lead to minimal or no disclosure however, the 
existence of mitigating circumstances such as barriers to imitation that may 
deter the transfer of information to competitors, may lead to management's 
partial disclosure of IC attributes. These barriers to imitation may render 
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otherwise costly disclosures, less costly resulting in partial disclosure 
depending on management's ability to accurately quantify related benefits and 
costs. Nevertheless, the lack of mitigating factors renders disclosure costly and 
may lead to little or no disclosure. Such behaviour may be explained by the 
competitive costs hypothesis and the proprietary cost hypothesis. 
The third theoretical approach is signalling theory in which management 
disclose superior performance because of the existence of inimitable assets that 
generate competitive advantage. This signalling may be attributed to the 
investment in IC and is consistent with the RBV approach that forms the fourth 
theoretical approach. Management decide on whether IC attributes disclosed 
may be associated with disclosure costs that take the form of proprietary costs. 
Disclosure studies have regarded agency and signalling theoretical approaches 
as complementary. In exploring whether these two theories are consistent, 
Morris (1987, p. 52) found that the sufficient conditions for signalling theory are 
consistent with those of agency theory. However a necessary condition for 
signalling, information asymmetry, is not shared by agency theory, although 
implied, as such, the predictions of accounting choices can at least be improved 
by adding together the predictions from each theory. The fourth approach 
combines the RBV with signalling of competitive advantage due to the 
existence of potentially valuable assets that are difficult to replicate. Such 
inimitable assets may be disclosed in a bid to signal unique processes, products 
or services. 
Mandatory disclosures are generally ritualistic disclosures as 
management have no influence in the disclosure decision, but merely comply 
with accounting regulations. Voluntary disclosures on the other hand, are 
motivated by the theoretical foundations derived from economic theory, the 
major assumption of which is that management weigh the costs and benefits of 
their actions. Only once management decide that benefits outweigh costs, is the 
decision to disclose made. Generally, costs may include information collection 
and processing, litigation, political and competitive disadvantage costs 
(Benston 1986). Benefits include a reduction in the cost of capital and in 
information asymmetry because of reduced transaction costs, greater equity 
liquidity due to reduced asymmetrical information, less uncertainty due to more 
information availability, a mitigation of the adverse selection problems, 
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improved stock performance and a higher stock price correlation with future 
earnings (Benston 1986). Management therefore needs to have in place proper 
corporate governance procedures and processes capable of accurately compiling 
the data and assessing whether the incentives to disclose more information to 
investors, stakeholders, employees, customers and regulators outweighs the 
drawbacks. 
2.4.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory illustrates that the separation of ownership and control in 
companies results in conflicts of interest between a company's management and 
its shareholders. Several potential areas of conflict between management and 
shareholders have been identified including insufficient effort, extravagant 
investments, entrenchment strategies and self-dealing (Economist 2006). When 
such conflicts emerge, agency theory suggests that management tends to pursue 
their own interests over those of shareholders, resulting in conflicts of interest. 
Costs are incurred in monitoring these agents. Nevertheless, given that these 
costs reduce their compensation, management has an incentive to keep them 
low. Jensen and Meckling (1976) categorise this cost into monitoring, expenses 
incurred by the principal to limit aberrant activities of the agent; bonding costs, 
expense incurred to ensure that the agent does not undertake actions that are not 
in the principals' interests and residual loss, due to sub-optimisation by the 
agent of the welfare-maximisation objective (Barako et al. 2006, p. 110). Since 
VDIC may be one way in which management activity can be monitored, 
management are encouraged to disclose IC information voluntarily. Voluntary 
disclosure incentives theoretically arise from information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders. Information asymmetry leads to adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems for investors and signalling incentives for 
management to attempt to mitigate the information problems with investors 
(Healy and Palepu 1993). Where shareholders cannot observe the behaviour of 
management, the problem of moral hazard arises. Adverse selection arises 
because of hidden information particularly information concerning the 
characteristics of management i. e. as most shareholders are unaware of 
management motivations and/or interests. These differences are normally 
46 
reflected in share prices, but a problem arises if the investor cannot determine 
whether management behaviour may increase the quality of earnings, the 
growth rate and profitability. Moreover, lower returns may result in a 
replacement of management by shareholders. 
Agency theory maintains that the equity market is not perfect, as such; 
management can enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders without 
being displaced (Berle and Means 1934). Management would be expected to 
disclose positive information and conceal negative information about the 
company in attempting to avoid dismissal or a reduction in incentive contracts. 
Highlighting positive information and concealing negative information may 
also help maintain shareholder confidence in the company's management; 
otherwise, shareholders may sell the company's stock, causing the stock price to 
fall. Falling stock prices then make the company a potential takeover target, in 
which case, the company's management may be replaced. Moreover, concealing 
negative information gives management time to turn-around failing projects. In 
short, the constant pressure to increase shareholder value and the fear of being 
replaced motivates management to develop communication strategies aimed at 
shaping shareholder impressions about their managerial performance (Cheney 
and Carroll 1997). The adverse selection problem for shareholders is that they 
may not know the most relevant information or the better quality of data, as a 
representation of the company's activities. Thus, when management interests 
and shareholder interests diverge, management can exploit their informational 
advantages to pursue their own self-interests. Agency theory fits well within 
this research model. Agency theory has been associated with explaining 
management behaviour in the majority of disclosure studies. 
2.4.2. Proprietary Costs Hypothesis 
This section discusses the components of proprietary costs and non-proprietary 
costs and the resultant limitations placed in signalling IC attributes. Proprietary 
costs arise when information is revealed that potentially damages the company 
if it results in increased competition and or government regulation (Gray et al. 
1995). Competitive disadvantage results from competitive costs that are 
addressed in a recent study by Guo et al. (2004) who analyse the effects of 
47 
increased voluntary disclosure by biotechnology firms. This industry is highly 
competitive and information on R&D, clinical trials, product pipelines, etc. is 
considered sensitive. Increased disclosure would result in competitive costs. 
These costs result from a disadvantage in the product market. The harmful 
effect of these competitive costs has also a major impact on the equity market 
as it reduces VDIC i. e. disclosing sensitive data to existing and potential 
investors and creditors. These factors, proprietary costs and competitive costs, 
may restrict full disclosure of IC as disclosure may lead to a potential 
unfavourable change in future earnings (Dye 1985). 
The research model in Table 2.3 further illustrates that within the VDF 
IC attributes may or may not incur proprietary costs. The identification and 
measurement of these proprietary costs is complex, being forecasts of costs and 
intangible in nature, it is necessary for management to have appropriate 
corporate governance mechanisms in place to assist in the coalition of accurate 
information for these estimates. These governance characteristics may promote 
transparency and accountability in management reporting practices. Higher 
returns may accrue to disclosing companies and lower returns to non-disclosing 
companies. These returns provide greater incentives to disclose IC rather than 
to limit VDIC due to proprietary costs. This continued trade off results in full 
disclosure equilibrium as reported by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) 
who argue that it is in management's interest to disclose all IC in order to signal 
better performance. In contrast, Foster (1986, Chaps. 1 and 2), suggests that 
accounting and reporting are influenced by a diverse and complex set of supply 
and demand forces. As indicated in section 1.1.0., employees, investors, 
customers and regulations require IC information disclosures, however 
information collection and processing costs, litigation costs, and proprietary 
(i. e., competitive disadvantage) and political costs (Gray et al. 1995) may result 
in only partial disclosure. Proprietary cost theory states that the incentive to 
disclose information is a decreasing function of the potential proprietary costs 
attached to a disclosure and an increasing function of the favourableness of the 
news in a disclosure (Verrecchia 1983). As such, the better the prospects of the 
company in the IC disclosure and the greater the barriers to imitation the more 
likely management are to disclose IC attributes. 
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Lack of IC disclosure may lead to markets assuming the worst-case 
scenario in which full discounting may theoretically take place. Thus, the larger 
the proprietary cost, the greater the decrease in market share price and the 
greater the incentive not to disclose (Grossman 1981 and Milgrom 1981). 
Nevertheless, where investors are uncertain about what managers know partial 
disclosure policies are possible (Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1986 and Jung and 
Kwon 1988). Richardson (2001) looked further at the cost of disclosure and 
concluded that it is a function of information uncertainty. In this model, 
Richardson (2001) suggests that as information uncertainty decreases managers 
disclose more, because investors discount non-disclosure as a negative signal. 
However, beyond a certain point, disclosure costs due to competitive losses 
outweigh the discounting by investors. Thus companies may disclose some of 
their inside information when they expect to be penalised by investors relying 
on existing, more incomplete information. Proprietary costs may be inversely 
associated with high levels of IC disclosure; however, the existence of barriers 
to imitation for competitors provides an advantage to companies. Companies 
that estimate that they do not have sufficient protection from loss of 
competitive advantage through IC disclosure are not expected to disclose IC. 
2.4.3. Signalling Theory 
Within the research model, (Table 2.3) signalling theory explains the third 
theoretical approach that examines management's disclosure of IC and ICCA 
attributes. This approach examines signalling as a mechanism for explaining the 
disclosure of good news (Spence 1973) as represented by the disclosure of IC 
attributes. Although signalling initially developed 
in the labour markets, the 
process of signalling may be used in voluntary 
disclosure to reduce information 
asymmetry between management and investors. 
Information asymmetry may 
produce the problem of adverse selection (Akerlof 
1970) however, management 
apply disclosure to indicate the underlying reality and to 
influence stakeholders. 
Potentially only performing companies may be expected to apply this 
mechanism, as the market is likely to punish any wrong signals 
(Morris 1987). 
Thus, companies with serious agency and political problems are 
likely to spend 
more resources on contracting and monitoring. 
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Signalling mechanisms improve the allocation of resources ensuring 
that companies that are more efficient receive more capital (Inchausti 1997). 
The RBV examines the nature of the company's resources; those firms with 
inimitable intangible resources may signal their existence to reveal the 
company's competitive advantage within the market. This IC relates to growth 
opportunities, risk and cash flows. Management of such companies signal their 
superior capabilities in order to differentiate themselves from companies 
without such a competitive advantage. The content of these disclosures are 
necessarily credible, as the markets penalise any inaccurate disclosures. The 
restriction of mandatory regulation in the UK to only the movements of 
capitalised development expenditure, IA and goodwill provides considerable 
discretion for companies to reveal or not to reveal their competitive advantage. 
IC intensive companies may prefer such a regulatory environment that enables 
additional disclosures to explain the difference between the book value of the 
company and the market price. Signalling provides the markets with the IC 
information. This information enables the correct valuation of equity. 
Signalling as a theoretical approach fits well with the research model in Table 
2.2. 
2.4.4. Resource Based View of the Firm (RBV) 
The fourth approach, the RBV, bases its argument on the existence of 
potentially valuable assets that are difficult to replicate (Table 2.2). The 
applicability of this approach is based on the unique resources that IC provides 
a company. The RBV highlights the competitive advantage of companies as 
based in their unique constellation of resources, tangible capital, HC and 
organisational processes (Barney 1991). The resources that have been found to 
be especially valuable are those that are rare, durable, inimitable, and non- 
tradable (Barney 1991 and Dierickx and Cool 1989). These resources include 
SC, RC and HC. SC is generated mainly by unique R&D investment, RC by 
unique relations with customers and stakeholders and HC by a skilled, 
experienced and innovative workforce. 
The market is expected to respond, more so, to new research than to the 
development of existing products, processes and services. Performance 
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measurement of R&D and unique product and service development activities is 
gaining increased importance because the effectiveness and efficiency of these 
activities not only determine a company's competitive advantage, but its very 
survival. In an environment where it is difficult to replicate IC, management 
may voluntarily disclose IC to illustrate their competitive edge and restrict 
voluntary disclosure in areas where no competitive advantage exists. The 
reasons for management behaving in this way is made possible on the one hand, 
in a market where barriers to imitation are high; duplication is restricted; 
successful projects may signal growth and VDIC may positively influence 
shareholder wealth maximisation. Where barriers to imitation are lower, the 
duplication of new technologies may be commonplace. However, where 
barriers to imitation may be higher IC resources may be protected. The RBV 
provides a framework for examining the effectiveness of these barriers to 
imitation by determining the level of IC disclosure in particular for firms with 
higher levels of IA resources. 
2.4.5. Summary of IC Studies 
The majority of IC research authors (Table 2.4. ) have concluded that national 
setting bodies and regulators should develop an accounting framework to 
account for those IC attributes that are not regulated. The lack of regulation 
leads to an uncertainty regarding all issues surrounding IC, increase in high 
risk/reward opportunities and misallocation of resources by investors based on 
inaccurate forecasts by analysts. To understand the motivation behind certain 
choices and decisions, the lack of definition, description and 
details of 
characteristics associated with each IC attribute is the 
first major deficiency in 
the regulatory environment. The ASB and Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) 
have been consulted; however, the lack of research in the area of study 
has 
produced no acceptable alternative. Initial measurement approaches 
have failed 
to achieve unanimity and harmonious acceptance internationally. 
The narratives 
and statements in annual reports have attracted 
investors' interests; being 
qualitative, they offer an alternative to the more conservative 
financial 
statement and are therefore an important source of management 
disclosure. 
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IC studies conducted by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Garcia-Meca et al. 
(2005) and Williams (2001) provide some statistically tested independent 
variables that have been confirmed as associated with disclosure, turnover, 
multiple listing, gearing and membership of a technologically innovative 
industry. The frequency of reporting the different IC indicators compared 
poorly between most studies. The common element in most studies was that the 
samples selected consisted of the largest companies, generally from single 
industries as was the case with April et al. (2003) who selected the mining 
industry in South Africa. Goh and Lim (2004) confirm the trend of external 
capital being the most reported IC element, and that qualitative disclosures as 
opposed to quantitative disclosures form the content of IC attributes disclosed. 
Guthrie et al. (1999) found entrepreneurial spirit to be the most frequently 
reported, followed by customers and management processes. In contrast, 
Brennan (2001) found very few references to employees and entrepreneurial 
spirit but found customers to rank highly along with business collaborations. 
As IC is developing constantly, the literature indicates that subsequent 
studies illustrate a growing awareness and understanding by companies of IC. 
One such study, conducted by Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) in a longitudinal 
analysis indicates an improvement in IC disclosure levels. These varying 
disclosure levels have been attributed to the difference in market capitalisation 
between countries because of the different sizes of listed companies. 
Nevertheless, compounding the size effect, the sample of Guthrie et al. (1999) 
was taken (with one exception) from the top end (by market capitalisation) of 
Australian listed companies. A further difference is that Guthrie et al. (1999) 
studied six industry groups, whereas Brennan (2001) studied 11 companies 
from one industry. Goh and Lim (2004) study included banks, whereas most 
other studies did not include any financial companies. Certainly, differences 
exist between developed and developing nations in terms of the content and 
extent of disclosure, the various categories of IC indicators and the definitions 
of individual attributes disclosed. 
As no study has yet examined a large sample on IC disclosure, this 
research will increase the size of the sample relative to prior studies 
from an 
average 30 to 439 companies. In comparison, prior studies tended to 
concentrate mainly on one or another industry i. e. mining or technological. 
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Moreover, IC attributes investigated tended to fall into single IC categories 
mainly HC. This research therefore examines a larger sample of companies 
covering a large spectrum of industries. It appears that all countries require a 
recognised ICF, as the extent of disclosure remains low. In addition, as long as 
certain IC is unrecognised under IAS 36 and IAS 38 (International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) 1998) and other regulations, an international 
framework may not be easily achieved. This research groups all similar 
descriptive examples of attributes into categories of HC, SC and RC. In this 
way, this ICF may bring comparability to prior, current and future studies. 
Few studies on voluntary disclosure are conducted on a longitudinal 
basis. One such study, Williams (2001) found evidence that during some years, 
the listing status, the extent of gearing and the industry membership influenced 
the amount of IC disclosure provided by a company. Williams (2001) 
investigated the disclosure practices in the annual reports of 31 Financial Times 
Securities and Equities (FTSE) 100 listed companies from 1996-2000 and the 
relationship between IC performance and the extent of IC disclosure (Table 
2.4). The results vary significantly between the years; however generally, where 
IC performance is too high the amount of disclosure is reduced. This negative 
association may support the suggestion that firms reduce IC disclosures when 
performance reaches a threshold level for fear of competitive advantage being 
lost. This result reiterates the suggestion that competitive pressures may result 
in management reducing IC disclosures. The possibilities of voluntary 
disclosure levels changing from year to year in response to internal and external 
pressures may support the view for no regulation. 
Bontis (2003) in an IC study on 10,000 companies in Canadian annual 
reports determined the level of IC disclosure by applying content analysis to the 
disclosure of terminology within annual reports (Table 2.4). Bontis (2003) 
examined the extent to which Canadian corporations publicly 
document the 
presence (or importance) of IC, no significant evidence was 
found to indicate 
an increase in IC disclosure. Seventy-four counts of IC 
disclosure were evident 
across a population of 10 000 items of disclosure. The term 
"intellectual 
capital" was disclosed in only "5" annual reports. These companies represented 
a wide range of industries and some were not necessarily 
knowledge-based 
(e. g., petroleum and natural gas extraction). Only a small proportion of 
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Canadian companies even used IC terminology in their annual reports. Bontis 
(2003) argued that the use of the IC language is an important pre-requisite to 
developing IC statements and concluded that although IC has a very strong 
impact on the drivers of future earnings; it was found that it was largely ignored 
in financial reporting. Although Bontis (2003) presents no TF, the study 
illustrates in general terms the lack of disclosure throughout a multitude of 
companies. 
Guthrie et al. (1999) and Guthrie and Petty (2000) in content analysis 
studies investigated in Australian companies found that IC was largely ignored 
in financial reporting. Guthrie et al. (1999) conducted a frequency count in their 
content analysis study of 19 large Australian companies' annual reports (Table 
2.4). The extent of IC reporting was assessed using the 24 IC indicators of 
Sveiby (1997). This study was a significant improvement in the field, basing its 
foundations on an IC framework and following an established research 
methodology. Guthrie et al. (1999) found that the key components of IC were 
not reported within a consistent framework when reported at all. The main areas 
of IC reporting focused on human resources, technology and IP rights, 
organisational structure and workplace structure. Overall, it was concluded that 
there was no established and mutually agreed ICF either for Australian 
companies or for the accounting profession. Further, despite a general 
consciousness about the importance of IC and the role it assumes in ensuring 
long-term organisational success, few enterprises appeared to have adopted a 
proactive stance in attempting to measure and externally report this type of 
information. This was among the first IC studies published, although no TF was 
applied, the study was able to illustrate in general terms the lack of disclosure 
throughout these 19 companies. Although results of Guthrie et al. (1999) 
showed a marked improvement on those of Bontis (1998), they remain 
qualitative as opposed to quantitative; note too that the sample selected in this 
investigation is relatively small and appears to be limited in scope as it only 
concentrates on large companies. 
Brennan (2001) replicated Guthrie et al. 's (1999) study for Ireland. The 
sample of 11 Irish listed companies chosen for further study in this research 
comprised only knowledge-based companies, i. e. technology and HC orientated 
companies (Table 2.4). Such companies fall into an industrial sector (Hackstone 
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and Milne 1996, Robb et al. 2001 and Bozzolan et al. 2003) that is significantly 
associated with relatively more voluntarily disclosure of IC than others. 
Brennan (2001) concluded that there were very few references to employees 
and entrepreneurial spirit whereas customers ranked highly along with business 
collaborations, indicating that even in these highly technologically innovative 
sectors the incidence of IC reporting remains low. 
An additional industry specific study was conducted by April et al. 
(2003) who applied a research methodology used originally by Guthrie et al. 
(1999) and subsequently used by Brennan (2001). April et al. (2003) combined 
content analysis of company annual reports with questionnaires and interviews 
with senior individuals in South African mining companies. Sentences were 
identified as the coding unit under content analysis and the method applied 
followed that of Guthrie et al. (1999). The 20 largest South African listed 
companies by market capitalisation (90 per cent were mining companies) were 
selected for analysis (Table 2.4). 
As size has been positively and significantly associated with mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure (Firth 1979, Gray and Roberts 1989 and Camfferman 
and Cooke 2002), a selection of larger companies may be expected to have 
higher levels of IC disclosure. Findings at the individual attribute level indicate 
that the top 20 companies place the most emphasis on the reporting of business 
collaborations, work-related staff competencies, management processes, 
customers and brands. Companies placed least emphasis on the reporting of 
copyrights, patents, franchising agreements, licensing agreements and customer 
loyalty. The content analysis indicated that South African mining companies 
generally have a low awareness of their IC assets, or do not see the need to 
report on them. These findings have helped identify the need for IC 
development in particular, the need to provide a framework for policy makers, 
regulators, academics and practitioners. The lack of an established and 
generally accepted framework for IC reporting was again the reason given for 
the low results obtained in this study. These companies clearly value IC, but 
have some way to go in implementing appropriate systems and structures to 
manage IC meaningfully. 
The period of single industry investigations was brought to an end by an 
investigation on Italian companies by Bozzolan et al. (2003) who identified 
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considerable differences for IC disclosed in annual reports belonging to high- 
and low- profile industries. Bozzolan et al. (2003) carried out one of the first 
empirical studies on VDIC. The authors studied a stratified sample of 30 
organisations chosen from the non-financial companies listed on the Italian 
Stock Exchange as at 31 December 2001 (Table 2.4). This sample size was an 
improvement on prior comparative studies but remained small for empirical 
studies given the number of independent variables studied. The complete list 
consisted of 201 organisations. Samples were randomly chosen from two 
groups. The first group was those companies listed on the Nuovo Mercato (42 
companies belonging to high-tec industries such as internet providers, 
biotechnology, entertainment, internet, IT distribution, high-tech 
manufacturing, media, retail, software, system integration and 
telecommunication, web services). The second group was of those companies 
listed on the Ordinario, Star and Blue Chips (159 companies belonging to 
"traditional" industries and including food, automobile, chemical, etc. ). 
Disclosure by Italian companies mainly occurred with regard to external 
structure with particular attention to customers, distribution channels, business 
collaboration and brands. The results indicated that IC attributes were 
structurally higher for the high profile industries. However, interestingly, these 
high profile and low profile companies disclose the same type of information. 
Although, this study pioneers the empirical research development in IC 
it uses a small sample and examines only two company characteristics. This 
finding was not comparable with Australian voluntary reporting practices 
(Guthrie et al. 1999) while it was comparable with the Irish one (Brennan 
2001). Industry and size seemed to be relevant factors in explaining the 
differences in reporting behaviour amongst Italian companies. This result was 
consistent with Gray (2002) and Mathews (1997). 
In contrast, Abdolmohammadi (2005) in a study of the USA found 
different reporting patterns in different industries. Old economy and traditional 
tangible asset based companies disclosed more partnership and brands whilst 
new economy and high technology R&D companies 
disclosed more IP and 
information technology information. Nevertheless, some investigations focus 
on one or two industries such as that reported by Goh and Lim 
(2004) in which 
their focus on the banking and utility industries investigated a sector normally 
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excluded due to different reporting regulations. Goh and Lim (2004) examined 
the practice of the top 20 profit-making Malaysian public listed companies on 
VDIC information in their annual reports (Table 2.4). Of the 20 companies, five 
companies were banks and another five were utility companies (electricity, gas 
and telecommunication companies). 
The study adopted the methodology of Guthrie et al. (1999). Forty-one 
percent of IC disclosed was on RC, 36.6% on SC, consisting of IP: 1.4% and 
infrastructure assets: 35.2%. The remaining 21.9% was disclosed on HC. All 20 
companies disclosed qualitatively but not quantitatively on management 
philosophy, corporate culture and entrepreneurial spirit. Ninety percent of the 
companies disclosed on networking system and 85% of the companies on 
information systems. Both attributes were quantified in the financial statements. 
Eighty percent of the companies disclosed on work-related knowledge and 
work-related competencies, respectively, which again was not easily quantified. 
Patent and copyright had the lowest disclosure frequency. 
Overall, results show consistency in disclosure of some attributes across 
industries whilst some disclosures only appear in certain industries and not in 
others, nevertheless the significant factor is that all sample sizes are small. 
Following the increase in the number of sectors/industries examined in the 
literature, Vergauwen and Allem (2005) compared IC disclosure of public listed 
companies on an international level, in The Netherlands, France and Germany. 
IC disclosure was found to be more significant in France, significant in 
Germany and least in the Netherlands. Regulations and auditor conservatism 
have been attributed as the reasons for the variations (Table 2.4). Although the 
methodology applies a simple content analysis and reports results in 
descriptive 
statistics, this paper only extends prior research methodology. 
The results 
though are different as they highlight for the first time the prevalence of the 
IC 
attributes information systems (SC) and IP (SC) as the more 
dominant 
disclosures and provide for the first time a comparative international 
perspective; whereas Brennan (2001), April et al. 
(2003) and Bozzolan et al. 
(2003) report a higher incidence of RC attributes. 
Generally, RC appears to have had more disclosure, compared with SC 
and HC; very limited disclosure has been made on patent, copyright, 
trademark, 
franchising agreements, know-how and vocational qualification. Lack of an 
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internationally recognised IC framework, has been one of the reasons advanced, 
compounded by the complexity of identifying, measuring and reporting; on the 
other hand, in some cases, the high incidence of IC disclosure may be as a 
result of overlapping regulations between national standards and International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). Companies regulated on a foreign exchange may 
disclose international IC mandatory attributes that are voluntary in the home 
country. Due to the comparative nature of the above studies, the limited 
empirical work conducted has been motivated by proprietary costs, political 
costs, stakeholder, agency and signalling theory. The results illustrate 
consistency in the association between industry membership, listing status and 
size (Williams 2001, Bozzolan et al. 2003 and Garcia-Meca et al. 2005). 
2.5.0. Hypothesis Development 
Section 2.2.0 to 2.4.0 have discussed and established a VDF, ICF and TF to 
provide the context for the statistical tests that are conducted on the hypotheses 
in Section 2.5.0. These tests are applied to several hypotheses pertaining to 
company characteristics representing risk, IC investment, industry membership 
and corporate governance mechanisms. The development of the hypotheses is 
conducted in conjunction with the review of the IC literature and general 
disclosure literature as presented in Table 2.4 and in Appendix IA respectively. 
Furthermore, the analytical framework as illustrated in Table 2.1 is applied in 
predicting the hypothesised influence of the selected independent variables. The 
dependent variables DI and WDI and the empirical models are developed in 
Chapter 3. 
2.5.1. Size 
Numerous studies have provided evidence of a positive association between 
company size as measured by market value (MV), turnover (SALES) or total 
assets (TA) and voluntary and mandatory disclosure (Appendix 
IA). Fewer 
studies have provided evidence of a negative association. Size as measured 
by 
MV has been confirmed as a significant positive variable in Chow and Wong- 
Boren (1987), Lang and Lundholm (1993), Hossain et al. (1994), Owusu-Ansah 
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(1998), Eng and Mak (2003) and Abdolmohammadi (2005). Size as measured 
by total assets (TA) has been confirmed as a significant positive variable in 
Singhvi and Desai (1971, McNally et al. (1982), Cooke (1991) and 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and as measured by SALES by Firth (1979), 
Cooke (1989), Wallace et al. (1994), Depoers (2000) and Naser et al. (2002). 
However, in contrast, size as measured by TA is negative in the UK study by 
Williams (2001) and may be due to an IC performance coefficient dependent 
variable and a sample restricted to only 31 UK listed companies. Similarly, size 
as measured by SALES is reported as negative by Wallace (1987) in a study on 
a mandatory and voluntary disclosure in a developing country; nevertheless, 
size as measured by TA was found to be significant in the same research. This 
variation may be due to differences in financial and economic development, 
regulation and cultural disclosure practices. 
Within IC studies however, size has been confirmed as positively 
associated with disclosure by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Garcia-Meca et al. (2005), 
Garcia-Meca and Martinez (2005) and Guthrie et al. (2006). However, 
Williams (2001) and Bontis (2003) found size to be insignificant. Generally, 
larger companies increase voluntary disclosure for several reasons. Larger 
companies are more exposed to public scrutiny. They may respond by more 
VDIC. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) revealed that some companies are 
exposed to political costs because of lobbyists, exposure to public scrutiny, risk 
of nationalisation, expropriation or break-up (Jensen and Meckling 1976 and 
Stigler 1971). Increasing VDIC may mitigate this issue. Wallace (1987) argues 
that to reduce these political costs the selection of minimum disclosure policies 
to minimise reported earnings is necessary (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). 
These alternative procedures regarding political costs identified by Wallace et 
al. (1994, p. 44) indicate that the theoretical basis of a relationship is unclear. 
The direction of the relationship may be either positive or negative. Wallace's 
(1987) opposing view provides evidence of larger companies withholding value 
relevant information to avoid the political costs in terms of tighter regulations 
and increasing tax, price controls, more social responsibilities and the threat of 
nationalisation (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Coupled with these political costs 
are legal costs that may lead to damages in security litigation, which Skinner 
(1994) suggests are greater for larger companies. 
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In addition, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) established that larger 
companies might disclose more information as they may already produce the 
information for internal use and therefore the additional costs of disclosure are 
minimal (Cooke 1989 and Lang and Lundholm 1993). Buzby (1975) suggests 
that small companies may not possess the necessary resources for collecting 
and presenting an extensive array of information in their corporate reports due 
to the stifling costs. Due to the large number of shareholders in companies, 
agency costs can be mitigated by additional voluntary disclosures (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1983). Moreover, due to the large number of shareholders, large 
companies are subject to both greater information demand from analysts (Lang 
and Lundholm 1993) and lower information production costs (Leftwich et al. 
1981 and Inchausti 1997). Agency theory explains that larger companies may 
disclose more information to mitigate the potential of wealth transfers from 
shareholders to management (Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Leftwich et al. 
1981). Larger companies are able to attract highly skilled individuals that 
facilitate the disclosure of an extensive array of information (Buzby 1972). 
Larger companies have more access to finance on the international bond 
market, therefore these companies may increase disclosure in order to lower the 
costs of capital (Botosan 1997 and Lang and Lundholm 2000) and lower the 
effective taxation rate. Small companies may believe more strongly that the 
disclosure of more detail could endanger their competitive position (Singhvi 
and Desai 1971, Mautz and May 1978 and Raffournier 1995). The final reason 
relates to market liquidity, large companies may wish to ensure that the book 
value of the share is matched by the share price, so that equities are 
appropriately priced in the secondary market, thereby avoiding the possibility 
of a takeover motivated by the acquisition of an undervalued company (Cooke 
1996). Nonetheless, on balance, size has been found to be a very significant 
variable in most studies with a positive association between size and the extent 
of disclosure. 
In the Camfferman and Cooke (2002) UK study, the TA figure, as the 
measure of size, is significant with a positive coefficient. The finding that size, 
as measured by TA, is positively associated with disclosure is consistent with 
the work of Cooke (1989) and McNally et al. (1982). Size appears to be an 
important explanatory variable whether measured by TA, SALES (Firth 1979), 
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or MV (Hossain et al. 1994 and Lang and Lundholm 1993). The common 
proxies for company size have been TA, SALES, number of shareholders, 
proportion of assets in place, number of employees and MV. TA, SALES and 
MV are applied as size proxies in this research. The selection of MV is based 
on the association between IC and MVBV and on the association between IC 
and Market value to total assets (MVTA). This research acknowledges that BV 
is an accounting measurement of nominal values of equity that are not related 
with the MV of these equities, similarly that the value of TA may be dependent 
on management's accounting policies. Both tangible and intangible assets 
contribute to the generation of turnover, SALES is therefore included as a 
measure of size irrespective of the IC intensity of the company or the 
constitution of the resource base. 
The selection of TA examines the relation between capital intensity on 
the one hand and size on the other. Capital intensity as measured by TA does 
not account for the IC of equities and as such may be negatively associated with 
VDIC whilst concurrently, TA is the tangible capital applied in the company to 
generate operations and may not measure the entire capital applied in IC 
intensive companies. It is expected that traditional companies consist of 
manufacturing, heavy engineering and other fixed asset intensive industries 
whilst non-traditional companies are expected to be more technologically 
innovative and IA intensive. Traditional companies do apply IC in their 
operations however the level of IC is expected to be lower than that found in 
non-traditional tangible asset intensive companies and vice versa. This is 
evidenced by the market to book value phenomenon. The inclusion of the three 
size variables provides a comparative analysis, in which by utilising TA and 
SALES as controls, the effectiveness of MV as a size variable can be 
established. In this way, the trend in the influence of or lack of application of IC 
in companies' operations may begin to be. chartered. 
Two theoretical approaches may be applied. Management can increase 
VDIC due to political costs. The risk associated with size is explained by the 
political cost hypothesis. VDIC can be increased to avoid undue exposure to the 
public, providing information in anticipation of the public's increased need. 
Larger companies are expected to follow the research model, disclosing 
proprietary information to avert market adverse reaction from non-disclosure or 
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inaccurate disclosure. This research applies signalling theory that explains the 
resources available to larger companies in providing VDIC. The perceived 
benefits of signalling IC are expected to outweigh the potential disclosure costs 
arising from political costs. A significant positive association is expected. It 
may therefore be hypothesized that: 
H 1.1: Size as measured by SALES is a positive significant explanatory 
variable of the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
H I. 2: Size as measured by MV is a positive significant explanatory variable of 
the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
H I. 3: Size as measured by TA is a positive significant explanatory variable of 
the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.2. Growth (GRWT) 
A higher growth rate (GRWT) is expected to lead to more voluntary disclosure 
as management signal the realisation of company potential previously held in 
IA. Management of high GRWT companies may disclose ICCA to indicate 
company success (economic theory), management expertise and competence 
(agency theory) and to maximise shareholder value in the markets (shareholder 
maximisation). Lev and Stefano (2003) believe that the major drivers of 
company growth are IA. Such IA consist of IC in the form of innovation, 
information and communication technologies, networks and alliances, quality 
human resources and management processes that continue to be vital to 
companies. Lee and Shim (1995) investigated the impact of R&D on a 
company's long run performance (market growth) and competitiveness within 
the U. S. and Japanese high-tech industries. A positive relationship between 
R&D expenditures and a company's market growth was established in Japan. 
In an empirical analysis on growth of 500 Italian manufacturing 
companies between 1989 and 1997, Del Monte and Papagni (2003) maintained 
that companies with a strong commitment to R&D had a higher rate of growth. 
McNally et al. (1992) reported an insignificant result, with voluntary disclosure 
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of non-financial and non-retail companies listed in New Zealand. Similarly, 
Eng and Mak (2003) reported an insignificant growth variable. In contrast, 
however, Prencipe (2004) in a study of 65 Italian listed companies identified a 
negative significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and the growth 
rate. This research extends this work, by applying a compound annual growth 
rate over a five-year period, to minimising year on year changes in economic 
conditions. It can therefore be hypothesised that: 
H2: GRWT is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.3. Technological Listing (TMRK) 
The understanding is that technologically innovative companies firstly, may 
apply more IC in their operations and secondly, may disclose such IC in their 
annual reports. Such high IC in technologically innovative and R&D intensive 
companies may be represented in a listing on a technological index. The first 
classification is therefore represented by the LSE TechMARK listing (TMRK). 
TMRK is the LSE international market for innovative technology companies 
and includes computer hardware, computer servicing, internet, semi- 
conductors, software, telecom equipment, biotechnology, specialist 
pharmaceuticals, drug delivery and medical technology. Following Bozzolan et 
al. (2003), the expectation is of a positive significant association. By applying 
content analysis, Bozzolan et al. (2003) confirmed the existence of a 
relationship between higher IC content in companies of certain industries and 
higher levels of VDIC within those industries. Listing on this exchange may be 
justified through signalling theory as the company promotes its R&D and 
technological development. 
Nevertheless, competitive pressures may lead management to be 
reluctant in disclosing ICCA recently developed or on going technological 
processes. Thus, the "bandwagon" effect may be expected to increase 
disclosure whilst competitive costs are expected to suppress VDIC. Increased 
disclosure is expected to be more prevalent as the general trend has been that 
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technological companies disclose more than non-technological companies do, 
therefore it may be hypothesised that: 
H3.1: TMRK is positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
2.5.4. Manufacturing (MANUF) 
The second classification is supported by Camfferman and Cooke (2002), 
Cooke (1991) and Ho Wong (2001) who report a significant positive 
association between disclosure and manufacturing (MANUF). In this research, 
industries are classified into manufacturing, high value tangible assets, low 
profile; and into non-manufacturing, low value tangible assets, service, high-tec 
and high profile industries. A dichotomous variable is chosen, one that scores 
"1" for manufacturing and "0" for non-manufacturing. In general, traditional 
fixed asset intensive companies are classified as manufacturing and the more IA 
intensive companies as non-manufacturing. Although some manufacturing 
companies can consist of both capital intensive as well as IA intensive 
companies these are few, it is expected that the level of IA in such companies 
may not exceed the level of IA in a non-manufacturing company. A more 
appropriate proxy may include more than just two classifications for the 
manufacturing variable particularly as manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
are never truly distinct in any one organisation. To mitigate a potential 
shortcoming this research has included SIC and industry grouping (INDG) as 
industry variables that provide more than just two classifications. 
The approach in this research is illustrated by the analytical framework 
developed in Table 2.1, manufacturing companies are less likely to have higher 
levels of VDIC as non-manufacturing companies that are expected to utilise 
more IC than tangible assets in their operations. The incentives are derived 
from signalling theory; non-manufacturing companies are expected to apply 
unique and non-replicable IA and IC in their operations. These companies 
disclose ICCA attributes due to the lack of disclosure costs, consistent with 
disclosures of firms with high barriers to imitation. 
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The nature of IC means that these resources have been found to be rare, 
durable, inimitable and non-tradable (Barney 1991 and Dierickx and Cool 
1989); being unique, IC resources may be patent protected, may require large 
financial and HC resources, may take a lengthy process to develop and may be 
specific to certain processes, departments, companies or industries. It may 
therefore be hypothesised that: 
H3.2: MANUF is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.5. Industry Grouping (INDG) 
A further industry classification is applied in this research, INDG is a 
DataStream 6 level classification based on a company's primary activity. 
Equities are classified at the most detailed level appropriate as listed in 
Appendix 2A. The theoretical approach is consistent with manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing as the classification INDG charts the increasing IC content 
as companies move from Level 1 to level 6. The effective classification 
amounts to Level 2, non-financials, non-financials excluding resources, 
resources and Level 3, resources, basic industries, cyclical consumer products, 
non-cyclical consumer products, cyclical services, non-cyclical services, 
utilities and information technology. The classification codes "basic industries" 
with a lower score than it does the more complex industries. The understanding 
is that basic industries will disclose less IC due to the lack of complexity in 
their operations. Complex IT and chemical industries may provide more VDIC 
comparatively as they may employ more IA in their operations. INDG has 
provided a variety of results in the literature as illustrated by Appendix 1 A. 
Generally, the classifications have been subjective, providing positive 
and negative results and significant and insignificant results depending on the 
association of the classification with the disclosure index. One such study, Ng 
and Koh (1993) found no significant relationship between voluntary disclosure 
of 106 listed companies in Singapore and the complexity of operations. 
Similarly, McNally et al. (1982), Wallace et al. (1994), Raffournier (1995), 
Inchausti (1997), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998) found no 
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significant association with industry, whereas Ng and Koh (1993), Gray et al. 
(1995) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a significant negative relationship. 
Ng and Koh (1993) results identified industries relating to finance, properties 
and hotels as negative. The motivations are derived from signalling theory. 
High IC intensive companies are expected to apply IA and IC, unique to their 
organisation and therefore not easily replicable. These companies disclose 
ICCA attributes due to the lack of disclosure costs, consistent with disclosures 
in sectors of high barriers to imitation. Furthermore, such disclosures mitigate 
the loss in equity value where no disclosure may result in markets discounting 
the share price in expectation of the worst news. It may be hypothesised that: 
H3.3: INDG is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.6. Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
A further industry classification applied in this research is that of the UK SIC of 
Economic Activities (National Statistics 2003) that provides an ascending 
industry classification ranging from 0100 basic agriculture industry to 9000 
complex service industry (Appendix 2B). Forestry and paper, food producers 
and processors, beverages and tobacco form the most basic industries whereas 
telecommunications, media and entertainment, health, leisure and hotels form 
the more complex service industries. Service industries are expected to apply 
more IA rather than tangible assets in production. Agriculture, forestry and 
tobacco are highly mechanised industries, employing a substantial amount of 
tangible assets in comparison. In this way, the incentives to disclose are 
determined by the resource base of companies; companies with largely IA 
resources are expected to provide VDIC. Service and highly complex 
companies are expected to apply IA and IC, unique to their organisation and 
therefore not easily replicable. 
Archambault and Archambault (2003) and Citron et al. (2005) find a 
strong positive association between disclosures and the number of SIC codes in 
the firm. It appears that operating in a large number of distinct industries may 
lead to increased disclosure; generally, companies that seek greater resources 
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will increase disclosure (Zarzeski 1996) as such, diversification may lead to 
greater disclosure (Verrecchia 1983). These companies disclose ICCA 
attributes due to the lack disclosure costs, consistent with disclosures in sectors 
of high barriers to imitation. Management may increase VDIC to illustrate their 
competitive edge particular in areas where there are no disclosure costs and 
adopt a partial disclosure policy in areas where proprietary costs may be 
mitigated. It may therefore be hypothesised that: 
H3.4: SIC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
2.5.7. BETA 
The relationship between the beta risk factor (BETA) and VDIC may be 
expected to be positive. A high BETA may motivate management to increase 
VDIC in an attempt to mitigate exposure to systematic risk. By informing the 
markets and shareholders of IC within the company, management expect to 
reduce the risk associated with the company by reducing uncertainty as to its 
"hidden value" and potential. Although Foster (1978) found significant 
correlation between accounting annual report disclosure and systematic risk, 
Firth (1984) in the UK found the association of voluntary disclosure and 
earnings BETA to be insignificant in manufacturing companies but positive and 
significant with systematic risk. A weighted index was applied and the 
incentives were explained by agency theory. These results further emphasises 
the intricacy of the definitions and components of risk. 
Following the theoretical approach adopted by Firth (1984), this 
research applies agency theory as the explanation for management behaviour. 
Although only 100 manufacturing companies were examined by Firth (1984), 
the methodology appears comprehensive, with a weighted index and multiple 
regression analysis (Appendix 1 A. ). An alternative approach however, is that a 
high BETA may result in management reducing VDIC. These actions allow 
management to perpetuate their positions at the expense of shareholders and the 
market at large. Timely, unmanaged and maximum disclosure of a high 
systematic risk status may lead to a reduced share price and ultimately 
71 
management replacement. Overall, the risk attitude of management is expected 
to dominate, as management and shareholder objectives are not necessarily 
aligned. A high-risk status presents a negative impression on management 
performance. 
Nevertheless, following the first approach, a high-risk status is expected 
to result in increased IC attributes disclosure as management attempt to reduce 
share price fluctuations by illustrating the "hidden value" and reducing 
uncertainty. It may therefore be hypothesised: 
H4.1: BETA is a positive significant explanatory variable of the extent of 
VDIC. 
2.5.8. Liquidity (LQD) 
This variable investigates the influence of a company's ability to honour its 
short-term obligations as they fall due without recourse to selling other assets in 
place (Wallace and Naser 1995). One approach is that companies with higher 
levels of liquidity (LQD) may be expected to signal successful cash flow 
management through increasing VDIC. Liquidity in this case, illustrates the 
availability of financial resources necessary for investment in IC. Explanations 
for this association are based on signalling theory, consistent with 
management's intentions to indicate the underlying reality and to influence 
stakeholders. An alternative approach may be that companies with lower levels 
of LQD may reduce information disclosure including IC attributes that may 
otherwise indicate the financial risk associated with the equity. The explanation 
for this association is based on agency theory. 
The current ratio is commonly accepted as a measure of LQD and 
therefore, of short-term financial risk. The association with market risk is 
expected to be negative. On the one hand, a higher net LQD position allows a 
buffer in the event of adverse incidents. However, on the other hand, it is 
acknowledged that some larger companies may not need to keep large amounts 
of cash available, as lines of credit and other short-term borrowings are readily 
available. These companies are likely to disclose IC as financial risk is expected 
to be lower. This view is based on the expectation that a financially strong 
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company is more likely to disclose more information than a weak one. One 
reason for expecting LQD ratio to influence voluntary disclosure is that those 
companies with relatively high LQD ratios are more likely to meet their debt 
obligations. Such companies are, therefore, more likely to give more 
information to differentiate themselves from competitive companies. 
Nevertheless, the literature presents varying views. 
In Australia, Craswell and Taylor (1992), found no significant 
association in the mandatory and voluntary disclosure of oil and gas reserves 
information and the cash flow risk associated with 86 companies included in 
the sample. The disclosure index was restricted to only one attribute based on a 
dichotomous scale, and the sample was restricted to one regulated industry. The 
result may therefore be specific to this scenario alone. Nevertheless, a 
significant negative result was reported in Malaysia by Hossain et al. (1994). 
The empirical studies applied 78 items to the voluntary disclosure index, and 
companies were selected from several industries excluding financial. A similar 
result is reported by Wallace et al. (1994) for Spain; lower operational 
performance, as measured by LQD might induce management to more 
mandatory disclosure. In this scenario, liquidity might be perceived in the 
market as a measure of performance, in which case a company's lower liquidity 
ratio may motivate management to give more details in explaining the weak 
performance. In a voluntary disclosure study on 106 companies in Singapore, 
Ng and Koh (1993), found liquidity to be insignificant. 
The literature is inconclusive in respect of LQD. Wallace and Naser 
(1995) found in Hong Kong, that 80 listed companies' liquidity is insignificant 
in explaining the variation in mandatory disclosure. Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
concurred with this result in a multi-industry analysis on 49 companies listed on 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange that applied 214 mandatory items. Liquidity 
was found to be insignificant. The results of this study appear robust as new 
methods are applied to problems associated with the distribution of the data. A 
similar result was found in Hong Kong by Chen and Jaggi (2000) in almost a 
mirror investigation to that of Owusu-Ansah (1998), 87 non-financial 
companies were investigated using a 30 mandatory attribute disclosure index. 
Applying agency theory, liquidity was found to be insignificant. 
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The results of the Camfferman and Cooke (2002) study indicated that in 
the UK liquidity as measured by the current ratio is insignificant in explaining 
the variation in disclosure. Nevertheless, in the same study, liquidity also 
measured as the current ratio was found to be positive and significant in the 
Netherlands. The results of this study appear robust due to the methodology 
applied that was adopted from Cooke (1998). The disclosure index was based 
on 93 items from 322 sample companies, sufficient to provide significant 
results. 
A more recent investigation based on the unranked OLS methodology 
applied in Camfferman and Cooke (2002) was conducted for Saudi Arabia on 
40 companies from various industries. An insignificant result was reported for 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure and liquidity. Generally, the 
results on liquidity as illustrated in Appendix IA indicate insignificant 
relationships between liquidity and disclosure, these results are insignificant in 
different countries and different industries and in both voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure. The two exceptions are Wallace et al. (1994) in Spain, who found a 
negative significant relationship and Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in the 
Netherlands, who applied the current ratio, and found a positive significant 
relationship. This research extends this work by applying a new liquidity proxy, 
the acid-test ratio, by eliminating stocks in this measure, this research controls 
for those more tangible trading operations that carry greater amounts of stock. 
In this way, a relationship may or may not be established between VDIC and 
LQD in the UK. 
The acid-test ratio is operationalised as the liquidity proxy based on 
signalling theory as low LQD may lead to lower VDIC levels and higher LQD 
may lead to higher levels of VDIC as management signal successful cash flow 
management through VDIC. High LQD levels enable IC investment. 
Financially strapped companies are unable to invest in IC; as such, their 
disclosure levels are lower. It may therefore be hypothesised that LQD is 
positively associated with VDIC. 
H4.2: LQD ratio is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
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2.5.9. Gearing (GEAR) 
The basis for the relationship with VDIC is based on the risk associated with 
increased levels of debt. As the proportion of debt increases for some 
industries, so too does the financial risk associated with repayment of interest 
and capital; rising debt levels may lead to an increase in the risk of the equity. 
Thus, an increase in the gearing ratio (GEAR) increases the probability of 
financial and insolvency risk. Two approaches may explain the options 
available to management. Firstly, to counteract this increase in risk, 
management may provide VDIC in a bid to illustrate transparency and 
accountability; and secondly, highly geared companies may not have the 
financial resources required firstly for investment IC and secondly for 
investment in the processes and procedures required to identify, manage and 
report IC. Agency theory views debt as a governance device useful in reducing 
the conflict between shareholders and management (Jensen 1986). Debt reduces 
cash flow available to management as the company is contractually bound to 
repay interest and capital. Furthermore, companies investing in tangible assets, 
have the security for debt as such, debt may be associated with more tangible 
asset based companies that are less likely to report IC. In addition, Williamson 
(1988) concluded that debt providers might be unwilling to finance projects 
with assets that are highly company specific and for which the expenses can be 
considered sunk costs; such companies may exist in industries that may be 
associated with IA that have reduced tradability. Research evidence has shown 
that R&D of a company is negatively related to its gearing (Balakrishnan and 
Fox 1993 and Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989). This evidence is consistent with 
R&D as the driver of IA growth without which there is likely to be reduced 
levels of VDIC. 
Within the general literature, the expectation of a positive relationship in 
the UK is supported by Williams (2001) who applied a theoretical approach to 
an IC longitudinal study. A higher incidence of agency costs is associated with 
companies with a greater proportion of debt (Leftwich et al. 1981, p. 56). This is 
consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) who suggest that companies with 
high gearing costs may incur higher monitoring costs. Further, debt providers 
may demand a more comprehensive level of disclosure and maintenance of 
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certain liquidity levels, although such information may be relayed through 
private disclosures. As such, gearing (GEAR) may be insignificant in 
explaining the variation in VDIC. The level of GEAR may be influenced by 
several factors including covenants, limitations on borrowings, stability of the 
dividend payout ratio, management practices, corporate governance structures 
and constitution of shareholders. Empirical evidence on the direction of the 
relationship between GEAR and disclosure remains inconsistent. Various 
proxies have been applied in establishing a relationship as illustrated by 
Appendix IA. Firth (1984) applied gearing in the UK in a study of 100 
manufacturing companies; the results indicated an insignificant result with 
voluntary disclosure. However, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) found evidence 
of a positive significant result in the UK, based on a questionnaire study of 212 
financial executives. The negative result in Firth (1984) is mirrored in the 
results of a study by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) where in Mexico an 
insignificant result was reported for the association between voluntary 
disclosure of 52 listed manufacturing companies and gearing. Both studies 
applied gearing and presented agency theory as the motivation for the 
arguments, both examined manufacturing companies and both found an 
insignificant result. 
Subsequent studies by Gray and Roberts (1989), and Roberts and Gray 
(1988, cited by Meek and Gray 1989) returned contrasting results, with a 
negative significant result between mandatory and voluntary disclosure with 
gearing and a positive significant result with the debt equity ratio respectively. 
Both studies were conducted in the UK. Consistent with the results of Gray and 
Roberts (1989), Lufti (1989) established a positive significant relationship also 
within the UK. Although the companies examined were unlisted, the 
methodology appears robust; various theoretical approaches are applied, 
including agency theory, as the motivation for the relationship with voluntary 
disclosure. Internationals studies (Appendix IA) include Craswell and Taylor 
(1992), Hossain et al. (1994 and 1995), Raffournier (1995), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Ahmed (1996), Inchausti (1997), Patton and 
Zelenka (1997), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Depoers (2000) and Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002) in a UK study, found no significant relationship with gearing and 
disclosure. In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Belkaoui 
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and Kahl (1978), Bradbury (1992), Malone et al. (1993), Ng and Koh (1993) 
Hossain et al. (1995), Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in the Dutch study, 
identified gearing as positively affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Meek et al. (1995) and Eng and Mak (2003) identified gearing as negatively 
affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure. The results have therefore been 
generally inconclusive. The methodologies applied in the above studies differed 
in the dependent and independent variables, in the industries, in the companies 
and countries of study. These differences may jointly contribute to the 
inconsistent results. Consistent with Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) and 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) highly geared companies may be expected to 
have less IC disclosure. The arguments are based on agency theory; 
management may decrease VDIC; by increasing asymmetrical information 
management are able to perpetuate their positions in office. Such action may 
provide management the opportunity to turnaround failing projects, reduce 
gearing and ultimately secure their employment. Furthermore, with increasing 
insolvency risk, management may be expected to focus on short-term projects 
to the exclusion of R&D. VDIC is expected to decrease as the investment in IC 
decreases. It may therefore be hypothesised that GEAR is negatively associated 
with VDIC. 
H4.3: GEAR is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.10. Employee Cost (EMPC) 
High investment in employee remuneration and benefits may result in 
management signalling IC attributes to disclose investment in IA that 
differentiates it from its competitors. The motivation for the variation in VDIC 
due to the variation in employee cost (EMPC) may be explained by signalling 
theory. Employee cost (EMPC) captures the degree to which management is 
efficient in hiring the optimal number of employees under the assumptions of 
competitive labour and product markets and in extracting value from 
investment in HC. High remuneration may provide the company with a 
competitive edge in attracting quality employees and retaining existing ones; 
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the signalling of ICCA attributes may ensue as management disclose successful 
management practice. Furthermore, Sofian et al. (2005) reiterate the importance 
of investment in HC adding that such investment is associated with 
management accounting practices, organisational culture and corporate 
performance. 
Despite the benefits to be gained from disclosure of these investments, 
pressure from competitors, may curb full disclosure due to the mobility of 
employees in some industries. Furthermore, political costs may restrict such 
voluntary disclosures due to the risk of pressure from labour unions and other 
regulatory bodies. A negative association has been found between labour 
pressure and voluntary segment disclosure by Pourtier (1996), voluntary value- 
added statement disclosure by Deegan and Hallam (1991) and financial and 
non-financial discretionary disclosure by Depoers (2000) in their multivariate 
tests. Nevertheless, where management voluntarily disclose, companies can 
differentiate themselves from their peers through the signalling of high-quality 
HC (Akerlof 1970). An expectation to see companies with a higher investment 
in human resources voluntarily disclosing more HC exists. However, one 
approach recognises employee pressure as a dominant force, which particularly 
for cohesive labour unions may demand transfers of wealth under the form of 
wage demands (Liberty and Zimmerman 1986). A no disclosure policy may be 
considered appropriate if disclosure increases the bargaining power of labour 
unions or increases the potential for competitors to attract a company's existing 
employees. Theoretical explanations are taken from agency theory and 
proprietary costs theory in a study by Depoers (2000) in which he found a 
significant negative relationship between labour pressure and voluntary 
disclosure. These results were consistent with the predictions of Darrough 
(1995) who concluded that management conceals information as readily from 
their employees as they do from their competitors. The measure of EMPC 
applied in this research is the ratio of staff costs to number of employees. 
Various proxies have been examined (Appendix IA) to try to capture 
the HC content in companies, Singhvi (1968) and Wallace (1987) examined the 
type of management, and reported a significant relationship with mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure of 45 listed Indian companies and 87 non-financial 
Nigerian listed companies respectively. In Bangladesh, Ahmed (1996) found no 
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relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure and qualifications of 
the accounting officer whereas Patton and Zelenka (1997) found a positive 
significant relationship between mandatory disclosure and number of 
employees, although this variable may also proxy for size. An insignificant 
relationship was established between the qualifications of the financial director 
and voluntary disclosure of 138 non-financial listed companies in Malaysia and 
employees and mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 84 manufacturing and 
service listed companies in Jordan by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Naser et 
al. (2002) respectively. This research hypothesises that higher EMPC as 
measured by staff costs including all employee benefits such as health 
insurance and pension plan contributions divided by the number of employees 
representing both full and part time employees of the company may lead to 
more VDIC. The arguments are derived from signalling theory and the 
propensity of companies to disclose their competitive advantage. These 
motivations are expected to outweigh any competitive pressures and labour 
related proprietary costs that are associated with such disclosures. It may be 
hypothesised that EMPC is positively associated with VDIC. 
H5.1: EMPC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.11. Research and Development Expenditure (R&D) 
The expectation is a positive association between research and development 
expenditure (R&D) and VDIC. R&D is associated with the generation of IC 
that is inimitable and company specific. This unique IC may provide a barrier 
to imitation for competing firms. High R&D companies are likely to be 
characterised by high levels of VDIC due to the reduced proprietary costs 
attributed to barriers to imitation. This variable identifies whether R&D 
necessarily leads to VDIC. Although R&D is associated with IA generation, IP 
registration of patents and copyrights, some registrations for patents may be 
lengthy processes. R&D may signal success to the market, as investment in IC 
is made possible through surplus earnings. 
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The theoretical relationship between R&D and VDIC may be unclear 
because no previous study has been found to investigate this relationship. 
Clarkson et al. (1994) found a significant relation between barriers to imitation 
and the voluntary inclusion of forecasts in Canadian companies' annual reports. 
The proxy applied in this study was gross fixed assets as a financial barrier to 
access. This variable may however be a proxy for size as disclosure studies 
have illustrated that larger companies provide more voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure. Gray et al. (1995) study examined R&D information in contrast to 
this research that examines R&D expenditure. However, Gray et al. (1995) 
study confirmed a positive significant relationship of R&D information with 
general voluntary disclosure of 64 UK and 116 USA companies. The 
theoretical motivation was based on legitimacy theory and the disclosure index 
comprised 128 voluntary disclosure items. Depoers (2000) examined 65 
voluntary disclosure items in a French study on 102 non-financial industrial 
companies. The results confirmed a positive association between disclosure and 
barriers to imitation; indicating that the existence of barriers to imitation 
increases disclosure. R&D is defined as all direct and indirect costs related to 
the creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and 
products with commercial possibilities. As R&D has been found to increase IA 
and growth prospects, this research expects an increase in VDIC associated 
with new venturing activities/projects. Investment in R&D is traditionally 
considered an internal innovation that expands companies' capabilities over 
time (Hoskisson et al. 1994). Myers (1977) suggests that R&D creates IA and 
company specific assets. Sustained R&D leads to stable growth (Hall and 
Mairesse 1995). The association between R&D, technological development 
and growth have been empirically established at the company, industry and 
national levels. R&D has led to subsequent gains in productivity, earnings and 
shareholder value (Griliches and Regev 1995, Lev and Sougiannis 1996, Deng 
et al. 1999 and Gelb and Siegel 2000). R&D's innovativeness affects the 
marginal costs of production. Greater R&D spending translates into lower 
expected marginal costs. Management in R&D intensive companies may 
disclose more IC as a measure of signalling potential and successful projects. 
Nevertheless, as indicated by Williams (2001, p. 201), where IC 
performance is too high the amount of disclosure may be reduced, suggesting 
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that companies reduce VDIC when performance reaches a threshold level for 
fear of competitive losses. However, competitive costs may be exceeded by 
potential benefits of signalling when proprietary costs may be mitigated by 
barriers to imitation. These barriers may be due to the complexity of IC and the 
requirement for additional financial resources, technical expertise and corporate 
governance mechanisms. It may therefore be hypothesised that R&D is 
positively associated with VDIC. 
H5.2: R&D is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
2.5.12. MVBV 
Edvinsson and Malone (1997) define the difference between a company's BV 
and MV as the value of IC. This research acknowledges the existence of this 
"hidden value" which when disclosed, enables markets to operate more 
efficiently. Due to the inability of traditional financial statements to report SC, 
RC and HC, IC intensive companies are likely to have a larger difference 
between MV and BY. An example of this MVBV difference is provided by 
Dzinkowski (2000) in which Microsoft's unrecognised intangible assets 
amounted to 11.2 times the tangible assets. To match the equity market, 
management may be expected to provide VDIC to bridge the gap created by 
this difference. They suggest that VDIC is likely to be higher where the MVBV 
ratio is larger. Although the assumption that IA are represented by this 
difference has been adopted by several authors (Federal Accounting Standards 
Board 2001, Frankel et al. 1999 and Tasker 1998), the assumption is not widely 
accepted as representing the level of IA. Findings by Lev and Sougiannis 
(1999) illustrate that price earnings ratios and market to book ratios may be 
misstated by analysts and various user groups. Furthermore, Lev (2001) points 
out that MVBV were well in excess of one in the 1950s and 1960s so that this 
gap is not new. Nevertheless, Lev (2001) suggests that three areas may be 
attributed to this difference. However, various authors have indicated ways in 
which voluntary disclosure may mitigate the shortfalls within the traditional 
reporting framework. 
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Firstly, the market values IA differently to the accounting valuation. 
The greater the extent of VDIC the more accurate the predictions of future 
earnings (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). These future earnings are associated with 
market value that accounts for both tangible, intangible assets and growth 
prospects (Frankel et al. 1999). Secondly, the market accounts for sources of IA 
value not recognised on the balance sheet as such, the greater the extent of 
VDIC the more the upward rise in revision in equity valuations (Healey and 
Palepu 1993). VDIC requires the identification of individual IC attributes and 
therefore the individual sources of IA generation. Thirdly, increased VDIC 
including the company's plans, opportunities, risks and other factors unrelated 
to intangibles may result in increased liquidity and tradability and decreased 
cost of capital (Botosan 1997). 
Few studies have conducted a direct empirical investigation on MVBV 
and disclosure. Patton and Zelenka (1997) found no significant relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and percentage of IA in the resource base. The 
explanations were based on signalling theory however, little IA have been 
regulated as such the lack of a link between accounting figures and IA may 
have restricted this study. The existing literature suggests that IC represents the 
missing value in the balance sheet that may be attributed to IC, IA and IP. 
Tobin's Q has also been studied with respect to establishing a relationship with 
the "hidden value"; this research applies MVBV and MVTA ratios as its 
proxies for this "hidden value". The theoretical approach applied in the 
development of this hypothesis is based on explanations from the RBV and 
signalling theory. 
The motivations for an expectation of a positive association are derived 
from Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) that confirm MVBV as a positive significant 
variable in the presentation of information to analysts. The main concern with 
bridging the MVBV gap is the reliability, objectivity of estimates required for 
capitalisation of IA. Signalling theory explains that management may be 
motivated to disclose more IC when the MVBV ratio is larger. This explanation 
is supported as service, high technology, R&D and computer and software 
development companies are more disadvantaged by current accounting 
regulations than are traditional tangible assets based companies. These 
companies are expected to disclose the investment that would otherwise remain 
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invisible to shareholders and stakeholders alike. Whilst recognising that MVBV 
is an imperfect measure of IA (Brennan 2001), it remains nevertheless a 
function in part of this difference as such companies with higher levels of IA 
may have more unrecognised IC to communicate in narratives. Given this 
deficiency in book value, this research develops a sensitivity test in the ratio of 
market value to total assets (MVTA) that may proxy for the difference between 
intangible and tangible assets based equities. The proxies for this "hidden 
value" are therefore MVBV and MVTA. It may therefore be hypothesized that: 
H5.3: MVBV is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
H5.4: MVTA is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.13. Experienced Non-executive Directors (EXPRCD) 
Non-executive directors (NONEXEC) are perceived as a tool for monitoring 
management behaviour and may result in more VDIC. Both Leftwich et al. 
(1981) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the larger the proportion of 
NONEXEC on the board the more effective it will be in monitoring managerial 
opportunism and the more reliable in diffusing agency conflicts between 
managers and owners and in providing the necessary checks and balances 
needed to enhance board effectiveness. As such, NONEXEC may not exert 
sufficient monitoring power if their numbers only account for a small 
proportion of board membership (Ho and Wong 2001). 
This research introduces experienced non-executive directors 
(EXPRCD) as a corporate governance variable defined in this research as 
NONEXEC that hold more than one directorship in different listed companies 
(Kosnik 1987, p. 171). This research acknowledges that the mere increase in the 
number of NONEXEC does not necessarily improve decision-making or 
performance (Walsh and Seward 1990, Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Baligia 
et al. 1996, Romano 1996 and Kren and Kerr 1997 and Haniffa and Cooke 
2005). Although, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) argue for more NONEXEC on 
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boards, due to their wider expertise, prestige and contacts, their results 
suggested a negative association indicating perhaps that NONEXEC lack the 
experience and knowledge. Therefore, it appears that only those directors that 
bring expertise on board may influence effective board monitoring and 
company performance (Useem 1993). Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that 
those directors who sit on several corporate boards have developed this 
experience and related reputation capital. This reputational capital is expected 
to provide the necessary expertise (Gul and Leung 2004). Kosnik (1987) 
suggested that this expertise might be measured in terms of whether the outside 
directorships relate to unconnected companies. This relationship is sometimes 
referred to as cross-director-ships. In as much as appointment of a large audit 
firm may be used as a signal of the existence of reputational capital, so too can 
the appointment of EXPRCD. 
Investment in attracting and retaining such expertise may lead to 
signalling of successful management practices and company performance 
sufficient to maintain such a calibre of EXPRCD. The theoretical approach may 
be linked to signalling of ICCA attributes. Nevertheless, an alternative 
approach examines EXPRCD as a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the 
effects of agency costs. EXPRCD directors may be instrumental in reducing 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders. This research 
adopts this approach based on agency theory, the more experienced the 
EXPRCD the greater will be the level of IC attribute disclosure. In a study on 
unlisted companies in the UK, Lufti (1989) reported an insignificant result on 
the influence of NONEXEC on voluntary disclosure. Similarly, in the US 
Malone et al. (1993), reported an insignificant result between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure and proportion of outside directors. Limitations are found 
in both these studies, in the first, only unlisted companies were examined 
placing questions on the comparability of NONEXEC from listed and unlisted 
companies. In the second, the study was limited to oil and gas companies. 
These studies are followed by Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) who confirmed the insignificant results as above, applying 
agency theory, Ho and Wong (2001) examined 98 listed companies employing 
a voluntary index of 20 items and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) applied agency 
theory in establishing an insignificant result. On the one hand, Adams and 
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Hossain (1998) and Chen and Jaggi (2000) found empirical evidence of a 
positive relation between proportion of independent directors and mandatory 
disclosure in Hong Kong. On the other hand, Eng and Mak (2003) found that 
NONEXEC is associated with reduced voluntary disclosure. The disclosure 
attributes differed in these studies, one examined mandatory and the other 
voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the studies were conducted in different 
countries. When objectives of EXPRCD are prejudiced against shareholders, 
agency theory may explain low IC disclosure levels. As such, this study applies 
the ratio of EXPRCD to total directors on the board. Those that support this 
view, base their arguments on agency theory that views EXPRCD as a check 
and balance mechanism in enhancing board activities by monitoring and 
controlling the actions of executive directors. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest a framework on agency theory for 
linking management disclosure behaviour and corporate governance. Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) and Mak (1996) share the same 
framework. In addition, EXPRCD are seen to be independent and not 
intimidated by the chair (Weisbach 1988), able to reduce managerial 
consumption of prerequisites (Brickley and James 1987) and act as a positive 
influence over directors' decisions (Pearce and Zahra 1992). This research 
adopts agency theory in explaining the variation in VDIC that may be 
associated with the variation in additional insight, links to the external 
environment, expertise, prestige and contacts attributable to EXPRCD. 
Moreover, these EXPRCD provide various resources on world affairs (Tricker 
1984), as such they are seen more in an advisory capacity than decision-making 
role (Mace 1991 and Spencer 1993). 
Other studies in favour of NONEXEC domination on boards include 
Kesner and Johnson (1990) and Grace et al. (1995). Where management is 
heavily reliant on the advice of EXPRCD, VDIC may be expected to increase 
due to the prudence and conservative approach of EXPRCD. Management may 
be dependent on EXPRCD for expert advice and may be sufficiently influenced 
to increase VDIC. In contrast, arguments against the effective influence of 
NONEXEC in general include stifling strategic actions (Goodstein et al. 1994), 
excessive monitoring (Baysinger and Butler 1985), lack of business knowledge 
(Patton and Baker 1987) and lack of real independence (Demb and Neubauer 
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1992). Nevertheless, multiple or cross-directorships are expected to promote 
transparency and accountability that may lead to increased VDIC. It may 
therefore be hypothesised that: 
H6.1: The ratio of EXPRCD to total directors is a positive significant 
explanatory variable of the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.14. Executive Remuneration (EXCREM) 
A high executive remuneration (EXCREM) may be motivated by self-interests 
of the executive, secondly, a high ratio may indicate susceptibility to financial 
risk as payments are diverted from shareholders to the executive thus reducing 
shareholder returns and increasing unsystematic risk. High EXCREM may be 
associated with low VDIC. The separation of ownership and control may be 
exacerbated by the incidence asymmetry of information as management exploit 
their information advantage to the detriment of stakeholders. A negative 
association may be expected between EXCREM and VDIC. 
This research adopts the approach in which a negative association is 
expected. Although both the theoretical arguments and the direction of the 
relationship have been reported as unclear, Lufti (1989) identified share option 
schemes as positive and significant in influencing voluntary disclosure in UK 
unlisted companies. This study applied share option scheme as a proxy for 
remuneration and benefits that management may accrue during their 
employment. Agency theory was applied as the theoretical approach suggesting 
that EXCREM is linked to agency theory within disclosure studies. The 
incidence of agency costs is exacerbated by the existence of high remuneration 
packages. The need for management to ensure continuance in office may result 
in agency costs; asymmetry of information may be prevalent, leading to 
management diverting profits from dividends to EXCREM. As such, it may be 
hypothesised that: 
H6.2: EXCREM is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
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2.5.15. Non-executive Chair (CNED) 
Within corporate governance, an important issue is the existence of dual roles 
within management. According to agency theory, combined functions can 
significantly impair the board's most important functions of monitoring, 
disciplining and compensating senior managers (Barako et al. 2006). Such 
combined roles may enable the engagement of opportunistic behaviour because 
of dominance over the board. Forker (1992) presented evidence of a negative 
relationship between disclosure quality and corporate governance as measured 
by "dominant personality" providing additional support for the findings of 
Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 314) that combined roles signal the absence of 
separation of decision management and decision control. Independent board 
leadership as measured by non-executive board chair was found to have an 
association with higher company performance in Berg and Smith (1978, cited 
by Davis et al. 1997), Schoorman and Donaldson (1997), Daily and Dalton 
(1994, cited by Davis et al. 1997) and Rechner and Dalton (1991, cited by 
Davis et al. 1997). Several investigations have revealed that stewardship's 
executive chaired boards have significantly higher corporate performance 
(Donaldson and Davis (1989, cited by Davis et al. 1997) and Donaldson and 
Davis (1991, cited by Davis et al. 1997) and Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994, 
cited by Davis et al. 1997). Nevertheless, other research has suggested no 
significant difference in performance between executive and non-executive 
board chairs in Chaganti et al. (1985, cited by Davis et al. 1997) and Molz 
(1988, cited by Davis et al. 1997). In their investigation, Davis et al. (1997) 
found that the company realises the most benefits when both agent and 
principle develop a stewardship relation. 
Applying this theoretical model to VDIC, non-executive chair (CNED) 
may be associated with VDIC. No studies have yet investigated this 
relationship within IC, although Ho and Wong (2001) established an 
insignificant result with dominant personality and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
established a negative and significant result with independent chair confirming 
that the roles of chair and non-executive director may be better separated. The 
literature indicates that executive board chairs are associated with higher levels 
of disclosure in general. This study further confirmed independently that role 
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duality and chair were insignificant in influencing voluntary disclosure. This 
particular study appears robust, investigating a large sample of 138 non- 
financial listed companies from different industries in Malaysia. Lack of 
alignment of shareholder and management objectives may lead to agency costs. 
The optimum balance would be to remove the risk to the company of the 
CNED being accountable for two functions, non-executive director and chair. 
The company may benefit from access to the external knowledge to which the 
role of NONEXEC may encompass. In the role of chair, the alignment of the 
interests of management and shareholders by reducing monitoring costs 
remains a priority. On the one hand, in the capacity of NONEXEC with respect 
to external commercial links may create an environment in which company 
business is heavily reliant on the chair's personal characteristics and personal 
contacts. In such a case, VDIC may easily be manipulated by the CNED as the 
extent of asymmetric information is expected to be high. 
Forker (1992) asserts that a dominant personality in a dual role poses a 
threat to monitoring quality and is detrimental to the quality of disclosure. 
However, expert knowledge of the external business environment due to 
external contacts may curb agency costs. On the other hand, as part of the 
management team and in the role of CNED, agency costs explain that 
information asymmetry may increase. This research applies agency theory, as 
the combined role of CNED is likely to require increased monitoring. A 
negative association is expected between VDIC and CNED consistent with the 
research model and the first theoretical approach. A dichotomous proxy is 
developed scoring "0" for an executive chair and "1" for a CNED. It may 
therefore be hypothesized that: 
H6.3: The role of CNED is a negative significant explanatory variable of the 
variation in the extent of VDIC. 
2.5.16. Directors' Shareholding (DIRSHS) 
The reasons for expecting managerial share ownership (DIRSHS) to be 
associated with VDIC are mainly based on agency theory. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Leftwich et al. (1981) noted that agency costs are associated with 
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increasing levels of non-owner management in a firm. These agency costs arise 
from the separation of the principals (shareholders) from the decision-making 
function in the firm. DIRSHS may be an effective approach to aligning 
management attitudes and objectives with those of shareholders, providing the 
impetus to act in the best interests of all shareholders including themselves. 
Where these are not aligned, one way of reducing agency costs may be through 
the voluntary provision of additional information to the principals 
(shareholders) about the outcomes of management decisions made by the agent 
on the principals' behalf (Whittred 1987, Watts 1977 and Craswell and Taylor 
1992). For example, disclosure of IC may be considered useful additional 
information to shareholders about the outcomes of management's decisions as it 
provides information allowing shareholders to assess more accurately the 
risk/return profile, the growth prospects and the IC of a company as a whole. 
Thus, increases in DIRSHS may be associated with increased VDIC, however 
O'Sullivan (2000) argues that when there is significant managerial ownership 
less disclosure may be expected as agency costs are reduced and the monitoring 
motivation for disclosure may be reduced. 
Finkelstein (1992) and Zahra et al. (1993) further argue that ownership 
empowers executive directors, enabling them to generate new business 
incentives and strategies, increase innovation and enable the company to adapt 
more quickly to a changing environment, in addition to allowing executive 
directors to develop better strategies in allocating resources to diverse 
stakeholders, thereby enhancing a company's image and reputation. Moreover, 
Hansen and Hill (1991) suggest that DIRSHS provides management with an 
incentive to focus on long-term viability of the company such as IC. 
Furthermore, in terms of Gray (1988) "secrecy hypothesis", with increased 
DIRSHS, directors' preference for secrecy is likely to decrease leading to 
disclosure of more information; in this case, directors act more as principals 
than as agents. The marginal cost to management of providing this additional 
IC may be much lower than the cost to individual equity holders of ascertaining 
the same information. Such disclosure may, reduce agency costs (McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe 1993). The literature has been inconclusive with some authors 
supporting an increase in DIRSHS leading to an increase in VDIC, whilst 
others take the opposing view. This research adopts the view that the 
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relationship between DIRSHS and VDIC is expected to be negative. As 
managers' share ownership decreases, the conflict between shareholders and 
management increases (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts 1977, Chow 1982, 
Dhaliwal et al. 1982). As such, sufficient transparency and accountability 
would enhance disclosure of IC and ensure the share price reflects the "hidden 
value". 
Share options and management shareholdings have been introduced 
over the past years to bridge the gap between the agent and the principle. By 
rewarding the agent with a share of ownership and a share of profits, 
shareholders have hoped to align their own goals and the objectives of 
management. Owusu-Ansah (1998) confirmed an association between inside 
ownership and mandatory disclosure in a mandatory investigation on 49 
Zimbabwean listed companies. The disclosure index consisted of 214 
disclosure attributes and the motivations were based on agency theory. Besides 
the limited number of companies, the investigation appeared robust. In contrast, 
Eng and Mak (2003) report a negative result between managerial ownership 
and voluntary disclosure. The sample consisted of 158 listed companies and 46 
items were weighted as the basis for the disclosure index. Country differences 
may be the reason for differences in these results; in addition, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) investigated mandatory disclosure as opposed to Eng and Mak (2003) 
who examined voluntary disclosure. On the one hand, agency theory explains 
manager behaviour commensurate with self-serving interests below a threshold 
level of beneficial ownership. On the other hand, above this threshold, the 
manager tends to behave more like a shareholder than an agent, management 
and shareholder aims are aligned. Management share ownership may be 
considered as a direct signal of confidence to the market to invest in the 
company's equity. An increase in VDIC may ensue as management signal this 
confidence; an increase in beneficial shareholding is expected to result in 
increased VDIC as monitoring costs are reduced. The proxy for this variable is 
the ratio of DIRSHS to the total shareholding and is defined as directors' 
beneficial shareholding in the ordinary equity of the company. It may therefore 
be hypothesised that: 
H6.4: DIRSHS is a positive significant variable in the variation of the extent 
of VDIC. 
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2.6.0. Summary of Hypotheses and Model Development 
In Chapter 2, this research has defined the VDF, TF and the ICF; furthermore, 
based on the analytical framework presented in Table 2.1,18 hypotheses have 
been developed linking investment in IC, financial measures of risk, industry 
membership and corporate governance with VDIC utilising agency theory, 
proprietary cost hypothesis and combining the RBV and signalling theory. 
Table 2.5 above, summarises the selected variables, proxies and the hypotheses 
developed for empirical tests in Chapters 5 to 9. Chapter 3 discusses the 
research methodology. 
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3.1.0. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two basic sections. The first examines the methods 
applied in calculating the dependent variables, the disclosure indices (DI and 
WDI). The second examines statistical methods applied in testing the 
hypothesised influence of investment in IC, financial measures of risk, industry 
membership and corporate governance mechanisms developed in Chapter 2. A 
VDF, that incorporates the three disclosure outcomes of minimal, partial and 
maximum disclosure and the ICF that defines SC, RC and HC attributes, was 
developed in Chapter 2. In addition, several hypotheses were developed linking 
selected independent variables with agency theory, proprietary cost hypothesis, 
the RBV and signalling theory. The methods applied, in data gathering through 
to the scoring of each annual report and the calculation of a DI and WDI for 
each of the sample companies, are discussed in this first section. Annual reports 
are chosen as the source of the data as they are easily obtainable, the content of 
the report is determined by management and the annual report is widely 
distributed to the public (Campbell 2000). Furthermore, annual reports have 
been applied extensively in IC studies (Guthrie and Petty 2000, Brennan 2001, 
Bozzolan et al. 2003 and Guthrie et al. 2004) as they are considered major 
public documents that influence financial markets and the manner in which the 
public perceives and reacts to companies. The methodology begins by 
describing the sampling procedure applied in selecting companies included in 
the content analysis and in the tests of the hypotheses. 
3.1.1. Sampling Procedures 
Companies were selected from the FTSE All Share Index for the year 
2003/2004 in the Financial Times. The Financial Times publication was 
assessed as suited to the needs of this research as it provides all listed 
companies in fitting alphabetical industry category; companies within industries 
are similarly listed alphabetically. Every second and third company was 
systematically selected from the population with the exclusion of companies in 
the banks, financial, insurance, life assurance, mining, oil and gas, real estate, 
speciality and other finance and investment and property industries. These 
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industries generally have additional reporting regulations; in particular, banks 
and insurance companies have industry-specific disclosure requirements that do 
not apply to other companies. This meant that if the second or third company 
was in an excluded category the next category on the list was selected and the 
next company on the list would be selected and the counting began again. Of 
the 732 companies in the population after removing the excluded companies, 
the theoretical sample was 488 as indicated in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Sample selection 
Number of companies in the FTSE ALL SHARE Index 1440 
Number of banks, insurance, life assurance, mining, oil and gas, real 
estate, speciality and other finance and investment companies (708) 
Population 732 
Sample select every 2"d and 3rd (1/3) (244) 
Sample (theoretical) 488 
Non-respondents 2244, ) 
464 
Suspended 
460 
Floated in current year _Qj 457 
Less than 12 months trading Q 
450 
Mergers/takeover 
443 
Incomplete data 
Final sample 439 
Source: Annual Reports 
A letter requesting an annual report for the financial year ending 2004 
calendar year was sent to all 488 companies. After one month, the first 
reminder was despatched followed by the second reminder after a further month 
to those companies that had not responded to earlier requests. Initially, 407 
companies mailed their annual reports forming 83% response rate and therefore 
28% of the total population of FTSE All index companies. Evidence from prior 
literature reveals no consistent method of selecting the number of sample items 
to include in DI; past studies have varied on this variable. After three months 
from the date of the first letter, several annual reports were still outstanding. At 
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this stage, those companies that had not responded at all were emailed to 
request their annual reports. More annual reports were received from companies 
on the final request. The final sample of 439 listed companies is investigated in 
this research comprising 91 % response rate and 31 % coverage of the FTSE All 
Share Index. The sample selection process is summarised in Table 3.1. Non- 
respondents have been considered to have no bias on the sample as they 
effectively account for 2% of the theoretical sample; these companies represent 
all industries; and have varying size values as measured by MV, indicating that 
non-respondents are neither sector nor size biased. In the next section, this 
research examines the methods applied in scoring the IC attributes. 
3.1.2. The Dependent Variable 
Since the early study by Cerf (1961), several different approaches have been 
applied in determining disclosure quality and quantity. Disclosure is an abstract 
construct the nature of which does not lend itself well to the determination of its 
intensity or quality (Wallace and Naser 1995). Hackstone and Milne (1996) 
found that a disclosure index or content analysis could be applied in the 
measure of the dependent variable. Various constructs used in prior studies are 
discussed below, Buzby (1974) applied adequacy as the dependent variable by 
assessing whether each annual report met a set of minimum standards i. e. 
mandatory regulations. Whereas, Patton and Zelenka (1997) studied the extent 
of disclosure which generally identifies whether an item is disclosed or not but 
may not determine the depth of the disclosures. The value of information may 
change depending on the timeliness of disclosure. Courtis (1976) and Whittred 
(1980) investigated timeliness of annual reports as a construct for assessing 
disclosure. They determined whether, the time of release was affected by good 
or by bad news. Moreover, they considered whether qualification or non- 
qualification of the audit report affected timeliness. A further construct was 
reported by Alford et al. (1993) who examined the informativeness of annual 
reports as to whether the direction of share prices and returns was indicated by 
the reported accounting earnings. Informativeness was described as the 
information content and timeliness of accounting earnings in 17 countries 
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including the USA. The results indicated significant differences between 
countries in the timeliness and information content of accounting earnings. 
These varying results are attributed to differences in capital markets, 
accounting standards, disclosure practices and corporate governance systems. 
Barrett (1977) and Wallace et al. (1994) investigated comprehensiveness. The 
authors investigated comprehensiveness by ensuring that no important aspect 
had been left undisclosed and by rewarding an information item with 
substantial detail. Comprehensiveness, is a construct of quality. Imhoff (1992) 
suggests, "High accounting quality is closely associated with full disclosure". 
This research refers to the extent of disclosure as its construct due to the nature 
of the method of content analysis applied in determining DI. Nevertheless, the 
literature reveals that each construct enables disclosure to be measurable along 
a continuum ranging from poor to excellent. The construct of 
comprehensiveness as measured by Barrett (1977) and Wallace et al. (1994) 
lends itself well to the adopted definition of WDI in this research. The 
information items of the index varied substantially in volume. In addition, some 
of the disclosure indices were weighted based on the perceptions of users while 
some others were unweighted. 
Parallel studies conducted by Spero (1979), Robbins and Austin (1986) 
and Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) have revealed no significant difference 
between weighted and unweighted disclosure indices. The literature has 
illustrated two approaches to index development; the first is questionnaire 
based and adopts various user-ranked accounting factors to construct a list of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure attributes (Buzby 1974, Chandra 1974, 
Firth 1978 and Turkey 1985). The second is based on an author constructed 
disclosure indices of mandatory, voluntary or total accounting disclosure under 
an established framework. Researcher/author-constructed index have formed 
the majority of studies. Imhoff (1992) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) used 
disclosure indices created by analysts. Gray et al. (1995), Adrem (1999), 
Williams (2001) and Ferguson et al. (2002) and in mandatory disclosure by 
Ahmed and Nichols (1994), Wallace et al. (1994), Inchausti (1997), Jaggi and 
Low (2000) and Richardson and Welker (2001) author constructed indices were 
employed in their annual reports studies. 
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This research adopts the second stream, as a DI and WDI are author- 
constructed. DI is measured based on the construct of the extent of disclosure 
and WDI is measured based on the construct of the competitive advantage in 
the disclosure. These two constructs are applied to identify in DI the existence 
or not of an IC attribute and in WDI the existence or lack thereof of ICCA 
attribute. The establishment of a framework based on a set of defined ICCA and 
IC attributes and a tried and tested content analysis reduces the subjectivity that 
may be associated with author-constructed indices. The steps taken to ensure 
reliability of the indices are included in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
This research defines competitive advantage from a practical perspective as: 
An ICCA attribute disclosed as a unit of analysis that identifies certain 
processes within management that include the acknowledgement and 
identification of a dynamic organisational process to manage, develop, 
maintain and report IC. 
Furthermore, at the ICCA attribute level, this research, applies the 
assessment of competitive advantage to each individual IC attribute. Following 
the strategic building blocks of competitive advantage summarised by 
Flamholtz and Hua (2003), this research links IC disclosure with specific 
competitive advantage attributes. The first identifies a viable market niche 
(Freeman and Hannah 1983) as a strategic building block accounted for in RC 
and including brands, customers and business collaborations. The second is 
associated with the development of products and services for a market niche 
(Midgely 1981), and may be attributed to entrepreneurial spirit, innovation and 
creativity embedded in HC. The third includes acquisition and development of 
resources required to operate the company (Caroll and Yangchung 1986) 
accounted for in the ICF under SC and relating to financial relations, IP and 
information systems. 
The final three competitive advantage building blocks as summarised by 
Flamholtz and Hua (2003) include operational systems (Starbuck 1965), 
management systems (Tushman et al. 1985) and organisational culture 
(Flamholtz and Aksehirli 2000) that are found under SC within the ICF. From a 
practical point of view, characteristics such as proactive development, 
successful implementation, periodic or on going improvement and maintenance 
100 
of IC within the company when coupled with value-creating strategies increase 
market share (RC), support brand development (SC) and maintain good 
employee relations (HC). 
These strategies provide a competitive advantage, as they are not 
simultaneously being followed by any current or potential competitors (Clulow 
et al. 2003), that suggests the existence of ICCA attributes whereas DI 
measures the existence or not of IC, a unique product, service, process, IP, 
relationship or human resource. In this manner, DI and WDI can be evaluated 
and compared in ascertaining whether the quality-adjusted index reflects the 
significance of competitiveness. 
3.1.3. Content Analysis 
A content analysis of the entire annual reports of a sample of listed companies 
was conducted by adapting the methodologies of Guthrie et al. (1999), 
Bozzolan et al. (2003) and Milne and Adler (1999). Krippendorff (1980) first 
reported on the use of content analysis, further developments and adaptations 
have cumulated in several authors applying it in disclosure studies particularly 
Gray et al. (1995) and Guthrie et al. (2004) who detail its usefulness in 
investigating disclosure of IC in annual reports. Content analysis has been 
widely used in social and environmental disclosure (Guthrie and Parker 1990, 
Zeghal and Ahmed 1990 and Milne and Adler 1999). Content analysis has been 
carried out in several studies of accounting and IC including Abbot and Monsen 
(1979), Andrew et al. (1989), Choon et al. (2000), Guthrie and Mathews 
(1985), Olsson (2000) and Subbarao and Zeghal (1997). This involves 
codifying IC attributes into SC, RC and HC in order to derive patterns in the 
presentation and reporting of IC (Guthrie and Petty 2000, p. 244). 
This approach is deemed systematic, objective and reliable in 
determining the content of written publications and can be used to make 
replicable and valid inferences (Krippendorff 1980 and Guthrie and Petty 
2000). In accordance with the three conditions set by Krippendorff (1980) for 
the existence of reliability (Milne and Adler 1999), inferences may be drawn 
from this research, as various steps have been taken to ensure that the coding is 
accurate, reproducible and stable. The following steps taken to ensure reliability 
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in the coding exercise are summarised by Beattie and Thompson (2006, p. 6). 
The ICF adopted by this research encompasses 23 IC attributes grouped into the 
three IC categories of SC, RC and HC as summarised in Table 3.2. 
Firstly, to attain the requirements of accuracy, reproducibility and 
stability as suggested by Krippendorff (1980), this research defines the 
parameters within which the content analysis is conducted. The complete 
annual report was read first before coding commenced in order to obtain an 
initial overview of the annual report. The coding was conducted on all areas of 
the annual report including voluntary narrative and non-narrative disclosures 
included in the financial statements. The limitations and exclusions included 
areas of mandatory disclosure in particular the financial statements that provide 
mandatory quantitative disclosures and that are audited to ensure compliance 
with regulations. 
Secondly, no differentiation is made, between completed R&D projects 
such as patents and ongoing intangible generation projects such as new R&D 
developments and activities, in the coding process and in identifying the 
disclosure or not of an IC attribute. Within this research, both established and 
developing IC indicates the presence of potential for future earnings. 
Furthermore, R&D activity applied to create IP such as patents or new products 
increases the potential of future earnings. As these resources have the ability to 
increase growth, management's objectives in signalling these IC attributes may 
illustrate value not disclosed in traditional financial statements. Nevertheless, 
patents rather than R&D activities can be immediately applied in generating 
value as these investments may be at various stages of IC development, each 
providing different growth prospects. Although intellectual liabilities are not 
considered in this research, this research acknowledges that no IC disclosure in 
itself may be considered a liability given the necessity of innovation and 
technology in the new knowledge economy and given the market's adverse 
reaction to no news. With respect to DI, this research acknowledges the 
presence of IC whether developed or developing as the presence of an IC 
attribute. With respect to WDI however, recognition of an ICCA attribute is 
dependent on the completion of the development process whether training 
leading to HC qualifications or R&D leading to IP structures or customer 
relations leading to increased market share. In addition, in all cases the 
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identified, developed and implemented IC should lead to a competitive 
advantage in the market place. Furthermore, management should be actively 
maintaining the IC in a manner that confirms the importance of the attribute as 
generating competitive advantage. This maintenance may take the form of a 
dynamic organisational process to manage, develop, maintain and report IC. 
According to Holsti (1969), a recording unit is "the specific segment of 
content that is characterised by placing it into a given category" within the text. 
Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) indicate that words are the smallest unit of 
measurement for analysis and may provide a robust measure in quantitative 
terms. This research however acknowledges that individual words may not 
convey the meaning of the disclosure in particular with respect to ICCA 
attributes, as such word counts may be considered appropriate for the 
measurement of amount of space or percentage of words dedicated to IC but not 
indicative of the quality of the disclosure. Milne and Adler (1999) suggest that 
sentences are the most reliable unit of analysis. However, sentences may signal 
the existence or competitive advantage of more than one IC or ICCA attribute. 
Furthermore, sentences may differ in size and as such may result in the loss of 
one or more IC attribute in the coding exercise. Due to the nature of the 
definition of an attribute as discussed above, individual words or sentences are 
therefore not applied as the recording unit. The variable nature of IC disclosures 
is such that a comprehensive analysis would need to capture all manner of IC 
attribute disclosure including phrases, sentences, groups of words, pictures, 
diagrams and graphs, as individual words are deemed insufficient to meet the 
requirements of an ICCA or IC attribute. 
Davison and Skerratt (2007) concur that discretionary words (IC 
attributes) and pictures and diagrams (brands, licenses, patents, efficiency 
certificates, awards, IC attributes, HC certificates) are being used to 
communicate business intangibles such as; corporate activities not covered by 
traditional accounting, products, management, markets, business development, 
customers, employees, future aspirations, corporate responsibility and brands. 
As such with respect to narrative disclosures, consistent with the approach 
applied by Beattie et al. (2004, p. 32), this research splits sentences into text 
units with each group of words able to meaningfully convey independently, a 
single IC or ICCA attribute. With respect to non-narrative disclosures, 
104 
consistent with the suggestions of Davison and Skerratt (2007, p. 9) and 
Unerman (2000), the use of narratives alone will capture only the partial 
disclosures. This research therefore includes other visual forms of 
communication that have been found to provide an immediate and effective 
means of corporate disclosure (Beattie and Jones 2001 and Beattie and 
Thompson 2006). Davison and Skerratt (2007) provide evidence that within the 
top 100 UK companies, 94% of pictures communicated intangible aspects of 
companies businesses. 
Thirdly, as illustrated in Table 3.2 the 23 IC attributes have been 
identified as representative of the spread of IC attributes that may bring 
comparability to existing IC studies (Guthrie et al. 2004 and Bozzolan et al. 
2003). Various authors have applied a different number of IC attributes in their 
studies. IFAC (1998) in a study on measurement and management of IC applied 
a 30 IC attribute framework, Ch'ang and Yastreboff (2003, p. 170) in a study on 
types of IA applied 12 IC attributes, the Australian Society of CPAs and the 
Society of Management Accountants of Canada (1999) applied 37 IC attributes, 
Abeysekera (2001) applied an IC framework of 43 attributes. Nevertheless, by 
far the most common framework originates from the work of Sveiby (1997, 
p. 12) and developed by Guthrie (2001, p. 35) that applies a framework of 25 IC 
indicators. Guthrie and Petty (2000), Brennan (2001), April et al. (2003) and 
Bozzolan et al. (2003) all applied this framework. Milne and Adler (1999) 
suggest that as the number of content categories increases, the potential for 
coding errors increases. Conversely, as the number of categories decreases, the 
likelihood of random agreement in coding decisions increases. As such bearing 
the importance of comparison and replicability, this research defines the 23 IC 
attributes as illustrated in Table 3.2 as representative of an equilibrium point 
that ensures limited coding errors and limited random agreement. 
Fourthly, to ascertain that the scoring was consistent and accurate 
according to the chosen scoring procedure a verification test was carried out by 
three researchers from the field in a similar process as that conducted by 
Guthrie and Petty (2000). Twenty annual reports were randomly selected, 
scored, compared and correlated. Twenty annual reports out of the total of 488 
or 1 out of every 25 were verified and agreed by three independent persons. 
Explanatory notes on each ICCA and IC attribute and examples of specific 
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ICCA and IC disclosures in practice were discussed before the start of the 
analysis consistent with Bozzolan et al. (2003). The ANOVA test for variance 
illustrated significantly similar objectivity after 20 annual reports had been 
coded. The results of the 20 companies pre-tested provided significant evidence 
of consistency in the coding process. This consistency is important to ensure the 
content analysis stage of this research gives each ICCA and IC attribute in any 
annual report, an equal chance of selection if it meets the criteria. 
Fifthly, the importance attached to the manner of disclosure of each IC 
attribute disclosure may vary based on the objectives of the analysis. The 
frequency of disclosure, the size of the font, the location of disclosure and other 
variables too may reflect the emphasis of the disclosure. However, the 
overriding focus of this research in DI is to establish the existence of IC 
attributes particularly as prior studies have indicated a lack thereof. As such, 
multiple disclosures, large font disclosures and location characteristics are not 
considered in this context; secondly, with WDI, the manner of disclosure is 
analysed and the emphasis of the manner is in the competitiveness of the 
disclosure. This competitiveness is evident in the content of the disclosures as 
opposed to the manner of the disclosure. 
This factor gives rise to the decision to weight the attributes within WDI 
given that different IC attributes are of different importance to different users. 
Following Cooke (1989), it was decided to weight the IC attributes in order to 
take into account differences in competitive advantage in terms of depth of IC 
disclosure in the annual report. This research utilises this competitive advantage 
scoring procedure by developing a new index construct. Therefore, the 
limitations imposed by the objectives of DI that investigates only the existence 
or not of IC attribute disclosure may be mitigated by WDI. Toms (2002) 
proposes that the volume of disclosures may be potentially misleading when it 
is the credibility or quality of disclosure that is important. Furthermore, 
Hasseldine et al. (2005) proposes that to capture the underlying relationship, a 
quality adjusted content analysis method in which disclosures are counted and 
weighted to identify their likely significance, may be more appropriate (Beattie 
and Thompson 2006, p. 11). This approach minimises coding errors that may be 
associated with as Toms (2002) describes, rhetoric and non-verifiable 
disclosures that are largely without commitment as opposed to the more 
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informative and higher quality disclosures. Wallace (1987) suggests that as 
attributes have different levels of importance to different users the scoring 
method may be based on a hierarchy of weights. The weights may be subjective 
as was done by Singhvi and Desai (1971), may be a replication of weights used 
by a previous researcher (Barrett 1977) or may be based on the ranked order of 
preference derived from user perceptions (Buzby 1974). 
Table 3.3 Index Construction Methods 
DICHOTOMOUS Copeland and 
Cooke (1989) 
WEIGHTED 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
Buzby (1974) 
Barret (1977) 
Firer and Meth (1986, cited 
by Meek 
and Gray 1989) 
Chow and Wong-Boren 
Gray and Haslam (1990) 
Cooke (1993) 
Hossain et al. (1995) 
Meek et al. (1995) 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
Alsaeed (2005) 
QUALITATIVE Wiseman (1982) 
Giroux (1989) 
(1987) 
Wallace (1987) 
Malone et al. (1993) 
Wallace et al. (1994) 
Prencipe (2004) 
Buzby (1975 
Source: Appendix 1A 
Table 3.3 shows some of the weighting procedures which have been 
adopted in past studies. Table 3.3 is intended to be indicative rather than 
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exhaustive since there have been many studies that have used different 
weighting systems. Further, this review of the literature enables the justification 
of the application of a weighted DI. The studies in Table 3.3 are categorised 
according to whether the index items are weighted or unweighted and whether 
the items are evaluated dichotomously or according to the quality of individual 
disclosures. Table 3.3 reveals that 20 of the 23 indices used a dichotomous 
rather than a qualitative approach in recognising the disclosure of the items and 
13 of the 23 indices have used an unweighted system. 
This research applies both DI and WDI to determine if weighting 
substantially influences the results. This research may thus confirm or 
contradict the findings by both Wallace (1987) and Cooke (1989). The 
competitive advantage weighing scheme applied in this research, accounts for 
the proactive identification, development, management and utilisation of the IC 
attributes disclosed. Once all the annual reports had been scored, an index was 
created to measure the relative level of voluntary disclosure by each company. 
The index is the ratio of the actual scores awarded to a company to the 
maximum possible score that that company is expected to earn. Overall, the 
score for a company is additive: 
Where: 
So that 
given that: 
So that 
X= "2" if ith attribute bears a competitive advantage, 
is comprehensive and illustrates the quality 
of IC is disclosed 
"1" if ith attribute is disclosed, 
"0" if ith attribute is not disclosed 
0<Ij <2 
Xy = expected item of disclosure 
nj _ "23" the number of items in the voluntary 
disclosure list 
nj = number of actual attributes disclosed 
for the jt' company 
nj < "23" 
mi < "46" if Ij = WDI 
"23" if Ij = DI 
ni < mi 
(1) 
The maximum possible score (n) a company can earn varies. In the first 
instance with respect to IC, its development, management and maintenance and 
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in the second, with respect to ICCA, its unique product, service, process, IP, 
relationship or human resource that cannot be replicated by competitors. This is 
the first time that such an index is constructed within the IC literature. The 
coding was conducted by the researcher. Disclosure illustrating a competitive 
advantage earned a score of "2" under WDI and earned a score of "1" under DI. 
In both cases, no disclosure earned a score of "0". The disclosure for each 
company is calculated as follows for WDI the competitive advantage index: 
where: 
so that 
ni 
Ix 
Iý- `_' (2) 
m; 
Imo- WDI 
nom- number of actual attributes disclosed for 
the jth company 
n-< 46 
mj< 46 
n< mi 
xr "2" if ith attribute disclosed illustrating a 
competitive advantage 
"1" if ith attribute disclosed, 
"0" if ith attribute not disclosed 
0<Ij <2 
In order to compete successfully, competing firms must hold some form 
of competitive advantage. This may be assessed if companies adopting an 
industry competitive strategy disclose stable local sources of tangible and 
intangible capital, materials, labour and customers, or have plans in place to 
obtain such resources. This competitive strategy is translated into ICCA 
attribute disclosures by the signalling of a unique product, service, process, IP, 
relationship or human resource particularly as the ICCA cannot be replicated 
due to barriers to imitation that may provide protection from loss through 
proprietary costs. Clulow et al. 2003 explains that a company is said to have a 
competitive advantage when it is implementing a value-creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors. 
This competitive advantage is sustainable if the advantage resists imitation by 
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competitor behaviour (Bharadwaj et al. 1993). The disclosure for each 
company was calculated as follows for DI the unweighted index: 
ni 
I X,; IJ= t_l 
m; 
where: 
(3) 
Ij= DI 
nom- number of actual attributes disclosed for 
the jth company 
nj< 23 
mj< 23 
n, < mj 
XY= "1" if ith attribute disclosed, 
"0" if ith attribute not disclosed 
So that 0< Ij <1 
Hayton (2005) argues that IC offers a unique source of advantage that 
facilitates entrepreneurship by reducing the risk and increasing the returns from 
investments in innovation and venturing activities. Attainment of competitive 
advantage may be high risk but may be associated with higher returns when 
successful. There is a statistically significant relationship between different 
sources of competitive advantage and IA. SC is a major source of competitive 
advantage (Flamholtz and Hua 2003). As the traditional barriers to imitation 
collapse and as tangible assets and resources offer decreasing competitive 
advantage, many organisations have had to turn to SC such as patents, brands 
and organisational or process knowledge. To mitigate the expected lack of 
depth in disclosure, only one IC attribute, "company names" is regulated; 
therefore measuring the depth of these IC attributes is enhanced by the lack of 
regulation as companies have more discretion in choosing a disclosure policy 
within the parameters of the ICF of this research. No penalties were imposed if 
an attribute was judged not to be relevant (Haniffa and Cooke 2002). To ensure 
that judgement of relevance was not biased, the entire annual report was read 
before any decision was made (Cooke 1992 and 1996). 
Nevertheless, more and more evidence is emerging in the literature on 
the notion that there is little if any significant difference between weighted and 
unweighted disclosure indices (Spero 1979 and Chow and Wong-Born 1987). 
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However, as part of the original contribution of this research, the opportunity of 
identifying such a difference exists largely due to the relationship between 
competitive advantage and IC. 
3.1.4. Research Methodology 
This section discusses the statistical methods that are applied. Empirical studies 
have been widespread, ranging from mandatory to voluntary, from international 
to industry specific, from social and environmental to IC however, in all cases 
theoretical applications have enabled the explanation of management behaviour 
with the use of various hypotheses. Various explanations have been advanced 
to justify why a company may disclose more IC than just mandatory 
information. There has been extensive research on empirical work relating to 
corporate characteristics and their association with voluntary disclosure 
practices. In this research, a decision was made on the statistical methods that 
would be applied in testing the impact of the corporate characteristics on VDIC. 
An examination of the complete data in this research determined that 
some independent variables are not normally distributed and are transformed 
according to the methodology followed by Cooke (1998). Various methods are 
applied to resolve statistical problems due to non-normality of the data. The 
understanding in the literature is that not all empirical relationships are linear. 
Empirical tests commonly applied in the literature, parametric tests and non- 
parametric tests (Nachmias and Nachmias 1976) have indicated that each type 
of statistical procedure depends on the data meeting certain conditions. In 
addition, influential observations may have inferential significance in the 
distribution of the sample. 
The data set in this research is both leptokurtic and in some cases 
positively skewed. These two issues necessitate thorough data analysis before 
empirical tests are carried out. Two potential methods of transforming data 
include the rank regression approach and the normal scores approach. These 
transformations are necessary when residuals are not normally distributed. In 
order to understand the data, several quantitative and qualitative analytical tools 
are applied to provide descriptive statistics of the data, including descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Based on this analysis, it 
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was established that the data is not normally distributed. Further analysis of the 
descriptive statistics and tests for association and collinearity revealed the 
extent of non-linear monotonic relationships, revealed the extent of skewness, 
kurtosis and heteroscedasticity justifying the data transformation conducted in 
this research. 
Linear models (Beaver et al. 1979 and Cheng et al. 1992) have become 
more complex and now incorporate some of the data transformations included 
by Cooke (1998). These statistical procedures favour transforming the data as 
one option, and applying rank regression as another, rather than applying the 
conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression without statistically 
accounting for non-normality (Lang and Lundholm 1993, Wallace et al. 1994, 
Wallace and Naser 1995 and Lang and Lundholm 1996). In addition, to 
mitigate the effects of influential observations on the regression statistics, this 
research suggest two approaches linked to Cooke (1998). The first, estimates a 
rank regression that assigns equal weight to all points in a data set whether it is 
influential or not (Iman and Conover 1979, p. 502). The second approach is to 
remove the influential observations from the data set. 
This research adopts Cooke's (1998) approach that includes data 
transformations; when the relationship is a monotonic function of DI and WDI 
and non-linear in nature, this research controls for this problem by transforming 
variables without using ranks but by applying terms of powers, roots and logs 
(Roberts and Gray 1988, cited by Meek and Gray 1989). As the error term is 
normal and independent, the F-statistic can be used since large F-values 
suggest linearity. As this research indicates, there is no need to exclude outliers, 
as the monotone non-linear relationships do not persist (Cooke 1998). In 
addition, the dependent variable DI and WDI is a metric ratio and can be 
transformed where necessary before statistical tests are applied. In addition, to 
satisfy the econometric assumption that the distribution of the dependent 
variable should not be constrained to be between "0" and "I", DI and WDI are 
transformed. Furthermore, sensitivity tests are conducted, the first compares DI 
and WDI; the second compares the results of the OLS linear regression with 
results of the quantile regression and the third generates industry dummy 
variables in assessing the robustness of the results. Tests for heteroscedasticity 
and skewness are applied and variables are transformed by applying terms of 
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powers, roots and logs before a robust OLS regression is estimated. The second 
sensitivity test assesses the sensitivity of the results to the OLS regression that 
are associated with non-normal residuals, this research applies quantile 
regression, that is expected to report similar or better results. This sensitivity 
test assumes a Poisson distribution of WDI given the possibility that WDI could 
be discrete and not continuous. The results of these sensitivity tests are 
presented in Chapter 8. 
3.2.0. Model Development 
This section discusses the selection of the statistical model, the inclusion of 
each independent variable and its respective proxy in each of the models. The 
model is motivated by the four focal areas of this research; investment in IC, 
financial risk measures, industry membership and corporate governance 
mechanisms as indicated in the analytical framework, Table 2.1. Secondly, on 
prior voluntary and mandatory disclosure studies as reported in Tables 2.4 and 
Appendix 1A. Generally, size and growth have been associated with VDIC. 
Thirdly, variables selected are expected to differentiate between IC and tangible 
measures so that the influence of IC can be accounted for in the variation of 
VDIC. 
Three proxies of size are examined, MV, TA and SALES to 
differentiate between intangible and tangible assets and to differentiate the 
effect of the different size proxies on VDIC. Industry classifications are based 
on increasing complexity that is based on innovation and technology. Two 
"hidden value" proxies MVBV and MVTA are included consistent with 
identification of the effect of variations of book value and total assets on VDIC 
in the presence of variation in MV. Fourthly, examination of the descriptive 
analysis and the collinearity tests between the dependent and the independent 
variables ensures that correlated independent variables are not included in the 
same model. 
Furthermore, motivations for the inclusion of each of the variables in 
each model are discussed in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5. This strategy has, however, 
been criticised by Wallace and Naser (1995) who argue that it is better to 
begin the analysis with those variables which have frequently been proven by 
113 
previous studies to be predictors of disclosure indices. However, as the 
literature review has indicated only a few variables are examined in IC studies 
and very few theories have been applied in these studies. As such, the 
development of the variables for each model follows a hierarchy of importance 
as indicated above that begins by a focus on the four areas identified as 
potentially influencing VDIC and consistent with the research objectives. Their 
particular relevance to IC has resulted in their selection ahead of other 
categories of company characteristics. 
3.2.1. Model I: Investment in IC 
IC investment is generally accompanied by increased VDIC, as companies 
signal their superior IC generating capabilities. Model I determines whether the 
benefits of VDIC are perceived as outweighing proprietary costs and whether a 
maximum disclosure policy may be maintained, consistent with research 
objective 1.1.2 (a). Generally, Model I is associated with the RBV and 
signalling theory as companies with high levels of IC investment are expected 
to have higher levels of VDIC as they differentiate themselves from their 
competitors. The main components of IC investment as defined in ICF 
comprise HC, SC and RC. 
The selection of variables included in Model I has initially been 
motivated by identifying a representation of the constituents of SC, RC and HC 
in the financial statements. Few financial measures of IC content are reported in 
companies' financial statements as such, there has been no option available for 
the researcher in selecting IC investment proxies to include or exclude from 
Model I. The main reason attributable for this lack of quantitative measures is 
the complexity of identification, measurement, title and control that has been 
illustrated by the literature. Furthermore, this complexity has been compounded 
by the lack of regulations on IC disclosure as illustrated by the VDF that too 
has been attributed to these issues surrounding IC's intangible nature, 
ownership issues, competitive costs and replicability. This model investigates 
financial measures of IC investment, EMPC (HC), R&D (SC), TMRK (SC) and 
MANUF (SC). Table 2.1 illustrates that the lowest levels of disclosure are 
illustrated by a lack of investment in IC and a lack of IA in the resource base. 
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The empirical form of Model I including a summary of defined 
variables is set out below: 
WDI=ßo+A, EMPC+X32R&D-ß3MANUF+/34TMRK+ß5SIZE+E ý4ý 
where 
ßo : intercept; 
A- ßs : coefficient of slope parameters; 
E error term. 
Dependent Variable: 
WDI: weighted disclosure index based on disclosed ICCA attributes 
measured as a square root transformation. 
Independent Variables: 
EMPC: staff costs including all employee benefits such as health insurance and 
pension plan contributions / number of employees (representing the number 
of both full and part time employees of the company); 
R&D: ratio of research and development to sales turnover; 
MANUF: manufacturing or non-manufacturing; 
TMRK : the TechMARK listing. 
Control Variable: 
SIZE: market value is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in 
issue measured as a log-transformed variable. 
The dependent variable is represented by WDI, the ratio of ICCA 
attributes disclosed to the total potential ICCA disclosures. EMPC is taken from 
DataStream and represents the ratio of staff cost to number of employees. R&D 
is defined as research and development expenditure. MANUF is a dichotomous 
variable that differentiates between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
based on primary economic activity of each company; this variable is obtained 
from the annual report. MV is obtained from DataStream and is defined as 
share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. TechMARK 
listing is a further industrial classification that is based on technologically 
innovative processes. The variable is obtained from the LSE TechMARK 
listing. Companies investing in IC however, are expected to have higher levels 
of "hidden value" and as such may disclose more IC. Furthermore, management 
of these companies may be expected to signal the existence of IC particularly 
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when they operate in complex sectors whilst conducting technologically 
innovative operations. 
In this model, MV is applied as the size variable. The existence of 
various IC attributes including HC, SC and RC has been attributed with an 
increase in the MV of firms. Increasing labour intensity or reduced staff 
turnover may signal good practice within HC, enhancing the MV of firm. 
Investment in IP may be associated with higher levels of applications, citations 
and references with respect to patent and other IP (SC), that are associated with 
higher MV and stock returns for technology and science-based companies 
(Deng et al. 1999). In addition, companies that generate innovative technology 
are likely to benefit from important inventions and successful products (Gelb 
and Siegel 2000). These products may provide a competitive advantage if they 
provide returns that exceed those of competitors. Such a competitive advantage 
can be developed where barriers to imitation either financial, technical, market 
or legal prevent or delay the entry of competitors. These first mover advantages 
are attributed to time delays in high-tech industries that may permanently affect 
any such entry particularly where the industries are based on rapidly developing 
technologies. These advantages may also be attributed to the RBV due to the 
nature of IC, being inimitable and difficult to replicate. A few studies have 
investigated the effect of disclosure on MV. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) report that companies with increasing levels 
of disclosure experience significant price increases these increases are 
attributed according to Healey et al. (1999) on investors upwards revision of 
their valuation of a company's shares. The inclusion of SIC and MANUF 
control for industry reporting trends, tangible or intangible investment in 
operations. Model I includes MV as a size proxy. The classification of the 
industry proxies applied in this model is based on IC content. Industries with 
higher levels of SC, RC and HC are expected have higher levels of VDIC. 
3.2.2. Model II: Financial Measures of Risk 
Model II focuses on measures of risk as the independent variables in 
compliance with research objective 1.1.2 (b). From a theoretical perspective, 
Model II is associated with the financial measures of risk that may be 
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associated with agency theory in line with the minimal disclosure of IC. 
Performance measures include liquidity that may be associated with signalling 
theory. Agency theory on the other hand proposes an explanation based on 
reduced VDIC as a means of withholding potential damaging information from 
stakeholders. Companies that are endowed with substantial IC may tend to have 
higher market risk and may be subject to a higher degree of asymmetry 
(Aboody and Lev 2000, p. 2749). Chan et al. (2001) and Van der Meer-Kooistra 
and Zijlstra (2001) found that the lack of VDIC caused investors' risk 
perception to increase, in addition a lack of information about IC investments 
could lead to conservative estimates of future earnings. Coles et al. (1995) 
suggest that assessing the risk attached to equities may be influenced by the 
company's beta factor (BETA); the perceived risk and uncertainty may be 
greater for companies with high R&D activities, particularly where such 
activities result in the creation of value through SC, RC and HC. The 
communication of this value is not easily achievable due to the inherent nature 
of IC, leading to uncertainty over the existence and growth potential of a 
company. 
The variables included in this model comprise three variables of 
financial, liquidity and market risk represented by gearing (GEAR), liquidity 
(LQD) and (BETA). Control variables in this model include size as measured 
by total assets (TA), growth (GRWT), industry (SIC) and "hidden value" 
variable MVBV. Agency and signalling theory are applied in the development 
of the risk hypotheses. The inclusion of TA as the proxy for the size variable 
investigates the effect of tangible asset based companies on VDIC. A 
comparative review is conducted with MV as a size proxy and SALES as a size 
proxy in different models. TA does not account for the IC in the equity of the 
company whereas MV and turnover are expected to represent the value and 
proceeds of all tangible and intangible assets respectively. SIC controls for the 
variation in VDIC that may be attributed to the variation in industry reporting 
trends. The model includes a measure of "hidden value", MVBV that 
determines the influence of risk on VDIC of companies associated with varying 
levels of intangible value. 
To provide a basis for selecting variables to include in the risk model, 
reference is made to the literature review in identifying associations identified 
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in the past. The association of risk and disclosure has been generally 
insignificant with Garsombke (1979) finding no significant association between 
various measures of risk and disclosure. This study identified the lack of a 
logical theoretical base in previous studies by Singhvi and Desai (1971) and 
Kochanek (1974). The results indicate that the measure of risk applied and the 
lack of control on other variables may account for the relationship found. In an 
ancillary study, although Beaver et al. (1970) found that earnings variability, 
dividend payout ratio, earnings beta and gearing showed consistently 
significant correlations with systematic risk, Firth (1984) produced no 
significant association between disclosures in general and the level of equity 
risk in the UK. This result for the UK suggests that components of equity risk 
may not be associated with disclosure; furthermore, greater amounts of 
disclosure may be of use to stakeholders, however these disclosure levels are 
not motivated by the market's need to assess current and future levels of 
systematic and other risks (Firth 1984). 
In contrast, the informativeness of increased disclosure is confirmed by 
Gelb and Zarowin (2000) who found that greater disclosure is associated with 
stock prices that are more informative about future earnings and therefore that 
greater disclosure provides information benefits to investors. The varying 
results are due mainly to the different definitions of risk; Abdelghany (2005) 
provides an analysis of the association between various accounting measures of 
risk and BETA, the market risk that measures the systematic, undiversifiable 
risk in companies. As BETA is dominated by share price fluctuations, this 
measure is traditionally taken as the market determined risk measure 
(Abdelghany 2005, p. 869) and within the context of pricing models, is a 
measure of unavoidable or systematic risk associated with investment in a 
company. Beaver et al. (1970) conclude that seven accounting measures capture 
most of the important relationships suggested in the literature and may be 
categorised into financial risk, business risk and systematic risk. 
The analytical framework in Table 2.1 sets out the expectations raised 
by the model and the theoretical approach applied. At lower levels of risk, 
companies are expected to provide moderate IC disclosure. However, as firm 
specific risk increases, management may reduce the level of IC disclosure in 
accordance with agency theory predictions as they protect their interests. In 
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contrast, an increase in market risk may be expected to result in an increase in 
IC disclosure as management reduce information asymmetry through signalling 
IC information and through the reduction of uncertainty. Nevertheless, the 
determining factor is found in the constitution of the resource base and the 
higher risk attached to a dominantly IA resource base. 
To address these categories, this research examines financial risk as 
being associated with the financial structure of the company. The risk is 
expected to arise from the gearing ratio and the liquidity ratio. Both these 
accounting measures have been associated with BETA. Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989) indicate that a positive association exists between GEAR, BETA and 
LQD. However, although traditionally BETA is expected to be inversely 
associated with LQD, Farrelly et al. (1985, p. 282) argues that larger and more 
financially secure firms may maintain lower levels of liquid assets because of 
easy access to lines of credit and to the market for commercial paper that is able 
to satisfy their liquidity requirements. 
Business risk is associated with the probability of losses arising from the 
operations of the company including product markets and input costs 
(Abdelghany 2005). Systematic risk however, is the probability of losses 
arising from forces that occur broadly within the economy. These forces affect 
a larger number of companies (Abdelghany 2005) and the risk attributed to 
their influence may be represented by BETA. The three accounting measures 
expected to capture earnings fluctuation characteristics are earnings variability, 
earnings growth and dividend payout. Thus in his study, Abdelghany (2005), 
confirms a significant association between market risk and total assets, current 
ratio, earnings growth variable and dividend payout. Given the close 
association of these accounting measures of risk with the market measure of 
risk, this research identifies the importance of including these measures in 
evaluating the hypothesised influence of financial risk measures on VDIC. 
Non-significant variables identified by Abdelghany (2005) include covariance 
of earnings, standard deviation of earnings-to-price ratio and debt to TA. GEAR 
is associated with the financial structure of the company and therefore the cost 
of capital. It is expected that the cost of capital would be generally higher for 
companies with higher systematic risk. 
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Botosan (1997) and Sengupta (1998) suggest that market risk 
(systematic risk or BETA) is an essential determinant of cost of capital and 
VDIC may be one way of mitigating such risk. Lower VDIC results in less 
information available and therefore market risk may increase resulting in the 
higher cost of capital. The sum of systematic and unsystematic risk provides the 
total market risk of equity in addition the sum of business and financial risk 
provides the total company risk. The empirical form of the model and a 
summary of defined variables are set out below: 
WDI = , ß0 + ß, BETA - /32 GEAR +ß3L QD + 84 SIC +, ß5 GR WT + , 86MVB V+ ASIZE +6 
where 
ßo : intercept; 
ß1 
- 
ß8 : coefficient of slope parameters; 
C error term. 
Dependent Variable: 
(5) 
WDI: weighted disclosure index based on disclosed ICCA attributes 
measured as a square root transformation. 
Independent Variables: 
BETA: systematic risk as measured by a company's beta factor; 
GEAR: total debt / total capital % (long term debt + short term debt & current portion 
of long term debt) / (total capital + short term debt & current portion of long 
term debt) * 100; 
LQD: quick assets ratio. 
Control Variables: 
SIC: standard industry classification measured as a square root 
transformation; 
GRWT: compounded five-year annual sales growth rate; 
MVBV: market value to book value ratio; 
SIZE: TA representing the sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, 
investments (including associates), other assets, total stocks & WIP, total 
debtors & equivalent and cash & cash equivalents is measured as a log 
transformed variable. 
Thus, in Model II the dependent variable is represented by WDI the 
ratio of ICCA attributes disclosed to the total potential ICCA disclosures. 
BETA is taken from DataStream and is a measure of systematic risk. It relates 
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movement in a company's share price to movement in the market. Over a 
period it expresses the relative movement of the price against the market, 
showing the likely relative change for a given market movement and whether 
the stock is prone to under- or over-react. GEAR is defined as the ratio of debt 
to equity and is obtained from DataStream. LQD is defined as the quick assets 
ratio and is taken from DataStream. GEAR and LQD are proxies for financial 
risk. SIC is the industry classification that is based on economic activity. This 
classification is obtained from DataStream, as is MVBV that is defined as the 
ratio of market capitalisation to book value. GRWT is the variable that is 
associated with companies that generate IC including new projects and services 
and is based on a five-year compounded sales growth rate. Sales data is 
obtained from DataStream, as is size that is defined as TA representing the sum 
of tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, investments (including associates), 
other assets, total stocks and work in progress (WIP), total debtors & equivalent 
and cash & cash equivalents. 
3.2.3. Model III: Industry Membership 
Model III introduces several recognised industry membership classifications 
consistent with research objective 1.1.2 (c). As the classification of each proxy 
for industry-membership is based on technological innovation and complexity, 
the variation in the level of VDIC is expected to be positively associated with 
the variation in industry classification. Companies in industries associated with 
higher levels of SC, RC and HC are expected to disclose higher levels of IC. 
The motivations for Model III are therefore based on the RBV and signalling 
theory and the benefits of disclosing superior qualities and competitive 
advantage evident in industries with high growth opportunities. The literature 
reports that disclosure may vary by economic sector. Mitchell et al. (1995) 
found that financial information disclosure was industry specific; furthermore, 
Inchausti (1997) and Ferguson et al. (2002) suggest that some industries have 
more voluntary disclosures. 
To determine the influence of the different industry classifications, 
TMRK, MANUF, INDG and SIC, the model controls for size as measured by 
SALES given that all assets whether tangible or intangible and in any industry 
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are applied in generating turnover. The motivations of inclusion of these 
particular industry classifications is their foundation in measuring business 
operations on a continuum ranging from low IC content to high IC content (SIC 
and INDG) and on a dichotomous scale differentiating between IC and no IC 
content (TMRK and MANUF). In Model III, the proxy for size is SALES thus 
enabling a comparative analysis with the results of size as measured by TA and 
MV in Models I and II respectively. It is important to examine the consistency 
of the results of the same variables included in different models. An assessment 
of the changes on the results of size, TMRK, MANUF, SIC and GEAR in their 
association with VDIC for different models can be conducted. 
The literature has illustrated that industry membership has been 
identified as a potential explanation of accounting and disclosure policy choice 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986 and Whittred and Zimmer 1990). The 
"bandwagon" effect may apply to each industry as companies may adopt 
particular reporting characteristics within their industries, over and above those 
regulated for all industries by law (Inchausti 1997 and Ferguson et al. 2002). 
Cooke (1989) pointed out that leading companies in an industry might motivate 
other companies therein to match their level and quality of disclosure. 
Furthermore, the demand for IC disclosure is greater for companies that operate 
in industries where the variability of the future is higher and the ability to 
forecast results is more difficult. This is especially the case in high tech- 
industries (Robb et al. 2001, Bozzolan et al. 2003, Patten 1991 and Roberts 
1992). Further, higher disclosure may be expected of companies in political 
sensitive industries such as oil and gas (Whittred and Zimmer 1990), 
manufacturing (Cooke 1992) and those in highly regulated industries (Ng and 
Koh 1993). Verrecchia (1983) suggests that voluntary disclosure policies may 
differ across industries due to competitive and political costs. Industry has been 
found to control for these costs in voluntary disclosure studies. 
This research identifies four potential ways in which industry 
membership may influence the level of VDIC. Industry membership of the LSE 
TMRK, membership of a manufacturing sector MANUF, membership of an 
industry group INDG and SIC constitute the four ways of differentiating 
industries as selected for this research. The analytical framework on industry is 
illustrated by Table 2.1 and is applied to Model III; increasing complexity and 
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increasing innovative activities are consistent with increasing non- 
manufacturing, increasing SIC code, increasing INDG codes and listing on the 
TMRK. As such higher levels of IA in the resource base are expected to lead to 
IC disclosure. The empirical form of the model and a summary of defined 
variables are set out below: 
WDI = ßo - ß1 GEAR + /32MVTA + ß3INDG - ß4 MANUF + ß5 SIC +, Q6TMRK 
+87SIZE +E 
where 
/30 : intercept; 
ßl 
- 
ß, : coefficient of slope parameters; 
E: error term. 
Dependent Variable: 
WDI: weighted disclosure index based on disclosed ICCA attributes 
measured as a square root transformation. 
Independent Variables: 
INDG: this data type returns the DataStream level 6 industrial 
classification number; 
MANUF: manufacturing or non-manufacturing; 
SIC: standard industry classification measured as a square root 
transformation; 
TMRK : the TechMARK listing. 
Control variables: 
(6) 
GEAR: total debt / total capital % (long term debt + short term debt & current portion 
of long term debt) / (total capital + short term debt & current portion of long 
term debt) * 100; 
MVTA capital productivity; market value to total assets; 
SIZE: net sales or turnover represent gross sales and other operating revenue less 
discounts, returns and allowances, measured as a log-transformed variable. 
In Model III, the dependent variable is represented by WDI the ratio of 
ICCA attributes disclosed to the total potential ICCA disclosures. INDG is 
taken from DataStream, and is an industry classification based on six 
industries. MANUF is a dichotomous variable that differentiates between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing based on primary economic activity of 
each company; this variable is obtained from the annual report. SIC is the 
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industry classification that is based on economic activity. This classification is 
obtained from DataStream, as is SALES the proxy for size in this model and is 
defined as gross sales less discounts. TechMARK listing is a further industrial 
classification that is based on technologically innovative processes. The 
variable is obtained from the LSE TechMARK listing. MVTA is taken from 
DataStream; it represents the ratio of value attributed to shareholders to total 
assets. GEAR is defined as the ratio of debt to equity and is obtained from 
DataStream. 
3.2.4. Model IV: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Model IV places emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms as the 
independent variables in compliance with research objective 1.1.2 (d). 
Corporate governance mechanisms are linked with the control of agency costs 
and the separation of principle and agent as such Model IV is associated with 
agency theory. As agents, management have significant influence over the 
disclosure decision. Nevertheless, conflicts of interests between the agent and 
principle may result in the agents pursuing their own interests due to 
asymmetric information. Furthermore, with the increase in markets, the 
shareholder base may be expected to increase resulting in additional agency 
costs. Management of disclosure policy is likely to be influenced by 
governance mechanisms (Healey and Palepu 2001) that are implemented to 
promote an optimal disclosure policy (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Corporate governance has emerged with the development and growth of 
the modern corporation, originating in the separation of ownership and control 
in the modem company. Today, certain imperfections are recognised regarding 
this legal construct in particular that no agent is directly responsible for the 
actions of the company. This has resulted in the identification and aggregation 
problem in which we find that companies have rights but no responsibilities. 
This separation of ownership and control has culminated in the agency problem 
(Berle and Means 1934), asymmetric information and differential shareholder 
rights with the exclusion of other stakeholders, profit maximisation as the 
dominant company objective. These views prevail in the conservative finance 
theory and the link to neo-classical economic and political doctrine. The 
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increased frequency of scandals, the increased reporting of their incidence has 
only confirmed the problem as it has existed throughout the development of 
company law. The response by the contemporary corporate governance 
movement is associated with a wave of corporate governance and social 
responsibility codes. Several codes have been proposed, a list of some of the 
codes that apply to the UK are listed below: 
- Cadbury Committee (1992) UK 
- The Rutterman Report (1994) UK 
- Greenbury Report (Hughes 1996) UK 
- The Turnbull Report (1999) UK 
- Combined Code (FRC 2003) UK 
These codes examined amongst others monitoring mechanisms, the 
disproportionate ratio of executive directors to NONEXEC, ethical and 
remuneration rights, financial reporting, audit committees, shareholder rights 
and corporate social responsibility reporting. Further codes grounded in moral 
and ethical foundations include the following that impact on UK listed 
companies: 
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (1976) 
- The United Nation's Global Compact (1999) 
- Global Sullivan Principles (Sullivan 1999) 
- The Global Reporting Initiative (2000) 
Overall, these codes emphasise voluntary compliance and only rarely 
impose penalties, as there is little if any link with concrete legal requirements. 
Mandatory requirements may be waived at times if adequate explanation is 
provided reported on by external auditors. Contemporary definitions refer to 
corporate governance frameworks that encourage the efficient use of resources, 
require accountability and stewardship for those resources and align the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society (Sir Adrian Cadbury in 
`Global Corporate Governance Forum', World Bank 2000). These codes have 
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proposed ways of enhancing the monitoring effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms, bearing in mind that disclosure is one of these monitoring 
mechanisms whose extent and effectiveness is dependent on other monitoring 
mechanisms. In contrast, the critical view regards corporate governance as 
encompassing the unspoken values and beliefs of ethical egoism that provide 
the philosophical framework upon which corporate governance reforms have 
been based (Lovell 2005). Certain authors outside mainstream corporate 
governance fear that this framework is more facade than substance, providing a 
convenient shield for extreme rent seeking on the part of governments and 
capitalists (Fligstein and Choo 2005). 
The theoretical approach includes agency theory however the dominant 
school in the neoclassical/neoliberal literature emphasises on the positive 
effects of near perfect markets and information Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
negative effects of imperfect markets, ownership concentration, asset tradability 
and liquid markets and the belief in developmental and convergence 
approaches. A further approach to corporate governance mechanisms is derived 
from Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958) on the evolutionary theory of economic 
change that suggests that competition may take care of corporate governance. 
Eventually, product market competition may pressurise companies to minimise 
costs by adopting rules and policies including corporate governance 
mechanisms to enable access to debt at the lowest cost (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). In the short term however, investors need to be assured of the return on 
their capital, as managers have been known to use their effective control rights 
to pursue projects that benefit them rather than shareholders (Jensen 1986 and 
Grossman and Hart 1988). 
This research follows neither the critical view nor the evolutionary 
theory of economic change but rather adopts the contemporary view; corporate 
governance frameworks may be justified given the correct context particularly 
where levels of mandatory and voluntary disclosures differ, where protection of 
investors differs and where differences in culture may affect business practice. 
The contemporary approach provides a context within the finance literature and 
illustrates the various monitoring mechanisms that enable shareholders to 
ensure that their interests are protected and decisions are made to benefit the 
company as a whole. Shareholders apply corporate governance mechanisms to 
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increase monitoring; these mechanisms assure shareholders of a return on their 
investment. 
Different corporate governance mechanisms that may influence 
voluntary disclosure practice have been examined in the literature. Ownership 
structure has been examined by Craswell and Taylor (1992), Hossain et al. 
(1994) and Raffournier (1995); the proportion of non-executive directors by 
Forker (1992), Malone et al. (1993) and the appointment of a non-executive 
director as chair by Forker (1992) and the existence of an audit committee by 
Forker (1992). Investors cannot rely on financing without corporate governance 
mechanisms as such legal protection of investor rights is one essential element 
of corporate governance mechanisms. This research examines the following 
proxies as representative of different mechanisms identified in the literature that 
may have an influence in the variation of VDIC: the ratio of experienced 
NONEXEC to total directors (EXPRCD), executive remuneration (EXCREM), 
the existence of a non-executive chair (CNED) and the beneficial shareholding 
in the ordinary equity of the company held by directors (DIRSHS). 
Table 2.1 introduced and discussed the corporate governance analytical 
framework that forms the basis for assessing and developing testable 
hypotheses to explain the disclosure of intangible assets. The motivation for the 
inclusion of corporate governance variables in Model IV is derived in the first 
instance, from significant management positions that influence disclosure 
policy including the chair, and executive and non-executive directors. In the 
second, instance the motivations are derived from the existence of sources of 
expert and professional advice emanating from the existence of cross- 
directorships amongst the NONEXEC. The third motivational factor stems 
from the separation of management functions between executive and non- 
executive directors and between functions within the board of directors. The 
separation of significant roles enhances internal control through the segregation 
of duties. The fourth motivational factor is the influence of management's 
shareholding in the company. This factor is closely linked to management 
remuneration, the fifth motivational factor, the effects of which either 
individually, or in aggregate, may or may not align shareholder and 
management objectives. 
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The empirical form of the model and a summary of defined variables are 
set out below: 
WDI = A3, + ß, EXPRCD - QZ CNED + ß3 DIRSHS - , Q4 GEAR + ß5 EXCREM + Q6 EMPC 
+ ß7 SIC + /38 MVB V+e 
where 
ßo : intercept; 
ßi 
- 
ß8 : coefficient of slope parameters; 
C error term. 
Dependent Variable: 
(7) 
WDI: weighted disclosure index based on disclosed ICCA attributes 
measured as a square root transformation. 
Independent Variables: 
EXPRCD: ratio of experienced non-executive directors to total directors measured as a 
square root transformation; 
CNED: non-executive chair; 
DIRSHS Directors' beneficial shareholding in the ordinary equity of the company 
measured as a square root transformation; 
EXCREM: ratio of executive remuneration to market value. 
Control Variables: 
EMPC: staff costs including all employee benefits such as health insurance and 
pension plan contributions / number of employees (representing the number 
of both full and part time employees of the company); 
GEAR: total debt / total capital % (long term debt + short term debt & current portion 
of long term debt) / (total capital + short term debt & current portion of long 
term debt) * 100; 
SIC: standard industry classification measured as a square root transformation; 
MVBV: market value to book value ratio. 
In Model IV, the dependent variable is represented by WDI the ratio of 
ICCA attributes disclosed to the total potential ICCA disclosures. EXPRCD 
represents the ratio of experienced non-executive directors to the total number 
of directors; it is obtained from the annual report. Experienced refers to cross- 
directorships or additional appointments as NONEXEC in a separate UK listed 
company. GEAR is defined as the ratio of debt to equity and is obtained from 
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DataStream, as is EXECREM, the ratio of executive remuneration to market 
value. CNED is defined as a non-executive chair and is obtained from the 
annual report. DIRSHS is the beneficial interests of the directors of the 
company in its equity and is taken from the annual report. EMPC is taken from 
DataStream and represents the ratio of staff cost to number of employees. SIC 
is the industry classification that is based on economic activity. This 
classification is obtained from DataStream, as is MVBV that is defined as the 
ratio of market capitalisation to book value. 
Within the context of IC, this research has suggested that corporate 
governance mechanisms may be closely associated with the SC of the 
company. The identification, measurement and reporting of IC held may be 
complex without effective corporate governance mechanisms. The ICF 
classifies these mechanisms as relating to IC attributes on leadership, 
communication, quality management procedures, increases in speed of process 
and quality and networking systems, IC attributes associated with good 
management practice. Thus, an IC approach would incorporate increasing 
VDIC as a signal of the effectiveness of management in steering the company 
to success and protecting the company from potential proprietary costs. 
Nevertheless, this alternative approach may be a suggestion for further research 
as the theoretical motivations for corporate governance are explained by agency 
theory, the first theoretical approach as illustrated in Table 2.3. Model IV 
introduces SIC as an industry control variable, MVBV as the "hidden value" 
variable and GEAR as the measure of financial risk and EMPC is introduced as 
a sensitivity test by controlling for the overall level of employee and 
management remuneration. 
3.2.5. Model V: The Full Model 
The final model, Model V the Full Model firstly, compares the two dependent 
variables the unweighted index (DI) and the weighted index (WDI). A 
comparative analysis is made to determine whether the weighted index provides 
significantly different results to the unweighted index. Secondly, in testing the 
assumption that DI and WDI are discrete, sensitivity tests are carried out 
through the application of the QREG model. In general, the OLS regression 
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may have non-normal residuals, so this research applies a quantile regression, 
which reports similar or better results. Thirdly, this model introduces dummy 
industry variables. Dummy variables introduced to control for industry include 
basic (BASIC), engineering (ENG), electrical (ELEC), pharmaceutical 
(PHAR), retailers (RET), computer (COMP) and services (SERV). The 
classification of these dummy variables is included in Appendix 2B. Both DI 
and WDI are included in variations of Model V that account for the sensitivity 
tests on Model V as indicated above. 
The Full Model examines the combined influence of IC investment, 
risk, industry membership and corporate governance mechanisms on VDIC. 
SALES is selected as the size proxy. Industry has been identified as a control 
variable, enhancing the results of regressions by controlling for sector 
differences. The selection of industry membership variables has been based on 
classifications that may be differentiated along the lines of IC, as is the case 
with TMRK and SIC that are introduced in this model. TMRK is an ideal 
choice as it differentiates companies into those that are IC, R&D and IA 
intensive and those that are not. The Full Model includes TMRK as both an 
industry and as an IC investment variable, representing SC. Two measures of 
risk are introduced as proxies for financial and liquidity risk and two measures 
of IC investment EMPC and MVTA and two measures of corporate governance 
mechanisms CNED and EXPRCD. The construction of the model achieves the 
objectives of identifying the combined and individual effects of the different 
focus areas. The focus on risk is based on the requirement for financial and 
liquidity stability sufficient to permit the investment in IC to take place. 
As illustrated by Appendix IA inconsistent results for both GEAR and 
LQD in the general literature leads to added interest in their association with 
VDIC. Furthermore, although R&D and IA growth have been predicted to 
increase performance, no research has investigated the influence of risk within 
IC studies and only a few have investigated GEAR within IC research. LQD 
and GEAR are therefore included in Model V as the financial risk variables. 
These variables represent the financial relations of the company and are 
included under SC within the ICF. The remaining risk variable BETA has had 
no significant influence on disclosure in the past and is therefore included only 
in Model II. EMPC and MVTA are selected as representing investment in IC. 
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Two corporate governance variables are included in Model V, CNED and 
EXPRCD. CNED and EXPRCD represent the HC that manages the company. 
The primary variables focus on the potential domination of the CNED 
and the influence of external advice on the corporate governance function. 
Thus, CNED and EXPRCD are included in the Full Model, ahead of other 
corporate governance mechanisms, due to their closer association with IC 
disclosure policy. The CNED is influential in disclosure decisions in addition 
expert advice of current practice from EXPRCD may be invaluable in the 
alignment of management and shareholder objectives. The variable CNED 
captures both the influence of being an executive or non-executive director on 
the one hand and on the other the effect of combining two executive roles. 
Similarly the variable EXPRCD combines the HC attributes of cross- 
directorship that have been deemed to lead to a great range of experience and 
the role of non-executive director. It is important to include these two variables 
as the incorporate significant positions in management that may be enhanced by 
separation of roles and segregation of duties. This differentiation further 
motivates the inclusion of these variables in the Full Model. 
Thus in Model VI, the dependent variable is represented by WDI the 
ratio of ICCA attributes disclosed to the total potential ICCA disclosures. 
EXPRCD represents the ratio of experienced non-executive directors to the 
total number of directors; it is obtained from the annual report. Experienced 
refers to cross-directorships or additional appointments as NONEXEC in a 
separate UK listed company. MVTA is taken from DataStream; it represents 
the ratio of value attributed to shareholders to total assets. GEAR is defined as 
the ratio of debt to equity and is obtained from DataStream. CNED is defined 
as a non-executive chair and is obtained from the annual report. EMPC is taken 
from DataStream and represents the ratio of staff cost to number of employees. 
SIC is the industry classification that is based on economic activity. This 
classification is obtained from DataStream, as is TechMARK listing a further 
industrial classification that is based on technologically innovative processes. 
SALES is the proxy for size in this model and is defined as gross sales less 
discounts. The empirical form of the model and a summary of defined variables 
for Model VI are set out below: 
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WDI =, 6o + /3, EXPRCD -, Q2GEAR + Q3CNED + /34EMPC + /J5MVTA + ß6SIC + ß7TMRK 
+ß8 SIZE +c 
where 
ßo : intercept; 
ßi 
- 
ß8 : coefficient of slope parameters; 
C error term. 
Dependent Variable: 
WDI: weighted disclosure index based on disclosed ICCA attributes 
measured as a square root transformation; 
DI: unweighted disclosure index based on disclosed IC attributes 
measured as a square root transformation. 
Independent Variables: 
GEAR: total debt / total capital % (long term debt + short term debt & current portion 
of long term debt) / (total capital + short term debt & current portion of long 
term debt) * 100; 
EMPC: staff costs including all employee benefits such as health insurance and 
pension plan contributions / number of employees (representing the number 
of both full and part time employees of the company); 
MVTA capital productivity; market value to total assets; 
SIC: standard industry classification measured as a square root 
transformation; 
TMRK : the TechMARK listing; 
CNED: non-executive chair; 
EXPRCD: ratio of experienced non-executive directors to total directors. 
Control Variable: 
SIZE: net sales or turnover represent gross sales and other operating revenue less 
discounts, returns and allowances, measured as a log-transformed variable. 
For the purposes of this section, the results of the hypotheses developed 
with respect the six major variables in Models I, II, III, IV and V are reported in 
Chapters 5,6,7,8 and 9 respectively. 
3.2.6. Collinearity 
The descriptive statistics establish the existence of non-normal data 
distribution. The next step is to identify the existence of or lack of significant 
multicollinearity between variables included in the models. Multicollinearity is 
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the problem that arises when two or more of the independent variables in an 
equation are highly correlated (Kleinbaum et al. 1988) this may lead to 
indications of a linear relationship. The relationship can be positive or negative 
and can significantly bias the results of the multiple regressions. 
Multicollinearity is checked by scanning the correlation matrix. The difficulty 
is to determine what a high value is. For some, a high r is anything above 0.5; 
for others it is anything around 0.6 (Eastman 1984). However, if correlation 
coefficient is less than 0.8 it does not seem to offer a serious threat to regression 
results (Farrar and Glauber 1967 and Judge et al. 1985). Based on the findings 
above, this research adopts 0.5 as its cut-off point. 
Three alternative ways can be applied in dealing with collinear 
variables. The first is to get another data set on the same variables that have no 
multicollinearity this is not possible for this research as an alternative data set is 
not available. The second solution is to enter the collinear variables one at a 
time into the regression model and observe the explanatory power of each 
variable. The third option is to run two models one with each of the collinear 
variables in order to determine individual effects. This research follows the 
third approach; collinear variables are not included in the same equation. The 
third approach is selected, as it does not require an additional data set. 
Furthermore, the specification of the model is based on theoretical motivations 
and the inclusion of each variable within the models is justified by this 
research's four focus areas. This limitation is expected to affect size and 
profitability variables that are expected to have higher collinearity. The 
Spearman's Rank Order correlation coefficient (rho) (p) is a measure of 
association between pairs of ordinal variables for a set of cases and is applied in 
this research. If a company is ranked high (or low) on an independent variable, 
one can predict that the case will also be ranked high (or low) on the dependent 
variable. 
3.2.7. Statistical Methods 
The next sections examine and discuss the benefits and shortfalls of chosen 
statistical tests and the justification for their inclusion in this research. These 
tests are applied using the statistical package STATA and comprise non- 
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parametric tests that include pair-wise correlation tests, Spearman's Rank Order 
tests, SWILK test (Shapiro and Wilk 1965) for normal data and rank regression 
analysis, and parametric tests that include the OLS multiple regression analysis. 
This research acknowledges that an important stage is deciding which statistical 
methods to use in testing the relationship between the corporate characteristics 
and VDIC. The employment of parametric tests is based on the assumptions 
that the observations must be independent (Siegel 1956). The sampling 
selection was based on a systematic basis, each observation from the population 
had an equal chance of selection and no one selection influenced the selection 
of any other. This assumption is therefore satisfied. The observations must be 
drawn from normally distributed populations. As the tests for non-normality 
indicated this condition is not satisfied. However, data is seldom strictly 
normally distributed (skewness ý 0) and data normally indicates 
heteroscedasticity characteristics (kurtosis < 3). 
Nevertheless, recent methods of transforming data before application of 
statistical tests have further developed the options available to the researcher. 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests are applied in this study, as it appears 
that there are certain advantages to be derived from the application of both 
methods. Non-parametric methods involve, generally, two types of tests: 
inferential tests and tests of association (Hickey 1986). Inferential tests are used 
when an investigation is directed towards making comparisons between groups. 
The tests of association as applied in this research refer to the degree of 
connection between changes in one variable and changes in another variable. 
The test is applied in the form of the Spearman's Rank Order test. Inferential 
tests are not applied in this research. Differences have emerged in the literature 
on the results of both parametric and non-parametric tests. As indicated above, 
the second condition has not been met. Most variables are not normally 
distributed. Nevertheless, Roberts and Gray (1988, cited by Meek and Gray 
1989) used a non-parametric method when they found that their turnover 
variable was not normally distributed. Secondly, unlike parametric tests, there 
are non-parametric tests that may be applied appropriately to dichotomous data 
e. g. corporate governance and industry variables. The third point is that it has 
been argued that using non-parametric tests is likely to assist in obtaining a 
primary assessment of the hypothesised relationships (Lufti 1989) when tests of 
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association are conducted. Fourth, using both non-parametric and parametric 
methods facilitate comparison with prior research, which have used either non- 
parametric or parametric methods or both. Finally, for added assurance, it may 
be important to confirm independently the results of one test with the other. As 
parametric tests presume if the data is normally distributed, then the error term 
in the regression results may be normally distributed. 
Preliminary data examination was conducted through histograms of 
observed values, normal probability plots and through the application of 
standard tests on skewness and kurtosis. The technique applied by the OLS 
regression model is appropriate because of the nature of the data, i. e. DI is 
measured on a ratio scale and the independent variables are measured on ratio, 
interval, ordinal and nominal scales. The OLS technique was chosen because 
other methods, e. g. ordinal scaled probit, do not give better results with rank 
ordered data (Lufti 1989). Output of the OLS regression model is also easier to 
interpret (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979). The OLS regression model is often used to 
explain the extent to which the amount of voluntary disclosure is a linear 
additive function of some of the company characteristics chosen. OLS 
regression is not always applied particularly when the dependent variable is a 
categorical dichotomy (Field 2000). As indicated in the discussion in section 
3.2.5 as the OLS regression may have non-normal residuals, the application of 
the quantile regression model may mitigate the statistical problems associated 
with the data. This research therefore applies quantile regression, which may be 
expected to provide similar or better results. Furthermore, the results of the 
quantile regression undergo similar sensitivity tests with comparison between 
DI and WDI and with the introduction of dummy variables. 
3.3.0. Summary 
This chapter has explained the procedures adopted to examine the impact of 
various corporate characteristics on voluntary disclosure practices. The chapter 
explained the procedure for selecting the companies to be investigated and their 
characteristics. The chapter also described how IC attributes of voluntary 
disclosure were included and how these were selected. The chapter also 
describes how three other issues relating to the scoring of annual reports were 
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dealt with. The first issue relates to how voluntary disclosure was measured. In 
the case of DI, a dichotomous approach was applied awarding "1" whenever an 
item is disclosed and "0" when it is not. In the case of WDI, a 3-point Likert 
scale was applied, awarding "2" for an ICCA, "1" for existence and "0" when 
the item is not disclosed. The second issue relates to the determination of 
whether a particular item is applicable to a particular company. It was decided 
that where an item is considered inapplicable after reading the annual report 
thoroughly the company would not be penalised, so the total number of its 
expected disclosures was reduced to reflect the number of items not applicable. 
The third issue concerns how much information is sufficient to earn a point in 
the scoring process. The ICF describes requirements that warrant a score on 
each ICCA and IC attribute of voluntary disclosure. 
The chapter also explained why the items in the voluntary disclosure 
index were not weighted in the case of the first index DI but were in the case of 
the second index WDI. Finally, the chapter described the measurement of the 
various corporate characteristics and the statistical tests that are applied in this 
research. The tests include both non-parametric and parametric. The non- 
parametric methods applied are the Spearman Rank Correlation. The parametric 
procedure applied is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Various steps were 
taken to build the best regression models, Models I-V for explaining the 
variation in VDIC; these steps were described in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5. In 
Chapter 4, the results of the descriptive statistics are tabled. The disclosure 
indices DI and WDI are first examined. Then the results of the content analysis 
are reviewed with respect to IC attributes and categories within a company and 
industry analysis. Reference is made to results of prior comparative studies 
identified in the literature. 
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4.1.0. Introduction 
This chapter discusses both the results of the extent of VDIC, the dependent 
variables DI and WDI and the results of the regression of Model I that is based 
on independent variables representing management's investment in IC. The 
first section examines the IC attributes as defined by the ICF. Disclosure levels 
are discussed and comparisons are made between the IC categories of SC, RC 
and HC. This section is important, as some prior IC studies have generated 
research of a comparative nature but only to a limited extent; understanding the 
nature and extent of the disclosure of IC per attribute and per category enables 
understanding of the trends in IC reporting. This analysis provides an additional 
differentiation between DI and WDI, and therefore confirms whether the 
weighted index provides results that are consistent with those of the unweighted 
index. 
This analysis provides the motivation for the use of WDI as the 
dependent variable in Models I to V as DI is then applied as a sensitivity test in 
Model V. In the second section of this chapter, the IC attribute and category 
analysis raises an expectation as to which IC categories SC, RC or HC may 
provide significant result in the regression analysis of Model I. The objective of 
the empirical tests is to establish a relationship between VDIC and investment 
in IC. The accounting measures applied as representative of SC, RC and HC are 
outlined in the development of the IC investment hypotheses in Chapter 2 and 
in the development of the model in Chapter 3. The empirical tests on these 
hypotheses are reported in this chapter. The next section discusses IC attributes 
at the company level. 
4.1.1. Intellectual Capital Attributes 
The results of the individual IC attributes are presented in Table 4.1. DI is a 
disclosure index based on 23 possible IC attributes. Each index is calculated 
based on a ratio of IC attributes actually disclosed to 23 possible IC attributes. 
WDI is a weighted index. Attributes not disclosed are allocated a score of zero, 
attributes disclosed are allocated a score of 1 and attributes displaying 
competitive advantage in their disclosures are allocated a score of 2. 
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Each company can therefore score a maximum of 46. The index is 
calculated based on a ratio of IC attributes actually disclosed to 46 possible IC 
attributes. Table 4.1 illustrates the results of the content analysis. Columns 1 
and 2 present the classification of IC per category and per attribute. Column 3 
indicates the results for DI being the number of actual IC attributes disclosed. 
Column 5 indicates the results for WDI being the number of actual ICCA 
attributes disclosed. Columns 4 and 6 provide the percentage of the disclosure 
of each IC attribute for DI and WDI respectively. Rows 3 to 26 provide the 
results of each IC and ICCA attribute. The final 3 rows provide the results for 
the calculation of the indices DI (48%) and WDI (33%). 
HC attributes, entrepreneurial spirit and innovativeness, are the two 
most disclosed individual IC attributes for DI and for WDI. As management is 
increasingly keen to develop new products and services, annual reports may 
disclose activities that signal entrepreneurial spirit and innovativeness. The RC 
attribute customers have scored third highest in the 23 IC categories. Disclosure 
of trade skills, expertise, technical knowledge and other competencies are 
important factors in developing comparative advantage. Management disclose 
these IC attributes to inform the markets of employee quality and competence 
in particular entrepreneurial spirit without which venturing activities may not 
succeed or take off. Human resources and work related knowledge are IC 
attributes identified by Guthrie et al. (1999) in Australia as the most disclosed 
attribute. Similarly, work-related staff competencies were identified by April et 
al. (2003) in South Africa. Additional studies by Abeysekera and Guthrie 
(2005) identified entrepreneurial spirit and work related knowledge as highly 
disclosed HC attributes in Sri-Lanka. 
The next relatively high scoring categories are customer loyalty and 
distribution channels for DI. These results suggest that RC attributes have a 
higher frequency in terms of IC attributes disclosed by management. The 
knowledge of customer relations and marketing channels seems high in 
management's disclosure hierarchy. This finding is consistent with results from 
Brennan (2001) for Ireland who identified customers and business 
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collaborations as high disclosure, IC attributes. Business collaborations, 
customers and brands were also disclosed significantly in April et al. (2003) for 
the South African study. 
Two other categories of IC scored high, management philosophy (7%) 
and management processes (7%) for DI. Management processes describe 
overall increases in efficiency of labour, capital and structural applications and 
in increases in speed of process, process quality and product/service quality 
suggesting a high content of effective management procedures. Management 
philosophy describes the values and principles of the organisation and 
incorporates individual and collective characteristics that are applied to the 
organisation by management. April et al. (2003) reported a high level of 
disclosure of management processes in South Africa. Guthrie et al. (1999) 
found a similar high incidence of organisational and workplace structure 
disclosures in Australian annual reports. Copyright, a SC attribute is the least 
disclosed IC attribute. Only three companies disclosed this SC attribute. Due to 
this lack of disclosure, this research eliminates copyrights as not applicable to 
all companies. Copyrights are IC attributes normally reserved for the media and 
publishing industries. Furthermore, publishing may occupy only a small 
segment of a media giants operations, as such copyrights may be held by a 
subsidiary. The holding company can at its discretion, disclose a subsidiary's 
IC in its annual report. This argument may hold for some but not all IC that 
becomes part of a holding company through the acquisition of a subsidiary. 
FRS 7.10 stipulates that where an IA is recognized in an acquisition the fair 
value should be based on its replacement cost that is normally, its estimated 
market value. This research therefore recognises only 22 categories as the total 
possible disclosure classification in terms of the calculation of both DI and 
WDI in this way no company is penalised for not being a publishing company. 
Other low disclosure categories include vocational qualifications (HC), 
franchising agreements (RC), licensing agreements (RC), financial relations 
(SC), patents (SC) and trademarks (SC). Out of the 443 sample companies, 53 
companies disclosed vocational qualifications for DI and 61 for WDI. Contrary 
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to other HC categories, management do not disclose high levels of vocational 
qualifications. This may be due to secretive management policies aimed at 
retaining staff and reducing the possibilities of staff moving to competitors. 
Franchising and licensing agreements may again be industry or sector specific. 
Retailers and other marketing industries are associated with franchises. 
Licensing may be found in the biochemistry and chemical industries. Fifty-nine 
companies disclosed franchising agreements and 73 companies disclosed 
licensing agreements. The next least disclosed IC attribute is financial relations. 
The low disclosure of this SC attribute may be attributed to the complementary 
financial information that is disclosed in the financial statements. Intangible 
relations may be inferred from this financial information. Furthermore, 
competitive pressures may motivate reduced disclosure as good financial 
relations may indicate growth potential and high return on investment in future 
projects. Management may limit disclosure of these prospects. Seventy-eight 
companies disclosed their financial relations. 
Eighty companies disclosed both trademarks and patents. Regulation of 
these SC attributes external to accounting disclosure may mitigate the lack of 
voluntary disclosure in management's view. Companies are required to register 
patents and trademarks separately. The public has access to this information. 
Although accounting disclosure of patents and trademarks is not regulated in 
annual reports, the impact of other legislation may reduce management's 
voluntary disclosure of these SC attributes. Two other variables, information 
systems, disclosed by 192 companies and favourable contracts disclosed by 205 
companies form a small group of the remaining high disclosing categories. A 
recent study by Vergauwen and Allem (2005) on the Netherlands, France and 
Germany found high disclosures of information systems. Different companies 
are expected to utilise different levels of information systems in their 
organisations, employees technical skills may influence the use of these 
systems. 
In conclusion, the results of DI and WDI do not indicate significant 
variance in the analysis of individual IC and ICCA attributes. The dispersion of 
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attributes amongst the IC categories is almost identical. Entrepreneurial spirit 
and innovativeness are the two most disclosed individual IC attributes for WDI. 
Patents and vocational qualifications are again amongst the least disclosed IC 
attributes. Customers and customer loyalty are again amongst the top six 
disclosing IC categories. Overall between the three classifications of IC, SC 
attributes have been least disclosed and RC most disclosed. 
4.1.2. Intellectual Capital Categories 
The IC attribute analysis indicates that entrepreneurial spirit (HC), innovation 
(HC), expertise (HC), brands (RC), customers (RC), customer loyalty (RC), 
distribution channels (RC) and business collaborations (RC) are the most 
reported IC attributes; whereas copyrights (SC), vocational qualifications (HC), 
franchising agreements (RC), licensing agreements (RC), financial relations 
(SC), patents (SC) and trademarks (SC) are the least reported IC attributes. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics DI, WDI, SC, RC and HC 
IC Mean Median Minii-nuin Maximum Standard 
Attributes Deviation 
DI 0.48 0.45 0.09 0.86 0.14 
Sc 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.88 0.17 
RC 0.56 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.17 
HC 0.49 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.23 
WDI 0.33 0.32. 0.07 0.75 0.13 
Sc 0.21 11 0.00 0.56 0.12 
RC 0.39 
; `f 
0.00 0.88 0.18 
HC 0.35 " 0.00 1.00 0.18 
Source: Descriptive statistics on research data 
Consistent with the analysis on IC attributes, Table 4.2 presents the 
results of DI and WDI at the category levels, SC, RC and HC. This table 
confirms that management discloses more RC than they do either SC or HC. In 
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addition, SC appears to be the least disclosed IC classification. These results are 
consistent with respect to both DI and WDI. These results are consistent in part 
with Goh and Lim (2004); their study from Malaysia found the distribution of 
IC disclosure to be 41% external capital (RC), 37% internal capital (SC) and 
22% employee competencies (HC). Table 4.2 indicates that with a mean of 
0.33, SC is the least disclosed classification whilst RC with a mean of 0.56 is 
the most disclosed IC classification in this research. 
This contradicts the findings of Goh and Lim (2004) who reported HC 
classification as the least disclosed IC classification. Bozzolan et al. (2003) in 
Italy identified the same trend as that of Goh and Lim (2004). Bozzolan (2003) 
identified that 49% was related to external structure (RC), 30% was related to 
internal structure (SC) and the remaining 21% to HC. Different country 
regulations, varying sample sizes may have a different influence on research 
results. Bozzolan et al. 's (2003) sample consisted of 30 Listed Companies from 
the Italian Stock Exchange in 2001 and Goh and Lim's (2004) sample in 
Malaysia consisted of the top 20 profit making public listed companies which 
was tested through questionnaires and interviews. In addition, management's 
disclosure policies may be governed by cultural perspectives that may differ 
from country to country. 
With respect to the ICF, all IC attributes included in the framework 
were disclosed; however, there was very few companies disclosing copyrights. 
This research has adopted copyrights as part of its ICF but has not penalised 
companies that have not disclosed them. Companies in industries not associated 
with copyrights were scored based out of 22 IC attributes. Those companies in 
industries associated with copyrights were scored out of the 23 IC attributes. 
The results indicate that the IC attributes included were appropriate; all 
attributes were disclosed although to varying degrees but no one attribute was 
disclosed significantly more than others were. Table 4.3 indicates that the 
results of the individual IC categories SC, RC and HC and the disclosure 
indices DI (48%) and WDI (33%) have been generally comparative to previous 
studies. Guthrie and Petty (2000) reporting the extent of disclosure at 30% for 
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HC and SC and 40% for RC. Bozzolan (2003) reported an average DI of 51% 
whilst Goh and Lim (2004) in Malaysia, reported an average DI of 61% for 
their investigation. Despite the variance in the size of the samples applied and 
the number of attributes in the IC frameworks, differences in legal frameworks 
and reporting cultures HC appears to have been the least reported IC category 
in prior studies whereas DI and WDI place HC second to RC. It may be that the 
country of investigation may be a contributing factor or that recent reporting 
trends include higher levels of HC attributes. 
Table 4.3 Descriptive results from prior content analysis studies 
Average # of IC Total SC RC HC 
attributes/company 
DI 11 48 33 56 49 
WDI 7 33 21 39 35 
Guthrie et al. (1999) N/A 33 30 30 40 
Guthrie and Petty 8.9 N/A 40 30 30 
(2000) 
Abeysekera and N/A N/A 49 29 22 
Guthrie (2000) 
April et al. (2003) 10.4 N/A 40 30 30 
Bozzolan et al. (2003) N/A 51 49 30 21 
Goh and Lim (2004) 14.6 61 41 37 22 
Source: Prior content analysis studies 
Thus within the UK, RC is the most disclosed category, followed by HC 
and then SC. RC is associated with customers, distribution channels and 
markets including IC related to increasing market share and turnover. 
Entrepreneurial spirit, innovativeness and know-how are the most individually 
disclosed IC attributes. RC is the category with the most IC disclosures overall. 
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It appears that customer relations and marketing strategies are more important 
to management. Guthrie and Petty (2000, p. 248) argue that the external 
structure emphasis is due to recent trends in improving distribution chains, 
firm-value chains and reassessing customer value. Expanding global markets 
too have motivated some companies to increase their market share. Copyrights 
(SC), vocational qualifications (HC), franchising agreements (RC), licensing 
agreements (RC), financial relations (SC), patents (SC) and trademarks (SC) 
have been shown to be the least disclosed IC attributes. Significant in these 
results is the low reporting of SC. The motivation for voluntary disclosure of 
SC may be decreasing as the ability to title and ownership increases. In 
addition, although accounting disclosure of patents and trademarks is not 
regulated in annual reports the impact of other legislation may reduce 
management's voluntary disclosure of these attributes in the annual report, if 
the information is easily available as is the case for patents, in the patents 
register. 
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 have discussed the disclosure indices based on 
number of IC and ICCA attributes disclosed. Thus within the UK, RC is the 
most disclosed category, followed by HC and then SC. Table 4.3 indicates that 
the results of the individual IC categories SC, RC and HC and the disclosure 
indices DI (0.48) and WDI (0.33) have been generally comparative to previous 
studies. In conclusion, the results of DI are not at variance with those of WDI in 
the analysis of individual attributes and categories. The dispersion of attributes 
amongst the IC and ICCA categories is almost identical. Entrepreneurial spirit 
and innovativeness are the two most disclosed individual IC attributes. Patents 
and vocational qualifications are the least disclosed IC attributes. Customers 
and customer loyalty are the top six disclosing IC categories. Overall between 
the three classifications of IC, SC attributes have been least disclosed and RC 
most disclosed. The next section examines the hypothesised influence of 
selected intellectual capital investment variables on the extent of IC disclosure. 
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4.2.0. Model I: Investment in Intellectual Capital 
This section presents the result of the regression analysis of Model I. 
WDI = ß + ß, EMPC + ßZ R&D- , Q3 MANUF + ß4TMRK +, OS SIZE +E 
ý4ý 
The objective of the empirical tests is to establish a relationship between 
VDIC and investment in IC. Chapter 2 outlines the development of the IC 
investment hypotheses. The empirical tests on these hypotheses are reported in 
this section. Chapter 3 developed the model represented by the equation 
presented above. The specification of the model is discussed in section 3.2.1. 
Data analysis examines the correlation of the variables included in Model I. 
This research concludes that data is non-normally distributed and therefore 
following Cooke (1998, p. 210-215), transformations are applied before 
regression tests. The choice of approach to accounting for statistical problems 
associated with non-normal distributions has been discussed in Chapter 3. 
Model I is a robust regression run on data transformed by logs and square roots 
to statistically control for non-normal distributions. The quantile regression is 
applied as a sensitivity test for the results of the OLS regression that are 
susceptible to non-normal residuals. The next section discusses the descriptive 
statistics and the level of association of variables in Model I. 
4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Analysis and Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are reported 
in Table 4.4. The results of the univariate analysis are obtained from the partial 
correlation matrix that illustrates the nature, direction and significance of the 
bivariate relationships of SRWDI and the independent variables. In addition, 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
WDI and the independent variables and the bivariate statistical correlations 
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between all independent variables. The results of the descriptive statistics on 
the disclosure index have been discussed with and respect to Table 4.2 in which 
the untransformed independent variable is reviewed with respect to DI and 
WDI and to the individual IC categories. The results of the descriptive statistics 
on SRWDI indicate that there is a wide range of variation in the extent of 
VDIC. This result indicates that the sample companies have great flexibility in 
their IC voluntary disclosure practices. Dichotomous variables indicate that 
16% of the sample companies are members of the TechMARK listing and that 
48% companies are involved in manufacturing activities. A significant 
correlation at 1% is found between SRWDI and MV, TMRK and MANUF. 
EMPC and R&D are significant at 5%. In general, the direction of the 
relationships is consistent with the expected sign; however, the partial 
correlation coefficient of SRWDI with R&D is negative indicating that 
increasing R&D expenditure may result in lower VDIC. 
This research attributes this trend to management's awareness of 
competitive losses that may result if proprietary information is disclosed. The 
expectation of a positive significant association between R&D and VDIC has 
not been realised. The benefits of signalling may be outweighed by disclosure 
costs resulting in R&D being insignificant in explaining the variation in VDIC. 
Nevertheless, this relationship is significant only at 10% and therefore the 
association may be weak. MANUF as a non-IC based industry classification is 
negative and significant at 1%. The direction of the association is consistent 
with the expected sign. The MANUF variable indicates that disclosure of IC 
attributes may be industry specific. The expectation of a positive significant 
association between MV as a proxy for size and VDIC has been realised. 
To establish the relationship between SRWDI and the independent 
variables, this research presents the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 4.4. The 
correlations are not sufficiently significant to influence the individual effect of 
each other. In addition, Table 4.4 illustrates that associations are significant at 
1% for MV, TMRK and MANUF. The result of the correlation test between 
SRWDI and EMPC is significant at 5%, consistent with the univariate analysis; 
however, the results of R&D indicate a positive and stronger association than 
that reported in the univariate analysis. This result is in contrast to that of the 
univariate analysis, illustrating that companies that engage in R&D expenditure 
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make significantly more IC disclosures than those with no R&D investment. 
The collinearity between TMRK and MANUF (-0.32) illustrates that high-tech 
companies are non-manufacturing. The largest level of collinearity in Model I 
exists between MV and R&D (+0.37). This association indicates that increasing 
investment in R&D leads to increased shareholder value. Significant 
collinearity identified between the IC variables suggests that TMRK companies 
are generally not very large. These companies are associated with non- 
manufacturing; this finding is consistent with non-manufacturing companies 
being more IC intensive and consistent with evidence that suggests 
manufacturing companies are larger. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics by industry 
Industry SRWDI LNMV TMRK MANUF EMPC R&D 
Group 
Mean 
BASIC 0.510 6.023 0.000 1.000 35.092 8.003 
CHEM 0.488 5.627 0.000 0.480 22.906 82.983 
ENG 0.490 5.797 0.465 1.000 33.191 249.519 
ELEC 0.595 5.710 0.340 0.660 41.077 70.173 
PHAR 0.700 6.649 0.769 0.000 531.435 605.378 
RET 0.493 5.481 0.021 0.319 20.970 57.821 
COMP 0.600 5.229 0.248 0.000 36.258 10.980 
SERV 0.602 5.838 0.121 0.759 33.247 1.730 
Standard 
deviation 
BASIC 0.115 1.952 0.000 0.000 31.421 33.711 
CHEM 0.113 2.294 0.000 0.510 13.676 298.092 
ENG 0.101 2.166 0.213 0.000 59.050 847.854 
ELEC 0.117 2.211 0.479 0.479 51.301 304.025 
PHAR 0.076 2.747 0.439 0.000 1740.654 1111.729 
RET 0.096 1.929 0.146 0.471 12.976 389.043 
COMP 0.103 1.911 0.434 0.000 15.842 63.060 
SERV 0.101 1.651 0.329 0.432 73.109 8.866 
Source: Descriptive statistics on research data 
Basic (BASIC): forestry and paper, food producers and processors, beverages, 
tobacco and construction and bldg materials industries; 
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Chemical (CHEM): chemicals, personal care and h'hold prods, household goods 
and textiles; 
Engineering (ENG): steel and other, engineering and machinery, automobiles and 
parts and aerospace and defence industries; 
Electrical (ELEC): info tech hardware, electronic and electrical equip't, 
electricity, utilities (Ex-el ectri city) and diversified industries; 
Pharmaceutical (PHAR): pharmaceuticals and biotech 
Retailers (RET): general retailers, food and drug retailers 
Computer (COMP): software and computer services, support services, 
telecommunication services, media and entertainment 
Services (SERV): transport, health, leisure and hotels 
Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics by industry consistent with the 
analytical framework in Table 2.1 and the RBV approach. The disclosure index 
SRWDI, illustrates that pharmaceutical and service companies have on average 
a higher extent of IC disclosure whereas chemical and engineering companies 
have lower levels of VDIC. Furthermore, the size variable illustrates that those 
companies endowed with a larger IA resource base such as pharmaceutical 
companies are associated with a higher market value. These companies invest 
significantly more resources in R&D and in EMPC. In contrast, service and 
basic companies have little investment in R&D. Industry variables indicate that 
most TMRK listed companies are found within the pharmaceutical industry, 
whereas the majority of manufacturing companies are associated with basic and 
engineering sectors. These results provide support for the results of the 
descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.4. The next sections discuss the 
parametric procedures, the data transformations applied in this model and the 
regression results of Model I. 
4.3.0. Multivariate Analysis 
Table 4.6 presents the regression results of Model I. As disclosed in Table 4.4, 
there is no multicollinearity in the data; Hair et al. (1995) state that 
multicollinearity is only a problem when correlation values exceed 0.80. This 
research therefore applies a sensitivity test as an effective test of 
multicollinearity: the variance inflation factor (VIF). This factor is reported in 
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Table 4.6 collinearity does not appear to be a serious problem in Model I as 
neither the highest factor nor the mean VIF exceeds two. Myers (1990) suggests 
that a VIF of 10 is cause for concern as the regression may be substantially 
biased if the average VIF is substantially greater than one. Thus, an average 
VIF of 1.12 confirms that collinearity is not a problem. 
Table 4.6 Regressions for the Model I: Financial Measures of IC 
Model 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Dependent SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI 
variable 
Independent 
variables 
CONSTANT 0.418*** 0.411 *** 0.441 *** 0.391 *** 0.414*** 0.429*** 
(26.74) (17.75) (20.32) (16.20) (20.26) (18.93) 
LNMV 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
(11.01) (7.62) (7.22) (6.81) (8.91) (7.29) 
TMRK 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.088*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 
(5.04) (3.71) (4.33) (3.90) (2.79) 
MANUF -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** (5.05) (4.30) (5.56) (5.54) (4.41) 
EMPC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(8.22) (8.23) (7.55) (9.40) (8.00) 
R&D -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(2.00) (0.69) (0.90) (0.89) (1.10) 
Mean VIF 1.120 
Z 0.14 
F1 63.62 
R2 (adjusted 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 
or pseudo) 
N 439 439 439 439 439 439 
VIF: Variance inflation factor 
Z: OLS specificati ons reported normal residuals (z = 0.14) and 
these models (1 .2 to 
1.6) were re-specified using quanti le 
regression. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
White's (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimation 
matrix. 
Significance lev els: one-tailed test except intercept terms and industry dummies; 
*** p<. 01; ** p<. 05; * p< . 
10 
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A robust linear regression is run on the independent variables. The F- 
statistic 63.62 is significant at 1%. The value of R2 is 0.28. The large F-statistic 
indicates that the linear equation fits the model. Overall, the model appears 
robust; the sample size is large (439 observations). 
This research formulates a one-sided test as a statistical hypothesis in 
which the coefficients for which we can reject the null hypothesis, Ho > 0. This 
research formulates the null hypothesis to determine if Model I has any 
explanatory power. 
Ho: all coefficients are < "0" 
In order to decide whether the null hypothesis is rejected, the value of F 
necessary to reject the null hypothesis is determined. This research rejects Ho 
when Fobserved > Ferltical. Thus F (. 05, s, 439) = 2.23. This research rejects the null 
hypothesis that all the variables jointly have no explanatory power in the model. 
As F> Fcrlticat, Ho is rejected and this research concludes that Model I has some 
explanatory power. 
In addition, the adjusted R2 of 0.28 for the regression indicates that the 
variables MV, TMRK, MANUF, EMPC and R&D are significant in explaining 
the variation in VDIC. Note that the coefficients of these independent variables 
are statistically significant at 5%. Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5 discuss the results of 
the individual variables and the hypothesis that are developed for the empirical 
tests. 
All variants of Model I, 1.2 to 1.6 are consistent with the results of the 
OLS Model 1.1 with the exception of R&D that is insignificant in the QREG 
model. The negative coefficient for R&D may be indicative of the existence of 
disclosure costs that may be explained by competitive cost hypothesis; 
increasing investment in R&D may lead to lower disclosure levels as 
management protect proprietary information from competitors. The results of 
the partial and Pearson correlation matrix reported in Table 4.4 provide 
consistent results with respect to the influence of R&D on VDIC in addition the 
multivariate analysis echoes this inconsistency with the predicted sign. Table 
4.5 illustrates that the chemical industry may have significant levels of R&D, 
however the disclosure index illustrates that VDIC may be restricted. Sections 
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4.3.1 to 4.3.5 discuss the results of the influence of the independent variables. 
The results from Table 4.5 confirm or reject the hypothesised influence of these 
variables and the theoretical approach adopted. 
4.3.1. Market Value (MV) 
As estimated, size as measured by MV has a positive and significant influence 
on the variation in VDIC. Larger companies may be more susceptible to 
political, competitive, marketing and or product market forces (Stigler 1971, 
Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts and Zimmerman 1978 and Skinner 1994) and 
may react by the disclosure of IC as generally MV may be associated with a 
larger the relative content of IC. Furthermore, as disclosure may expose 
companies to public enquiry, IC disclosure may be a means of avoiding these 
political costs. These costs are associated with increased public scrutiny and 
demands for more transparency and information. Agency theory explains 
asymmetry of information that may be attributed to size and increasing numbers 
of shareholders. 
Size as measured by MV has been confirmed as a significant positive 
variable in Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Lang and Lundholm (1993), 
Hossain et al. (1994), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Abdolmohammadi (2005). Size in any country appears to be an important 
explanatory variable whether measured by TA, turnover (Firth 1979), or MV 
(Hossain et al. 1994 and Lang and Lundholm 1993). As little or no effective IC 
regulations exist, reporting of IC has been mainly self-regulated, being 
influenced by availability of resources and industry trends. The increase in 
VDIC signals the company's competitive advantage and reduces information 
asymmetry between management and investors. Although certain factors 
including proprietary costs and competitive costs may restrict full disclosure, 
barriers to imitation may deter incumbents from entering the field. For larger 
companies the benefits of signalling IC are expected to outweigh the potential 
disclosure costs arising from political costs. Being larger and having access to 
more resources, larger companies may be more successful. Management 
behaviour is explained by signalling theory as VDIC may be influenced by the 
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intangible content included in MV. MV is therefore a significant positive 
variable on the extent of VDIC, hypothesis H1.2: in Model I is accepted. 
H I. 2: MV is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
4.3.2. TechMARK Listing 
Companies that have been admitted as members of the TMRK listing are 
associated with higher levels of IC disclosure relative to non-members. 
Previous industry studies by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Williams (2001) and 
Cooke (1989,1991 and 1992) yielded significant results. The variable TMRK is 
significant at 1 %. The understanding is that a listing on the innovation 
technology index is a result of an intensive long-term plan to invest in and 
maintain investment in IC as such the index cuts across some industrial sectors. 
The company's business growth and success must be dependent on 
technological development or innovation. Such companies are involved in 
innovative business, with new products or services, or new methods of 
business, with existing organic growth in revenue, historic and prospective, 
arising from the innovative business and relevant management expertise that 
has to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the LSE before any listing takes 
place (FTSE 2006). The general trend has been that innovative technology 
companies disclose more than non-innovative and non-technological companies 
do as they signal superior IC potential. 
Political costs in high tech, pharmaceutical, telecommunication and 
software companies are likely to be higher due to investments in IA. The rapid 
increase in the value of such companies poses a risk for stock markets due to 
the increase in the risk attributed to such IC investment. Analysts and investors 
associated with these industries may demand additional disclosures to clarify 
the issues arising from the MVBV phenomenon. Furthermore, competitive 
pressures and the need to signal a competitive advantage motivate management 
to a maximum disclosure policy as they increase VDIC. The theoretical 
motivation is derived from the RBD approach and signalling theory. As these 
high-tec companies may have IP, licenses, patents and brands, the potential 
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disclosure costs are exceeded by the potential benefits of increased disclosure 
of proprietary information. Investment in R&D, innovation and technology 
requires substantial financial investment, skilled employees and adequate 
marketing including listing on the TMRK. These innovative technology 
companies include computer hardware, computer servicing, internet, semi- 
conductors, software, telecom equipment, biotechnology, specialist 
pharmaceuticals, drug delivery and medical technology. Management of these 
companies signal this investment, indicative of procedures to accumulate 
competitive advantage by disclosing ICCA. Potential wealth increases are 
attributed to VDIC whilst competitive costs are expected to suppress VDIC. 
TMRK is positively associated with the extent of VDIC in Model I. The 
conclusion for this variable therefore is that hypothesis H3.1: is accepted. 
H3.1: TMRK is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
4.3.3. Manufacturing (MANUF) 
The results indicate that companies whose main economic activity is based on 
manufacturing are less likely to provide VDIC than non-manufacturing 
companies are. The non-parametric and the parametric results for Model I are 
negative and significant at 1%. This association between disclosure and 
MANUF is supported by Cooke (1991), Ho Wong (2001) and Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002). The results suggest that manufacturing companies are less likely 
to have higher levels of VDIC; non-manufacturing companies are expected to 
utilise more IC than tangible assets in their operations. Previous studies by 
Bozzolan et al. (2003) and Cooke (1992) yielded significant results. This 
variable MANUF is negative and significant at 5%. This research classified 
industries into manufacturing and non-manufacturing according to Cooke 
(1992) found that manufacturing companies are significantly associated with 
higher levels of general disclosure, in contrast, Model I indicates that 
manufacturing companies are negatively associated with VDIC. Non- 
manufacturing companies are expected to utilise more IC than tangible assets in 
their operations. In this model, the results are consistent with the expectation 
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that low IC content leads to low VDIC and that non-manufacturing companies 
disclose ICCA. The motivations are derived from the resource base of these 
companies and signalling theory that predicts the benefits of signalling these IA 
resources. These companies disclose ICCA attributes due to the lack of 
disclosure costs, consistent with disclosures in sectors of high barriers to 
imitation and due to the existence of higher levels of "hidden value". 
Management may increase VDIC to illustrate their competitive edge and restrict 
voluntary disclosure in areas where no competitive advantage exists. Being 
unique, IC resources may be patent protected, may require large financial and 
HC resources, may take a lengthy process to develop and may be specific to 
certain processes, departments, companies or industries. In this research, 
manufacturing companies apply mainly tangible assets in their operations and 
therefore disclose less IC. IC content held may lead to VDIC when proprietary 
costs are mitigated. The conclusion for this variable therefore is that hypothesis 
H3.2: is accepted. 
H3.2: MANUF is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
4.3.4. Employee Cost (EMPC) 
The results indicate that increasing remuneration per employee positively 
influences greater VDIC by management. Increasing salary cost per employee 
may be attributed to higher levels of education, more experience and highly 
complex professions. In an environment in which measurement of HC is 
complex, EMPC is a proxy for the value of HC in companies or alternatively, 
the rent required to maintain the HC in place. The motivation for this 
hypothesis is based on signalling theory. Proprietary costs are mitigated in the 
first instance by the perceived benefits of signalling and in the second by the 
disclosure of "better than the worst case scenario" that the markets would have 
assumed. This signalling is consistent with investment in training, health 
insurance and pension plans as employers signal their successful investment in 
HC through increased VDIC. An additional explanation may be found in the 
employee pressure that labour unions may exert on corporations. Trade unions 
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may support employees in bargaining, requiring more disclosures from 
management. The dependence of the company on employees as a resource 
without which the company cannot operate and that may not be easily replaced 
due to specialisation, may lead management accede to employee demands for 
additional VDIC. 
This variable confirms the expectation that companies with high levels 
of HC content disclose ICCA. Table 4.1 confirms that entrepreneurial spirit and 
innovativeness are the two most reported IC attributes. The demand for 
information from this stakeholder group may be specific and therefore require 
more disclosure in particular with respect to HC. Such companies are likely to 
be highly IC service orientated and may therefore provide more VDIC to 
mitigate the MVBV dilemma. Disclosure costs include risk of pressure from 
labour unions and other regulatory bodies. Pressure from competitors too, may 
curb full disclosure due to the mobility of employees in some industries. These 
motivations are expected to outweigh any competitive pressures and labour 
related proprietary costs that are associated with such disclosures. The literature 
has indicated that disclosure is associated with various measures of HC. 
Singhvi (1968) and Wallace (1987) reported a significant relationship between 
management type and mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The results of 
variables that are derived from individuals within management have generally 
been insignificant; these results raise questions as to the influence of individuals 
on the disclosure decision. Ahmed (1996) found no relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure and qualifications of the accounting 
officer. In addition, an insignificant relationship was established by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) between the qualifications of the financial director and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Higher EMPC may be associated with a more skilled work force, 
therefore companies with higher EMPC may be characterised by higher levels 
of HC content. Such companies are likely to be highly IC service orientated 
operations and may therefore signal ICCA. Table 4.5 illustrates that such 
companies include pharmaceutical and electrical industries that have both high 
EMPC and higher levels of VDIC. The expectation of a significant positive 
relationship is confirmed. Effective human resource practices are expected to 
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lead to signals that indicate competitive advantage to the markets. The 
conclusion for this variable therefore, is that hypothesis H5.1: is accepted. 
H5.1: EMPC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
4.3.5. Research and Development Expenditure (R&D) 
The results do not confirm that R&D is a positive determinant of VDIC. The 
results indicate that R&D companies are characterised by low levels of VDIC. 
Table 4.5 illustrates that although both chemical and engineering companies 
invest in R&D these resources do not culminate in a high disclosure index. The 
results of the QREG model provide contrasting results to those of the OLS 
model as the association is found to be weaker and insignificant. This 
inconsistency is illustrated in the results of the partial correlation and Pearson 
correlation matrices. Nevertheless, as the results of the OLS model are robust, 
this research confirms the existence of a negative association consistent with 
the expectation that competitive costs may limit the disclosure of IC. Although 
R&D may signal success to the market and although innovation reduces the 
marginal costs of production by translating into lower expected marginal costs, 
VDIC due to a high level of R&D activity may lead to the loss of competitive 
advantage as trade secrets and know-how may be revealed to competitors. This 
behaviour is consistent with the proprietary costs hypothesis. 
The results reject signalling as the theoretical explanation. ICCA 
attributes are therefore not disclosed, as the benefits of signalling IC do not 
appear to outweigh the potential competitive pressures. The motivations for a 
positive association may be derived from Gray et al. (1995) who confirmed a 
positive significant relationship with the voluntary disclosure and R&D 
information. However, Depoers (2000) confirmed a positive association with 
barriers to imitation; indicating that the existence of barriers to imitation are a 
necessary element if proprietary costs are to be reduced and VDIC increased. 
This research rejects that R&D is a significant positive variable on the extent of 
VDIC, hypothesis H7.2: in Model I is rejected. 
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H5.2: R&D is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
4.4.0. Conclusion 
In general, the results indicate that no company is consistent in disclosing all IC 
attributes. DI and WDI have exhibited similar characteristics, particularly as all 
companies that disclose a competitive advantage (WDI) disclose an IC attribute 
(DI) as such, a significant number of companies (69%) that disclose IC 
attributes disclose a competitive advantage. Generally, companies disclose 
more RC than either SC or HC. Although at the individual attribute, the top 
three IC attributes are disclosed from HC category, on an overall basis however 
total RC attributes disclosed exceed HC attributes disclosed. 
The results of the empirical tests in Model I indicate that IC investment 
proxies representative of SC, RC and HC are associated with VDIC. The 
parametric tests indicate that VDIC by service, highly complex and high-tech 
companies whose equity is made up of intangible value may be restricted by 
competitive costs and political costs as illustrated by the weak relationship; the 
multivariate results indicate that R&D companies have lower levels of VDIC. 
As a HC measure of the level of technical expertise, higher levels of EMPC is 
indicative of the value management places on HC, disclosure of HC attributes 
signals the existence of this underlying value. Model I is consistent with EMPC 
as a proxy for HC and TMRK as a proxy for IP (SC). Of interest, MV is 
significant as a representative of RC; companies strive to increase market share 
in an effort to increase shareholder value through larger returns. RC is 
generated in creating markets, larger companies have the resources and 
technical expertise to signal the existence of this IC that due to its inherent 
intangible nature may otherwise remain hidden. 
This research concludes that the necessary conditions for a maximum 
disclosure policy include the existence of programmes aimed at investment in 
IC at a stage of development commensurate with competitive advantage 
generation. Not all R&D is successful and not all IC generated from R&D leads 
to competitive advantage. As such, it may be expected that R&D successfully 
developed into IP, recognisable by third parties and commensurate with 
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membership of a technological listing may generate competitive advantage. The 
results indicate that non-manufacturing companies that may be associated with 
higher remuneration to employees operating in service sectors and characterised 
by higher levels of "hidden value", disclose higher levels of IC. Above all, 
these high disclosing companies are characterised by large MV, indicative of 
above average shareholder value generated by larger markets. The next four 
chapters discuss the result of the regression analysis of Models II to Model V. 
The objectives of the empirical tests are to establish a relationship between 
VDIC and various risk measures, industry membership and corporate 
governance mechanisms and to ascertain the effect of DI and WDI in Model V. 
Chapter 5 presents the results on the association of risk measures and the 
variation in VDIC. 
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5.1.0. Introduction 
This section presents the result of the regression analysis of Model II. 
WD1=, Q+, ß, BETA -/32GEAR +/J3LQD+ß4SIC+/i5GRWT+ß6MVBV+ß, SIZE+s 
ý5ý 
The objective of the empirical tests is to establish a relationship between VDIC 
and financial and market measures of risk. Chapter 2 outlines the development 
of the risk hypotheses. The empirical tests on these hypotheses are reported in 
this section. The specification of the model is discussed in section 3.2.1. Data 
analysis examines the correlation of the variables included in Model II. Based 
on this analysis, this research concludes that data is non-normally distributed 
and therefore following Cooke (1998, p. 210-215), transformations are applied 
before regression tests. The choice of approach to accounting for statistical 
problems associated with non-normal distributions has been discussed in 
Chapter 3. Table 2.1 illustrates the analytical framework as discussed in 
Chapter 1 and 2. Model II is a robust regression equation run on data 
transformed by logs and squares roots to statistically control for non-normal 
distributions. The quantile regression is applied as a sensitivity test for the 
results of the OLS regression that are susceptible to non-normal residuals. The 
next section discusses the descriptive statistics and the level of association of 
variables included in Model II. 
5.2.0. Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Analysis and Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are reported 
in Table 5.1. The results of the univariate analysis are obtained from the partial 
correlation matrix that illustrates the nature, direction and significance of the 
bivariate relationships of WDI and the independent variables; these are reported 
in Table 5.1. In addition, Table 5.1 reports the results of the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between WDI and the independent variables and the bivariate 
statistical correlations between all independent variables. Descriptive statistics 
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for the mean value for BETA that is equal to 1 indicates that the sample 
systematic risk is equal to that of the market. Both GEAR and LQD indicate a 
mean close to 1 signifying that within the sample, the value of equity finance 
has been matched by the value of debt finance and that current liabilities are 
matched by liquid current assets. The descriptive statistics indicate that GRWT 
and MVBV have negative minimum balances indicating that some sample 
companies have declining sales and that some sample companies have book 
values that exceed their MV. Furthermore, the mean of 2.8 for MVBV indicates 
that overall, shareholder value is almost three times that of the book value and 
may be an indication of the existence of "hidden value" in the sample 
companies. The results of the univariate hypotheses tests reported in Table 5.1 
indicate that the coefficients of the variables all have the predicted signs but 
that not all hypotheses are statistically validated. The results of the univariate 
analysis indicate a significant correlation at 1% is found between WDI and TA, 
LQD and SIC. BETA, GRWT and MVBV are significant at 5%. 
The parametric tests indicate that GEAR is not significant although it 
has the expected sign. The direction of the relationship with BETA indicates 
that higher levels of systematic risk motivate management to disclose IC. In 
line with agency theory, management provide VDIC in an attempt to mitigate 
the risk of uncertainty inherent in IA investments, and thus reducing asymmetry 
of information. In the presence of high market risk and reduced liquidity risk, 
GEAR is not a significant component of firm-specific risk that positively 
influences VDIC. The univariate analysis supports the hypothesis of high 
growth companies disclosing IC. Such disclosure signal success and sustain 
growth by informing the markets of management's ability. Successful 
management practices and investment in IC are attributed as the driving force 
behind company growth. As such, it may be expected that companies with 
higher MVBV are associated with higher levels of VDIC; the lack of a conduit 
for reporting IC leads companies to disclose IC in the narratives, non-narratives 
and illustrations that are able to communicate qualitative and quantitative IC 
information that is not included in the audited financial statements of the 
company. Table 5.1 confirms that size, as measured by TA, is positively 
associated with VDIC consistent with MV as reported in Table 4.4. On the one 
hand, the results indicate that TA as a size proxy is associated with high 
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disclosing companies; on the other hand, the results suggest that there may be 
no grounds to expect asset intensive companies not to disclose IC. Consistent 
with Table 4.4, industry membership influences disclosure; this is evident in the 
association between VDIC and SIC. 
In Table 5.1, the correlation matrix indicates results that are consistent 
with the partial correlation matrix. Nevertheless, the association with liquidity 
is weaker. Although the levels of association are well below the research 
parameters, they are of interest as they signal potential influences when the 
non-parametric tests are conducted. With the exception of GEAR and LQD, 
results are significant at 5% and consistent with the results of the partial 
correlation matrix. Nevertheless, although significant, none of the coefficients 
is of great concern as the highest correlation between WDI and TA is +0.31 at 
1%. In addition, investigation of the inter-collinearity between the variables 
themselves reveals similar results that BETA is significantly correlated at 5% to 
LQD and GEAR. This result is consistent with the approach adopted by 
Abdelghany (2005, p. 868), as beta is a measure of market risk, if an accounting 
determined risk measure is found not to be associated with market-based beta, 
the relevance of employing such a measure may be questioned (Beaver et al. 
1970, p. 655). The correlation of these variables in Model II, suggests that the 
inclusion of these variables as measures of risk may be justified. In addition, 
results indicate that risk may be industry specific with respect to the SIC 
industry variable. BETA and SIC are associated at 5%, suggesting that high 
technology and innovative companies are associated with higher levels of 
systematic risk. Both GRWT and MVBV have been associated with IA 
generation. The results are consistent with the predicted sign; high growth 
companies that have significant IA in their equity tend to disclose IC. 
The relationship between TA and SIC suggests that increasing 
technologically innovative processes are conducted by smaller companies. High 
levels of liquidity are associated with higher market risk that may be attributed 
to companies with higher growth rates. However, the results suggest that those 
companies with higher levels of liquidity are associated with the more basic 
industries. Service orientated and high technology companies may be 
associated with less liquidity. Overall, associations are significant at 5%; the 
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direction of the relationships between WDI and the independent variables is 
consistent with the TF and the direction of the hypotheses that were developed. 
Table 5.2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics by industry. 
The results indicate that tangible assets are more dominant in the basic and 
engineering industries, whereas computer and retail industries have fewer 
tangible assets associated with them as illustrated by the TA variable. The 
investment in IC is expected to result in high levels of market risk due to the 
hidden value associated with companies in the pharmaceutical and computer 
industries as illustrated by beta and SIC. A more tangible resource base as 
represented by basic and retail industries is associated with lower levels of 
market risk due to easier measurement, valuation and reporting associated with 
these tangible assets. 
Table 5.2 
Industry 
Group 
Mean 
BASIC 
CHEM 
ENG 
ELEC 
PHAR 
RET 
COMP 
SERV 
Standard 
deviation 
BASIC 
CHEM 
ENG 
ELEC 
PHAR 
RET 
COMP 
SERV 
Descriptive statistics by industry 
SRWDI LNTA BETA LQD GEAR SRSIC GRWT MVBV 
0.510 6.302 0.763 0.781 0.345 54.061 0.085 2.462 
0.488 5.836 0.965 1.002 0.323 56.590 0.010 2.616 
0.490 6.332 1.155 0.898 0.384 54.826 0.056 2.456 
0.595 6.047 0.939 1.794 0.336 59.414 0.108 2.671 
0.700 5.828 1.120 2.546 0.232 49.406 0.455 5.128 
0.493 5.622 0.881 0.670 0.295 72.348 0.164 3.067 
0.600 5.246 1.123 1.222 0.329 85.898 0.169 3.134 
0.602 6.095 0.872 0.676 4.871 89.436 0.127 2.234 
0.115 1.780 0.291 0.445 0.241 15.310 0.115 12.732 
0.113 2.029 0.356 0.729 0.222 10.922 0.111 3.535 
0.101 2.112 0.400 0.432 0.186 3.366 0.093 3.103 
0.117 2.604 0.521 2.163 0.296 5.739 0.362 3.903 
0.076 2.705 0.386 2.141 0.234 0.000 0.594 3.869 
0.096 1.916 0.372 0.372 0.253 1.084 0.537 4.111 
0.103 1.949 0.449 1.384 0.747 0.492 0.389 8.311 
0.101 1.820 0.357 0.388 34.026 7.328 0.208 4.501 
Source: Descriptive statistics on research data 
Financial risk on the other hand is associated with industries with less 
liquidity and more debt as illustrated by the service and retail industries; 
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whereas, pharmaceutical and electrical industries are the more financially stable 
sectors. Confirmation of the variation of VDIC with industry trends is provided 
by SRSIC that illustrates that IC disclosure increases as economic activity 
increases from basic to complex. Furthermore, the association between GRWT 
and MVBV is evidenced by pharmaceutical and computer companies that have 
the highest growth rates and the highest MVBV ratios. The next sections 
discuss the results of the non-parametric tests in the multivariate analysis. 
5.3.0. Multivariate Analysis 
Despite the results of the correlation coefficients illustrating the absence of 
significant collinearity, a certain degree of association may exist given that one 
independent variable may be an approximate linear function of a set of several 
independent variables. This research therefore applies a sensitivity test as an 
effective test of multicollinearity: the variance inflation factor (VIF). This 
factor is reported in Table 5.3; collinearity does not appear to be a serious 
problem in Model II as the highest factor does not exceed 10. Consistent with 
the methodology employed in Cooke (1998) such normally distributed residuals 
may provide a robust result. There is therefore no need for the exclusion of 
outliers. This approach maintains the integrity of the data and therefore 
provides results that are more consistent with the characteristics of the 
variables. A robust linear regression is run on the independent variables. The F 
- statistic 28.44 is significant at 1% and indicates a linear relationship. The 
value of R2 is 0.20; overall, the model appears robust, as the size of the sample 
is large (439 observations). The large F-statistic indicates that the linear 
equation fits the model. Overall, the model appears robust; the sample size is 
large (439 observations). This research formulates a one-sided test as a 
statistical hypothesis in which the coefficients for which we can reject the null 
hypothesis, Ho > 0. This research formulates the null hypothesis to determine if 
Model II has any explanatory power. 
Ho: all coefficients are < "0" 
In order to decide whether the null hypothesis is rejected, the value of F 
necessary to reject the null hypothesis is determined. 
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Table 5.3 OLS Regression for the Model II: Financial Measures of Risk 
Model 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 
Dependent variable SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI 
Independent variables 
CONSTANT 0.277*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 0.262*** 0.244*** 
(8.04) (7.10) (6.65) (7.56) (8.74) 
LNTA 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
(7.52) (8.37) (7.93) (7.69) (10.50) 
BETA 0.023* 0.029** 0.037*** 0.034*** 
(1.89) (2.10) (2.63) (3.09) 
LQD 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
(4.14) (3.09) (3.27) (4.00) 
GEAR -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** (4.83) (4.17) (7.79) (3.80) 
SRSIC 0.015*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(4.67) (4.69) (4.47) (4.54) (5.71) 
GRWT 0.037* 0.042** 0.047*** 0.045** 0.041 *** 
(1.76) (2.88) (2.90) (2.55) (3.54) 
MVBV 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.002** 0.002*** 
(3.57) (2.39) (1.83) (2.52) (3.00) 
Mean VIF 1.06 
Z 0.21 
F' 28.44*** 
R2 (adjusted or 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 
pseudo)' 
N 439 439 439 439 439 
VIF Variance inflation factor 
Z OLS specifications reported normal residuals (z = 0.21) and 
these models (2.2 to 2.5) were re-specified using quantile 
regression. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
White's (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimation 
matrix. 
Significance levels one-tailed test except intercept terms and industry dummies; 
***p<. 01; **p<. 05; *p<. 10 
This research rejects Ho when Fobserved > Fcritical. Thus F (. 05,7,439) = 1.96. 
This research therefore rejects the null hypothesis that all the variables jointly 
have no explanatory power in the model. As F> Fcriticai, Ho is rejected and this 
research concludes that Model II has some explanatory power. In addition, the 
adjusted R2 of 0.20 for the regression indicates that the variables TA, BETA, 
LQD, GEAR, SIC and MVBV are significant in explaining the variation in 
VDIC. Note that the coefficients of these independent variables are statistically 
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significant at 1 %. BETA and GRWT show a weak association with VDIC. 
Within the OLS model, GEAR is significant in the multivariate analysis and not 
in the univariate analysis. This change is matched by a reduction in the strength 
of the relationship between BETA and IC disclosure; this result suggests that 
GEAR and LQD are sufficient in explaining financial risk associated with 
VDIC. The sensitivity test represented by the QREG provides supporting and 
better results for the hypothesised influence of selected variables although the 
explanatory power of the model overall appears reduced. All variables reported 
are significant; however, GRWT is not significant in the OLS model; 
nevertheless, both the partial correlation and the correlation matrix provide 
evidence of a positive significant association. 
The results of the OLS model are robust and generally consistent with 
the results of the univariate analysis. The F-statistic is significant at 1%, the 
VIF factor illustrates the absence of multicollinearity amongst the variables 
included in the model and the z-statistic indicates that residuals are normally 
distributed. The next section discusses the results of the independent variables 
and the hypotheses that are developed in the empirical tests. 
5.3.1. Size 
This model confirms that large companies provide more VDIC than smaller 
companies. The results are consistent with Model I, the partial correlation 
matrix, the Pearson correlation matrix and the QREG model. In the 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) study, the TA figure, as the measure of size, is 
significant with a positive coefficient. The positive association may be 
attributed to various forces that have been discussed in the literature including 
high risk of political costs, relative costs of disclosure, lower transaction costs, 
increasing agency and decreasing competitive cost. This model applies 
signalling as the theoretical basis of the relationship. The perceived benefits of 
reporting IC are expected to outweigh the potential disclosure costs arising 
from political costs. Model II confirms this theoretical approach. The existence 
of superior resources, policies and procedures that lead to above average returns 
are sufficient motivation to herald this competitive advantage through 
signalling. The motivation may be attributed to characteristics associated with 
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larger companies; benefits of signalling, mediation by larger numbers of 
analysts, lower information production costs, benefits of highly skilled 
individuals who facilitate the disclosure, stakeholders that may demand more 
information, benefits of lower finance costs, benefits from economies of scale, 
benefits of equity tradability and benefits of market liquidity. 
Size as measured by TA has been confirmed as a significant positive 
variable in Singhvi and Desai (1971, McNally et al. (1982), Cooke (1989 and 
1991) and Camfferman and Cooke (2002). Although, size as measured by 
SALES is reported as negative by Wallace (1987), size as measured by TA was 
found to be significant in the same research. Within the IC field, it may be 
expected that companies that are more capital intensive may disclose less IC as 
production may be generated by applying mainly tangible assets. However, the 
results reject this approach. Size appears to be an important explanatory 
variable whether measured by TA or MV (Hossain et al. 1994 and Lang and 
Lundholm 1993). The direction of the variable is consistent with the expected 
sign; the motivations are derived from signalling theory. This research accepts 
that TA is a significant positive variable on the extent of VDIC in Model II. 
H l. 3: Size as measured by TA is a positive significant explanatory variable of 
the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
5.3.2. BETA 
Model II indicates that market risk BETA may be an insignificant factor in the 
VDIC decision. The results of the OLS model are inconsistent with the 
univariate analysis, the Pearson correlation matrix and the QREG model that 
report a positive influence of BETA on VDIC. This research concludes that the 
relationship between BETA and. VDIC may be weak. The literature indicates 
that Firth (1984) in the UK found the association of voluntary disclosure and 
earnings BETA to be insignificant in manufacturing companies. The 
expectation is that a high-risk status may be edited or not disclosed at all. 
Unmanaged and maximum disclosure of a high systematic risk status may lead 
to a reduced share price and ultimately management replacement. As such, 
these actions allow management to perpetuate their positions at the expense of 
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shareholders and the market at large. The motivations are based on agency 
theory. The results indicate that the level of BETA does not influence managers 
to alter disclosure practices; other factors that management takes into account 
may be more significant. As indicated in Table 5.2, LQD and GEAR are the 
more important determinants of equity risk in the IC disclosure decision. The 
expectation of a significant association has not been realised with respect to the 
OLS model, however the better results presented by the QREG model suggest 
that the relationship between BETA and VDIC is significant and positive. A 
high BETA may motivate management to increase VDIC in an attempt to 
mitigate exposure to market risk. By informing the markets and shareholders of 
IC within the company, management expect to reduce the risk associated with 
the company by reducing uncertainty as to its "hidden value" and potential. 
These results are consistent with those of Foster (1978) who found significant 
correlation between accounting annual report disclosure and systematic risk. 
Nevertheless, following the first approach, a high-risk status is expected to 
result in increased IC attributes disclosure as management attempt to reduce 
share price fluctuations by illustrating the "hidden value" and reducing 
uncertainty. This result confirms the hypothesis that is based on agency theory; 
hypothesis H4.1: is accepted. 
H4.1: BETA is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
5.3.3. Liquidity (LQD) 
Companies characterised by high levels of LQD tend to disclose more IC. This 
result is consistent with the partial correlation matrix, the OLS and the QREG 
model that report similar results. The results indicate that only those companies 
able to honour their short-term obligations as they fall due without recourse to 
selling other assets in place (Wallace and Naser 1995) are capable of VDIC. 
Liquidity provides the necessary cash flow required for IC investment 
activities, some of which require large capital outlays before any returns can be 
realised. Within the first approach, companies with higher levels of 
liquidity 
(LQD) may be expected to signal successful cash flow management through 
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increasing VDIC. In addition, the existence of liquidity indicates availability of 
financial resources necessary for investment in IC. Explanations for this 
association are based on signalling theory, consistent with management's 
intentions to indicate the underlying reality and to influence stakeholders. This 
view is based on the expectation that a financially strong company is more 
likely to disclose more information than a weak one. Such companies are, 
therefore, more likely to give more information to differentiate themselves from 
their competitors. 
Few authors have found liquidity to be significant in their studies on 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure; however, the choice of proxy (quick ratio) 
and the nature of the disclosure index (IC) may be the reason for the significant 
results in this research. Although the results of the Camfferman and Cooke 
(2002) indicated that in the UK liquidity as measured by the current ratio is 
insignificant in explaining the variation in disclosure, liquidity also measured as 
current ratio was found to be positive and significant in the Netherlands. The 
results of this study appear robust due to the methodology applied here and 
adopted from Cooke (1998). Generally, the results on liquidity as illustrated in 
Appendix 1 A, indicate insignificant relationships between liquidity and 
disclosure, these results are insignificant in different countries and different 
industries and in both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. The exceptions are 
Wallace et al. (1994) for Spain, who found a negative significant relationship 
and Camfferman and Cooke (2002) for the Netherlands, who applied the 
current ratio, and found a positive significant relationship and in a study by 
Cooke (1989) in which a higher liquidity in companies is associated with 
increased disclosure. Model II confirms this result. Agency theory supports that 
management are expected to increase disclosure if cash flow management is 
favourable and suppress disclosure if liquidity is negative. In this way, liquidity 
may be considered a performance measure given that low performance may 
result in management displacement and or a reduction in remuneration or 
performance based bonuses. Thus applying agency theory to explain 
management behaviour, the expectation of a positive significant association 
between LQD and VDIC is accepted. Consistent with the approach based on 
signalling theory, low LQD leads to lower VDIC levels and higher LQD may 
lead to more investment in IC and therefore higher levels of VDIC as 
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management attempt to perpetuate company standing and reputation. As such, 
companies with higher levels of LQD may be expected to signal successful 
cash flow management through VDIC. High LQD levels may result in IC 
investment, rendering disclosure supported. Consistent with signalling theory it 
may be confirmed that LQD is positively associated with VDIC. 
H4.3: LQD ratio is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
5.3.4. Gearing (GEAR) 
Model II indicates that the higher the proportion of debt in a company's capital 
structure, the lower the disclosure of IC. Highly geared companies apply debt to 
finance expansion and purchase of long-term tangible assets. Due to the lack of 
tangible security, companies investing in IA are limited in their access to 
financial resources. The results confirm that highly geared companies do not 
disclose ICCA. The financial risk associated with such debt levels does not 
motivate management to increase VDIC. Debt providers may demand specific 
information through alternative channels particularly when the level of financial 
risk increases. The explanation for this negative result may be based on agency 
theory. Management may reduce VDIC to facilitate project turnaround tactics 
that may sustain their positions and /or sustain shareholder perceptions of 
management's success. Furthermore, by perpetuating this position, increased 
asymmetric information leads to more agency costs. Generally, tangible asset 
intensive companies tend to be concentrated in manufacturing and less- 
technological industries that are characterised by less VDIC. In addition, 
tangible asset based companies may have the physical assets against which debt 
may be secured, unlike IC intensive companies that may have to rely on 
internal generated capital or equity finance thus rendering their gearing ratios to 
lower levels. 
Thus, an increase in the gearing ratio (GEAR) increases the probability 
of financial and insolvency risk. As such, highly geared companies may not 
have the financial resources required firstly for investment in IC; secondly, 
highly geared companies may not have the necessary resources for investment 
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in the processes and procedures required to identify, manage and report IC. 
Proponents of agency theory view debt as a governance device useful in 
reducing the conflict between shareholders and management (Jensen 1986). 
Debt reduces cash flow available to management as the company is 
contractually bound to repay interest and capital. Furthermore, companies 
investing in tangible assets are more likely to have assets that are more likely to 
be accepted as security as such, debt may be associated with more tangible asset 
based companies that are less likely to report IC. In addition, Williamson 
(1988) concluded that debt providers might be unwilling to finance projects 
with high company specificity; IA, including internally generated services, 
processes and products, have such reduced tradability as they are unique, 
inimitable and require substantial investment and expertise to develop. 
Research evidence has shown that R&D of a company is negatively related to 
its debt levels (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993 and Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989). 
This evidence is consistent with R&D as the driver of IA growth without which 
there is likely to be reduced levels of VDIC. 
The literature provides evidence that a higher incidence of agency costs 
is associated with companies with a greater proportion of debt (Leftwich et al. 
1981, p. 56). This is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) who suggest 
that companies with high gearing costs may incur higher monitoring costs. 
Gray and Roberts (1989) found a negative significant result between mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure with gearing in a study conducted in the UK. From an 
international perspective, Meek et al. (1995) and Eng and Mak (2003) 
identified gearing as negatively affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
results are consistent with Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) and Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1989) who find that highly geared companies have less R&D 
investment that may lead to less IC disclosure. The arguments are based on 
agency theory; management may decrease VDIC; by increasing asymmetrical 
information management are able to perpetuate their positions in office. 
Furthermore, with increasing insolvency risk, management may be expected to 
focus on short-term projects to the exclusion of R&D. VDIC is expected to 
decrease as gearing increases and as the investment in IC decreases. Despite 
both the Pearson correlation and the partial correlation coefficients, returning 
insignificant results the expectation of a negative association has been 
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confirmed by both the OLS and QREG models in the multivariate analysis. 
This research concludes that in Model II, hypothesis H4.4: is accepted. 
H4.4: Highly geared companies are more likely to provide less VDIC than 
less geared companies are. 
5.3.5. SIC 
The UK SIC of Economic Activities (National Statistics 2003) is used to 
classify business establishments by the type of economic activities they are 
engaged in. Model II indicates that this ascending industry classification 
ranging from 0100 basic agriculture industry to 9000 complex service 
industries is statistically significant at the 1% level with WDI in the partial 
correlation, the Pearson correlation, the OLS model and the QREG model. Due 
to the increasing IC content in ascending SIC code, the expectation of a 
relationship with WDI is confirmed. Forestry and paper, food producers and 
processors, beverages and tobacco, the most basic industries disclose little 
ICCA whereas the telecommunications, media and entertainment, health, 
leisure and hotels, the more complex service industries disclose more ICCA. 
Certain service and highly complex companies are expected to apply IA 
and IC, unique to their organisation and therefore not easily replicable. The 
benefits of disclosure of ICCA may outweigh the disclosure costs that may be 
associated with the disclosure of proprietary information. These companies may 
disclose ICCA attributes due to the lack disclosure costs that may normally be 
associated with competitors; such competitors may be limited in their ability to 
access this industry due to the high barriers to imitation attributed to the 
necessary financial, innovative and HC resources. Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) and Citron et al. (2005) find a strong positive association 
between disclosures and the number of SIC codes in the firm indicating that 
operating in a large number of distinct industries may lead to increased 
disclosure as companies seek to obtain a greater set of resources (Zarzeski 
1996) or because of increased diversification (Verrecchia 1983). More complex 
service orientated companies may be disadvantaged by the current reporting 
regime. This current reporting framework is biased for companies whose equity 
177 
is mostly intangible. This value is therefore not represented in the financial 
statements. VDIC provides the means for such companies to signal their growth 
potential and signal the underlying reality. The conclusion for this variable 
therefore is that hypothesis H3.4: is accepted. 
H3.4: SIC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
5.3.6. Growth (GRWT) 
The expectation of growth companies disclosing IC has been partially 
validated; the relationship is weak with respect to the OLS model. Nevertheless, 
the univariate analysis, the Pearson correlation matrix and the QREG model 
confirm that the growth of companies associated with "hidden value" are 
associated with the signalling of IC attributes. This research concludes that 
growth companies that are embedded with IA tend to disclose IC. Higher 
growth companies may have higher information asymmetry between 
management and investors and thus may provide incentives to narrow this 
information gap through VDIC. This result is consistent with Del Monte and 
Papagni (2003) who maintained that companies with a strong commitment to 
R&D have a higher rate of growth. Furthermore, the results suggest that higher 
GRWT leads to more voluntary disclosure as management signal the realisation 
of company potential previously held in IA and that may be reflected in a 
higher MVBV ratio. Management of high GRWT companies may disclose 
ICCA to indicate company success (economic theory), management expertise 
and competence (agency theory) and to maximise shareholder value in the 
markets (shareholder maximisation). The literature has revealed varying results. 
Lev and Stefano (2003) believe that the major drivers of company GRWT are 
IA. Such IA consist of IC in the form of innovation, information and 
communication technologies, networks and alliances, the quality of human 
resources and management processes continue to be vital to companies. Lee and 
Shim (1995) established a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and 
a company's market growth in Japan. McNally et al. (1992) reported an 
insignificant result, for voluntary disclosure of non-financial and non-retail 
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companies listed in New Zealand. Similarly, Eng and Mak (2003) reported an 
insignificant GRWT variable. In contrast, however, Prencipe (2004) in a study 
of 65 Italian listed companies identified a negative significant relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and the growth rate. Nevertheless, Model II 
indicates that growth opportunities translate into VDIC as management signal 
superior performance. Furthermore, investment in growth requires development 
of markets, products and customers areas that are closely related to investing in 
RC. Thus, the hypothesis based on signalling theory has been confirmed. In 
Model II hypothesis H2: is accepted. 
H2: GRWT is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
5.3.7. MVBV 
Model II confirms that companies with higher levels of "hidden value" disclose 
more IC than those companies associated with less intangible value. The 
theoretical relationship is supported by signalling theory that explains 
management's actions for increasing the value relevance of the financial 
statements. As information asymmetry may be high, VDIC may reduce agency 
costs. Lang and Lundholm (2000) report that companies with increasing levels 
of disclosure experience significant price increases, and Healey and Palepu 
(1993) report that increased disclosure leads investors to revise upwards their 
valuation of a company's shares. Edvinsson and Malone (1997) define the 
difference between a company's BV and MV as the value of IA. To match the 
equity market, management may be expected to provide VDIC to bridge the 
gap created by this difference with historical financial statements. Support for a 
positive association is derived from Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) that confirm 
MVBV as a positive significant variable in the voluntary disclosure of 
presentations to analysts. This research concludes that the benefits of signalling 
outweigh disclosure costs. These disclosure costs are attributed to competitive 
losses that may ensue because of IC disclosure. The results indicate that the 
"hidden value" may be represented by the difference between book and market 
value. Brennan (2001) recognises that the difference may not be due wholly to 
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undisclosed IC. Book values may be unrealistic as tangible assets may not have 
been re-valued to replacement cost (Lev 2001). Furthermore, book values are 
calculated based on accounting standards, the application of which can differ 
from company to company. In addition, fluctuations in the share price may 
render market value an unreliable measure of IC in the short term; finally, a 
multitude of factors has a significant influence on the share price. 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings in the MVBV proxy the 
results of the partial correlation, Pearson correlation, OLS model and QREG 
model indicate consistent results. Edvinsson and Malone (1997) define the 
difference between a company's BV and MV as the value of IC. This value 
remains hidden due to the inability of traditional financial statements to report 
SC, RC and HC. The results indicate that IC intensive companies, that are 
likely to have a larger difference between MV and By, have more incentives to 
signal these investments in IA that may otherwise remain invisible to 
shareholders and investors. Dzinkowski (2000) suggest that VDIC is likely to 
be higher where MVBV ratio is larger as illustrated by the pharmaceutical and 
computer industries in Table 5.2. Nevertheless, Lev (2001) suggests certain 
ways in which voluntary disclosure may mitigate the shortfalls within the 
traditional reporting framework. Although market and accounting valuations 
may differ, the results indicate that greater VDIC may lead to accurate 
predictions of future earnings (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). These future 
earnings are associated with market value that accounts for both tangible, 
intangible assets and growth prospects (Frankel et al. 1999). Healey and Palepu 
(1993) suggest that as the market accounts for sources of IA value not 
recognised on the balance sheet, greater IC disclosure may lend itself well to a 
rise in equity valuations, increased liquidity and tradability and decreased cost 
of capital (Botosan 1997). 
The main concern with bridging the MVBV gap is the reliability and 
objectivity of estimates required for capitalisation of IA. In the absence of this 
reliable information, signalling theory suggests that management may be 
motivated to disclose more IC as narratives, non-narratives and illustrations 
when the MVBV ratio is larger. This explanation is supported as service, high 
technology, R&D and computer and software development companies are more 
disadvantaged by current accounting regulations than are traditional tangible 
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assets based companies. These companies are expected to disclose the 
investment that would otherwise remain invisible to shareholders and 
stakeholders alike. The conclusions offer support for the arguments drawn from 
information asymmetry, the RBV and signalling theory; the existence of 
"hidden value" leads to company IC disclosure aimed at signalling the real 
drivers of value. MVBV is a significant positive variable on the extent of VDIC 
therefore hypothesis H5.3: in Model II is accepted. 
H5.3: MVBV is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
5.5.0. Conclusion 
The objective of the empirical tests is to establish a relationship between VDIC 
and BETA, GEAR and LQD. In general, various components of risk are 
significant in influencing the variation in VDIC. High financial risk as 
measured by LQD and GEAR leads to lower levels of VDIC. BETA on the 
other hand, indicates that market risk is a positive determinant of the variation 
in VDIC. Although the relationship is weak in the OLS model, the partial 
correlation matrix, the Pearson correlation matrix and the QREG model reports 
a significant association between BETA and VDIC. A robustness check on the 
composition of the model by application of the pairwise tests confirms that 
BETA is significantly correlated at 5% to GEAR and LQD providing 
collaborating evidence for inclusion of these proxies as measures of risk. This 
research concludes that larger more financially stable companies that are 
characterised by reduced insolvency and liquidity risk are more likely to 
disclose IC given that their "hidden value" is larger, as evidenced by their 
higher MVBV ratio and by their membership of more complex service 
industries. 
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6.1.0. Introduction 
The multiple regression model is estimated using four industry membership 
variables. 
WDI =, Qo -ß, GEAR+ß2MVTA+ß3INDG-, Q4MANUF+ß5SIC+, Q6TMRK+ß7SIZE+e 
ý6ý 
The objective of the empirical tests in Model III is to establish a relationship 
between VDIC and industry membership. Chapter 2 outlines the development 
of the industry hypotheses. The seven variables introduced are TMRK, 
MANUF, INDG, SIC, SALES, MVTA and GEAR that are discussed in Table 
2.1 the analytical framework. The development of the model has been discussed 
in section 3.2.3. This chapter provides a further sensitivity test in addition to 
that of the QREG model. Dummy industry variables are introduced into both 
the OLS and the QREG models to determine the influence of selected industry 
membership variables on the significance of SALES, MVTA and GEAR. In 
this way, groups of industries combined in these dummy variables may provide 
evidence of which industries are most associated with VDIC. The dummy 
variables listed in Appendix 2B consist of basic, chemical, engineering, 
electrical, pharmaceutical, retail, computer and services. The results of the 
dummy variables are included in the multivariate analysis. Consistent with 
Cooke (1998), transformations are applied to non-normal variables before 
regression tests. The choice of approach to accounting for statistical problems 
associated with non-normal distributions has been discussed in Chapter 3. The 
possible existence of multicollinearity is tested using two methods. The next 
section examines the level of association of variables included in Model III. 
Subsequent sections discuss the results of the empirical tests. 
6.2.0. Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Analysis and Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients 
Low coefficients in the correlation matrix suggest that there may be no 
collinearity problem. However, a certain degree of multicollinearity may still 
exist even when none of the bivariate correlation coefficients is large. As 
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indicated in Models I and II, the VIF is applied as the second test to compute 
the level of multicollinearity (Table 6.3). The results of this test are reported in 
Table 6.1. This section examines the descriptive statistics, the partial correlation 
coefficients and the Pearson correlation matrix. The descriptive statistics 
indicate that 16% of the sample companies are listed on the TechMARK 
exchange and that 48% of companies are manufacturing. The ratio of MVTA is 
1.16, it indicates that TA is as representative a proxy for size as is MV. 
Furthermore, the mean value for MVTA indicates that on average the sample 
MV exceeds TA by 16%. However, the minimum and maximum values for 
MVTA indicate that the "hidden value" varies from a fraction of the TA value 
to over ten times the value of TA. Industry variables INDG and SIC indicate a 
wide range of economic activities within the sample as illustrated by the 
minimum and maximum values. The partial correlation results (Table 6.1) 
illustrate the nature, direction and significance of the bivariate relationships of 
WDI and the independent variables. A significant correlation at 1% is found 
between WDI and SALES, TMRK, SIC AND MVTA whereas MANUF, 
INDG, are significant at 5% and GEAR is insignificant in the univariate 
analysis. Thus with the exception of GEAR the direction and significance of the 
variables in the parametric results of Model II are consistent with the predicted 
sign. 
The size variable is a significant determinant of VDIC whether 
measured by TA, MV or SALES. GEAR is included as a measure of financial 
risk that accounts for the variation in the extent of disclosure that may be 
attributed to agency costs. The partial correlation results indicate that gearing 
may be unimportant in the disclosure decision. The existence of "hidden value" 
accompanied by large sales revenue is sufficient motivation for companies in 
high technology and innovative industries to disclose IC. It may be that these 
companies do not rely on debt to finance their operations due to the lack of 
adequate debt security and the specificity and non-tradability of their assets. 
The results of the partial correlation are supported by the Pearson correlation 
matrix. Although some of the coefficients are correlated, none of these 
coefficients is of great concern as the highest correlation between MANUF and 
SIC is -0.45 at 1 %. The results of the coefficients with respect to significant 
associations with TMRK include certain non-manufacturing companies as 
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reported by a negative coefficient for MANUF, INDG, indicating a positive 
association consistent with ascending complexity, and MVTA, consistent with 
"hidden value" within high technologically innovative companies. This 
association is supported by the negative significant coefficient between 
MANUF and MVTA that indicates that non-manufacturing companies are 
associated with higher levels of "hidden value". The direction of the association 
between INDG and SIC indicates the consistency of the two classifications in 
the measurement of innovation, complexity and technology. Overall, the results 
of the Pearson correlation matrix are consistent with the partial correlation 
coefficients. In addition, the relationship between variables is consistent with 
the overall understanding of the underlying theoretical approach. 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics by industry 
Industry 
Group 
Mean 
BASIC 
CHEM 
ENG 
ELEC 
PHAR 
RET 
COMP 
SERV 
Standard 
deviation 
BASIC 
CHEM 
ENG 
ELEC 
PHAR 
RET 
COMP 
SERV 
SRWDI LNSALES TMRK MANUF INDG SRSIC MVTA GEAR 
0.510 6.481 0.000 1.000 52.339 54.061 0.861 0.345 
0.488 5.936 0.000 0.480 51.840 56.590 1.224 0.323 
0.490 6.529 0.465 1.000 60.116 54.826 0.726 0.384 
0.595 5.778 0.340 0.660 88.620 59.414 1.013 0.336 
0.700 5.126 0.769 0.000 123.615 49.406 2.865 0.232 
0.493 6.043 0.021 0.319 79.255 72.348 1.268 0.295 
0.600 5.231 0.248 0.000 95.950 85.898 1.291 0.329 
0.602 5.915 0.121 0.759 88.414 89.436 1.141 4.871 
0.115 1.749 0.000 0.000 20.551 15.310 0.416 0.241 
0.113 1.930 0.000 0.510 18.865 10.922 1.186 0.222 
0.101 1.979 0.213 0.000 24.771 3.366 0.526 0.186 
0.117 2.447 0.479 0.479 45.016 5.739 1.012 0.296 
0.076 3.032 0.439 0.000 32.170 0.000 2.601 0.234 
0.096 1.934 0.146 0.471 11.558 1.084 1.316 0.253 
0.103 1.855 0.434 0.000 34.376 0.492 1.189 0.747 
0.101 1.729 0.329 0.432 29.046 7.328 1.256 34.026 
Source: Descriptive statistics on research data 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics by industry. 
The size variable LNSALES indicates that both tangible and IA based resources 
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are instrumental in generating turnover. However, whereas pharmaceutical and 
computer industries are associated with higher levels of MV, these industries 
are associated with lower levels of turnover. Basic and engineering industries 
that were previously associated with less MV, are now associated with higher 
levels of turnover. This result is confirmed by the MVTA variable that 
illustrates that pharmaceutical and computer sectors have the higher levels of 
"hidden value" and lower levels of gearing. Industry variables, TMRK and 
MANUF indicate that non-manufacturing companies in pharmaceutical and 
computer sectors are associated with higher levels of VDIC. INDG reflects 
these trends, as companies with larger IA in their resource base are found to be 
more complex and more innovative consistent with the results of SRSIC. The 
next sections discuss the results of the regression equation in this model. 
6.3.0. Multivariate Analysis 
Consistent with Models I and II, two tests of collinearity are applied to ensure 
that no one variable may be an approximate linear function of a set of several 
independent variables. The results of the VIF are reported in Table 6.3; 
collinearity does not appear to be a serious problem in Model III, as the highest 
factor does not exceed 10. Consistent with the methodology employed in Cooke 
(1998) such normally distributed residuals may provide robust results. There is 
therefore no need to exclude outliers. Table 6.3 presents Model III, the 
regression of WDI and the four industry variables. A robust linear regression is 
run on the independent variables. The F- statistic 40.5 is significant at I% and 
R2 is 0.27. This research formulates a one-sided test as a statistical hypothesis in 
which the coefficients for which we can reject the null hypothesis, Ho > 0. This 
research formulates the null hypothesis to determine if Model III has any 
explanatory power. 
Ho: all coefficients are < "0" 
In order to decide whether the null hypothesis is rejected, the value of F 
necessary to reject the null hypothesis is determined. This research rejects Ho 
when Fobserved > Fcriticai. 
Thus F(. 05,7,439) = 2.03. This research therefore rejects 
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Table 6.3 OLS Regression for the Model III: Industry Membership 
Model 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Dependent variable SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI SRWDI 
Independent variables 
CONSTANT 0.299*** 0.321*** 0.297*** 0.514*** 
(7.92) (13.44) (6.65) (10.47) 
LNSALES 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
(9.85) (10.77) (7.86) (7.43) 
MVTA 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.013** 
(3.25) (3.55) (3.11) (2.04) 
GEAR -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** (-6.76) (-10.73) (-5.36) (-6.40) 
TMRK 0.070*** 0.077*** 
(4.65) (4.00) 
MANUF -0.027** -0.032** (-2.09) (-2.01) 
INDG 0.000** 0.000* 
(2.45) (1.85) 
SRSIC 0.001** 0.001 ** 
(2.59) (2.03) 
BASIC 0.014 -0.186*** 
(0.63) (-4.13) 
CHEM (dropped) -0.234*** 
(-4.70) 
ENG -0.005 -0.210*** 
(-0.24) (-4.48) 
ELEC 0.115*** -0.096** 
(4.77) (-2.09) 
PHAR 0.208*** (dropped) 
(8.41) 
RET 0.003 -0.218*** 
(0.11) (-4.76) 
COMP 0.128*** -0.077* 
(6.61) (-1.83) 
SERV 0.118*** -0.094** 
(5.54) (-2.09) 
Mean VIF 1.29 2.30 
Z 0.20 0.33 
F1 40.50*** 53.43*** 
R2 (adjusted or pseudo)' 0.27 0.39 0.15 0.24 
N 439 439 439 439 
VIF Variance inflation factor 
Z OLS specifications reported normal residuals (z = 0.20) and 
these models (3.2 to 3.4) were re-specified using quantile 
regression. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
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White's (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimation 
matrix. 
Significance levels one-tailed test except intercept terms and industry dummies; 
***p<. 01; **p<. 05; *p<. 10 
SR Variables transformed by square roots are prefixed with SR; 
LN Variables transformed by logs are prefixed with LN; 
SRWDI: weighted disclosure index based on disclosed ICCA attributes measured as a 
square root transformation; 
LNSALES: Size being the sum of net sales or revenues representing gross sales and 
other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances as a log- 
transformed variable; 
TMRK: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for listing on the TechMARK listing and 
"0" otherwise; 
MANUF: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for manufacturing and "0" for non- 
manufacturing; 
INDG: this variable returns the DataStream level 6 industrial classification number; 
SRSIC: standard industry classification measured as a square root transformation; 
MVTA: ratio of market value to total assets 
GEAR: total debt / total capital % (long term debt + short term debt & current portion 
of long-term debt) / (total capital + short-term debt & current portion of 
long term debt) * 100; 
BASIC: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 202, 
1589,1596,1600 and 4521 and "0" otherwise; 
CHEM: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 2410, 
2463 and 5212 "0" otherwise; 
ENG: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 2840,2710, 
3430 and 3530 and "0" otherwise; 
ELEC: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 3002, 
3210,4013,4100 and 5147 and "0" otherwise; 
PHAR: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 2441 and 
"0" otherwise; 
RET: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 5211 and 
"0" otherwise; 
COMP: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 7222, 
7412,7420 and 7440 and "0" otherwise; 
SERV: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 6340, 
8511 and 9210 and "0" otherwise; 
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the null hypothesis that all the variables jointly have no explanatory power in 
the model. As F> Fcriticai Ho is rejected and this research concluded that Model 
III has some explanatory power. In addition, the adjusted R2 of 0.27 for the 
regression indicates that the variables SALES, TMRK, MANUF, INDG, SIC, 
MVTA and GEAR are significant in explaining the variation in VDIC. Note 
that the coefficients of these independent variables are statistically significant at 
5%. The multivariate analysis indicates that VDIC is influenced by all variables 
included in the model. The high F-statistic indicates a strong linear relationship 
between these variables and VDIC. The results of the QREG model is 
consistent with the OLS model, however the variation in INDG between the 
two models is not material given the significant associations reported in the 
partial and Pearson correlation matrices. Significant for the multivariate 
analysis, is the negative significant relationship between VDIC and GEAR that 
was reported as insignificant in both the partial and Pearson correlation 
matrices. This research proposes that in the presence of "hidden value" large 
companies with low debt levels operating in high technology and innovative 
industries provide a high level of IC disclosure. 
Model III appears to be robust; the results of the four industry 
classifications have provided significant results, consistent with the theoretical 
approach based on the RBV and signalling theory. The dummy variables on the 
other hand provide more interesting and more detailed results. First, the 
explanatory variables SALES, MVTA and GEAR remain significant 
irrespective of whether industry classifications are applied or dummy industry 
variables are applied. Second, industry variables TMRK, MANUF, INDG and 
SIC are consistent in basing their association with VDIC on ascending 
TechMARK listing membership (i. e. increasing third party recognition of IC 
content), on increasing non-manufacturing (MANUF) economic activity, on 
increasing complexity in INDG and on increasing service activity in SIC. Both 
the OLS and QREG models provide consistent results with respect to these 
industry variables nevertheless, it is noted that INDG provides a weaker result 
in the QREG model. Third, certain dummy variables, for example electrical and 
services are significant in both the OLS and QREG modes. Fourth, coefficients 
in both the OLS and QREG model are consistent in terms of basic, engineering 
and retail sectors having the lowest coefficients and computer, services and 
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electrical having the highest coefficients. The order of significance is 
maintained in both the OLS and QREG models consistent with expectation that 
the more basic resources, manufacturing, less complex and retail organisation 
may be expected to disclose less IC than those organisations associated with 
more processing, non-manufacturing activities, more complex and service 
organisations that are characterised by greater VDIC. Fifth, consistent with four 
above, although coefficients of the dummy variables in the QREG model are 
negative, this research examines the order in the size of the coefficients to 
establish their relative positions in their influence on VDIC. Considering only 
the significant results and the highest coefficients, pharmaceuticals is the 
industry that discloses the most IC attributes under the OLS model and services 
under the QREG model. Overall, the OLS model is more robust than the QREG 
model with respect to the value of R2, although all variations of Model III are 
consistent in illustrating that industries with IC content generally disclose more 
IC than those without. In the next, section this research examines the results of 
the individual independent variables in order to confirm the hypothesised 
influence on VDIC. 
6.3.1. Size 
Size as measured by SALES has a positive and significant influence on VDIC. 
Model III confirms that large companies provide more VDIC than smaller 
companies. Model III is consistent with Model I and Model II in the partial 
correlation matrix, the Pearson correlation matrix and the QREG model. The 
results indicate that SALES is a key determinant of VDIC, regardless of which 
industry classification is applied, however the consistency in the direction and 
differentiation of the industry proxies provides the underlying characteristics; 
non-manufacturing, high technology, complexity and high technology service 
industries are characteristics that in the presence of high turnover result in IC 
disclosure. The motivation is derived from signalling the "hidden value" that 
drives this large market due to the lack of visibility of the underlying IC; 
signalling reduces asymmetric information by providing information on RC, 
responsible for a large market share. The variable MVTA, representing "hidden 
value" is significant and supportive of the above motivation. 
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Size in any country, appears to be an important explanatory variable 
whether measured by TA, SALES (Firth 1979), or MV (Hossain et al. 1994 and 
Lang and Lundholm 1993). In the Firth (1979), Cooke (1989), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Depoers (2000) and Naser et al. (2002) study, the SALES figure, as the 
measure of size, is significant with a positive coefficient. The result confirms 
that both tangible and intangible assets contribute to the generation of turnover, 
SALES is therefore included as a measure of size irrespective of the IC 
intensity of the company. Within IC studies, size has been confirmed as 
positively associated with disclosure by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Garcia-Meca et 
al. (2005), Garcia-Meca and Martinez (2005) and Guthrie et al. (2006). Model 
III confirms that for larger companies, the benefits of signalling IC outweigh 
the potential disclosure costs. Being larger and having access to more resources, 
larger companies may be able to institute barriers to imitation. 
Management behaviour is explained by signalling theory as successful 
management practices are advertised to inform markets of the company's 
competitive advantage. Consistent with the disclosure of RC attributes that 
signal the IC embedded in the processes that expand markets, build and 
maintain customer relations and ensure adequate distribution channels. 
Therefore, this research confirms that SALES is a significant positive variable 
on the extent of VDIC, hypothesis H 1.1: in Model III is accepted. 
H 1.1: Size as measured by SALES is a positive significant explanatory 
variable of the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
6.3.2. TechMARK Listing 
Companies that have been admitted as members of the TMRK listing are 
associated with higher levels of IC disclosure relative to non-members. 
Previous industry studies by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Williams (2001) and 
Cooke (1989,1991 and 1992) yielded significant results. The results of the 
association are consistent in the partial and Pearson correlation matrices and in 
the OLS and QREG models. The general trend has been that innovative 
technology companies disclose more than non-innovative and non- 
technological companies do as they signal superior IC potential. 
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The theoretical motivation is derived from the RBV and signalling 
theory. Management of these companies signal investment in IA, indicative of 
procedures to accumulate competitive advantage by disclosing ICCA. 
Membership of the TechMARK listing is a reputable characteristic. The process 
of listing on this exchange may be complex, IC investment is not always 
successful, furthermore, not all IC is identifiable or measurable as such 
providing evidence of its existence may be problematic for several companies 
as only 16% (Table 6.1) of the population are listed on the exchange. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that those companies that have successfully 
listed on this exchange are aware of the growth opportunities embedded in 
investment in R&D, IP and HC. The "hidden value" that is found to be larger in 
high technologically innovative companies is signalled to the markets to bridge 
the value gap. 
The results confirm that management of these companies have formally 
prepared and processed information required for listing status and may have the 
know-how for processing IC information for disclosure in the financial 
statements. Furthermore, the complexity of achieving TechMARK listing status 
provides a competitive advantage that is formally acknowledged through third 
party accreditation. TMRK is positively associated with the extent of VDIC in 
Model III. The conclusion for this variable therefore is that hypothesis H3.1: is 
accepted. 
H3.1: TMRK is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
6.3.3. Manufacturing (MANUF) 
Model III indicates that companies that are classified into manufacturing, high 
value tangible assets and low profile industries are associated with no VDIC, 
whereas non-manufacturing, high value IA, service, high-tec and high profile 
industries are associated with VDIC. These non-manufacturing companies 
signal the "hidden value" not disclosed within the traditional reporting 
framework. The expectation that MANUF negatively affects VDIC is supported 
by the confirmation of MANUF consisting of mainly tangible assets. As such, 
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non-manufacturing companies are not embedded with as much tangible assets 
as manufacturing companies. Non-manufacturing companies provide more IC 
disclosure in a bid to disclose the existence of "hidden value" undisclosed on 
the balance sheet in contrast to tangible assets that are disclosed. 
MANUF differentiates companies on their resource base; the existence 
of a greater proportion of tangible assets in product and service delivery is 
characteristic of these low profile manufacturing companies. Non- 
manufacturing companies may be associated with a lower proportion of 
tangible assets in their resource base. These companies may manage complex 
operations and hold more IC resources, expertise and know-how than the IC 
associated with manufacturing companies. Table 6.1 confirms a negative 
significant correlation between MVTA and MANUF that suggests "hidden 
value" is found in non-manufacturing companies. 
The partial and Pearson correlation matrices provide consistent results 
with the OLS and QREG models. Although Camfferman and Cooke (2002), 
Cooke (1991) and Ho Wong (2001) report a significant positive association 
between disclosure and MANUF, disclosure attributes and country of study 
differed. Furthermore, the underlying relationship between the dependent 
variable and the industry membership classification would determine the 
expected outcome. Model III confirms the approach adopted by this research 
that manufacturing companies are less likely to have higher levels of VDIC as 
non-manufacturing companies that are expected to utilise more IC than tangible 
assets in their operations. 
The motivations derived from signalling theory are confirmed by the 
existence of unique and non-replicable IA that may lead to high barriers to 
imitation consistent with rare, durable, imperfectly inimitable and non-tradable 
IC resources (Barney 1991 and Dierickx and Cool 1989). Model III thus 
confirms that non-manufacturing companies signal IC consistent with the 
existence of high levels of "hidden value". The conclusion for this variable 
therefore is that hypothesis H3.2: is accepted. 
H3.2: MANUF is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
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6.3.4. Industry Grouping (INDG) 
Model III confirms the predicted sign and that INDG is significant in the partial 
and Pearson correlation matrices. The QREG model provides a positive 
association but only at 10%. This research concludes that based on the OLS 
model, the multivariate analysis of Model III indicates that as the nature of 
operations increases from basic to more complex, so too does the level of 
VDIC. Non-cyclical services, utilities and information technology (IT) are 
classified as the more complex industries that are characterised by the "hidden 
value" which when coupled with the financial and human resources of larger 
companies, leads to more ICCA disclosure. The understanding is that basic and 
resource industries disclose less IC due to the lack of complexity in their 
operations. In contrast to basic and resource industries, complex IT and utility 
industries provide more VDIC as they may employ more IA in their operations. 
Cooke (1992) suggests that companies follow a herding behaviour in response 
to market demands for comparative information, as investors need to assess a 
company's relative position in an industry. Nevertheless, the results from the 
literature have been mixed. Ng and Koh (1993) found no significant 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and the complexity of operations. 
Similarly, McNally et al. (1982), Wallace et al. (1994), Raffournier (1995), 
Inchausti (1997), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998) found no 
significant association with industry, whereas Ng and Koh (1993), Gray et al. 
(1995) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a significant negative relationship. 
The results indicate that those companies that employ IC also disclose IC. 
These industries follow a more proactive role in VDIC as investment in RC 
maintains and expands market share; these companies may be leaders in the 
new era of IC narrative disclosure and in the reporting of competitive 
advantage. Other companies may follow these new reporting trends and may 
begin to signal the "hidden value" created by investment in IC. This hypothesis 
has been confirmed by Model III, hypothesis H3: 3 is accepted. 
H3.3: INDG is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
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6.3.5. SIC 
Model III indicate that SIC is statistically significant at the 5% level with WDI 
in the partial correlation, the Pearson correlation, the OLS model and the 
QREG model. The most basic industries disclose little ICCA whereas the more 
complex service industries disclose more ICCA. SIC has indicated that it is 
positively associated with the extent of VDIC, in Model II and III in both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. Therefore, hypothesis H3.4: in Model III 
is accepted. 
H3.4: SIC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
6.3.6. MVTA 
Consistent with Edvinsson and Malone (1997) who define the difference 
between a company's BV and MV as the value of IC this research 
acknowledges the existence of this "hidden value" due to the inability of 
traditional financial statements to report SC, RC and HC. Furthermore, in 
response to the measurement problems associated with the denominator in the 
MVBV ratio, the alternative proxy for the "hidden value" MVTA is associated 
with VDIC. The result suggests that as a proxy for IC intensive companies, 
MVTA is associated with VDIC that signals the existence of equity value not 
accounted for in the traditional reporting framework. Management may be 
expected to provide VDIC to bridge the gap created by this difference 
particularly for IC intensive companies in which the MVTA ratio is larger. 
Few studies have conducted a direct empirical investigation on MVTA 
and disclosure. Patton and Zelenka (1997) found no significant relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and percentage of IA. The motivations for an 
expectation of a positive association are derived from Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) 
that confirm MVBV as a positive significant variable in the voluntary 
disclosure of presentations to analysts. Signalling theory explains that 
management may be motivated to disclose more IC when the MVTA ratio is 
larger. This explanation is supported as service, high technology, R&D and 
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computer and software development companies are more disadvantaged by 
current accounting regulations than are traditional tangible assets based 
companies, being IC intensive there companies are expected to have a higher 
MVTA ratio that may proxy for the difference between intangible and tangible 
asset based equities. The proxies for this "hidden value" MVTA has been found 
to be positive and significantly associated with VDIC in both the partial and 
Pearson correlation matrices and in both the OLS and QREG models. 
Therefore, hypothesis H5.4: in Model III is accepted. 
H5.4: MVTA is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
6.3.7. GEAR 
Model III indicates that the higher the proportion of debt in a company's capital 
structure, the lower the disclosure of IC. Highly geared companies apply debt to 
finance expansion and purchase of long-term tangible assets. Model III 
confirms that these companies do not disclose ICCA; however, Model III is not 
significant in either the partial or the Pearson correlation matrices although the 
direction of the relationship is consistent with the predicted sign. Nevertheless, 
based on the results of the OLS and the QREG models, the financial risk 
associated with lower debt levels motivates management to increase VDIC. The 
explanations are derived from arguments based on agency theory; management 
reduce VDIC to facilitate project turnaround tactics that may sustain their 
positions and /or sustain the perception of success. Tangible asset based 
companies may have the security for debt finance, unlike IC intensive 
companies that may have to rely on internal generated capital or equity finance 
thus rendering their gearing ratios to lower levels. Thus, an increase in the 
gearing ratio (GEAR) increases the probability of financial and insolvency risk. 
As such, highly geared companies may not have the financial resources 
required firstly for investment in IC; secondly, highly geared companies may 
not have the necessary resources for investment in the processes and procedures 
required to identify, manage and report IC. Agency theory views debt as a 
governance device useful in reducing the conflict between shareholders and 
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management (Jensen 1986). Debt reduces the cash flow available to 
management. Companies investing in tangible assets are more likely to have 
debt security whereas IC intensive companies may be associated with fewer 
tangible assets and therefore less debt. Furthermore, research evidence has 
shown that the R&D of a company is negatively associated to debt levels 
(Balakrishnan and Fox 1993 and Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989). This 
evidence is consistent with R&D as the driver of IA growth without which there 
is likely to be reduced levels of VDIC. Despite both the Pearson correlation and 
the partial correlation coefficients, returning insignificant results the 
expectation of a negative association has been confirmed by both the OLS and 
QREG models in the multivariate analysis. This research concludes that in 
Model III, hypothesis H4.4: is accepted. 
H4.4: Highly geared companies are more likely to provide less VDIC than 
less geared companies are. 
6.4.0. Conclusion 
The objective of the empirical tests is to establish a relationship between VDIC 
and industry membership. The chapter confirms that the existence of a common 
basis of the different levels of IC between manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing companies; increasing levels of IC with ascending SIC code, 
high levels of IC required for membership of a TMRK and increasing 
complexity from basic to service goods in INDG provides significant results in 
the association with VDIC. The sensitivity test indicates a similar hierarchy of 
association with pharmaceutical companies disclosing the most IC content and 
basic resource industries the least. Overall, SALES, TMRK, MANUF, INDG, 
SIC, MVTA and GEAR are significant in explaining the variation in VDIC. 
The results indicate that companies associated with high technologically 
innovative characteristics whether classified under TMRK, MANUF or SIC and 
to a lesser extent INDG provide higher levels of VDIC; these companies 
include those from pharmaceutical, computer, services and electrical industries. 
Disclosure of ICCA attributes appears to be motivated by the presence of 
"hidden value" as measured by MVTA. Furthermore, consistent with the 
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characteristics of larger companies, the availability of resources to manage the 
IC disclosure process, coupled with reduced financial risk, is sufficient 
explanation for the signalling of IC attributes. Disclosure costs are perceived as 
minimal; generally, IP protection, barriers to imitation including financial, 
intellectual and political pressure afford the company defence from competitive 
losses. This research concludes that the level of IC content within industries is 
significant in influencing the VDIC trends. The variation in disclosure levels 
based on industry and sector differences has implications for standard setters in 
particular from an international perspective in establishing a universal IC 
framework. The more influential companies, particularly those with higher 
turnover and less dependence on debt, may be leaders in their respective 
economic activities; this research indicates that these companies provide more 
IC disclosures, given that these companies are characterised by high levels of 
"hidden value". Industry norms and competitive pressures may lead to herding 
effects as less resourceful companies follow the reporting trends set by more 
proactive companies. 
Some industries are regulated due to the environmental, political or 
financial nature of their operations. The traditional financial statements of these 
industries have been adjusted, amended and annexed to ensure disclosure of 
information that may reduce the risk attached to their sensitive operations. 
Financial, insurance, banking, mining and oil and gas industries show such 
characteristics. As is applied to the case of companies associated with higher 
levels of risk, standard setters encouraging more disclosure of risk information 
may be expected to support the argument for more IC disclosure with respect to 
companies associated with higher levels of "hidden value". Such regulation 
may mandate specific industries to follow specific reporting practices, practices 
developed, implemented and upheld by the regulator in order to provide 
appropriate value relevant information. 
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7.1.0. Introduction 
In this section, the results of the regression analysis of Model IV are presented. 
The objective of the empirical tests is to establish a relationship between VDIC 
and corporate governance mechanisms. Chapter 2 outlines the development of 
the corporate governance hypotheses. 
WD1= ß + ß, EXPRCD - ß2 CNED + /33 DIRSHS + ß4 EXCREM + /35TMRK +E 
ý7ý 
The empirical tests on these hypotheses are reported in this section. 
Table 2.1 introduces the corporate governance analytical framework that forms 
the basis for assessing and developing testable hypotheses to explain the 
disclosure of intangible assets. The four corporate governance variables 
introduced EXCREM, CNED, DIRSHS and EXPRCD. Control variables in this 
model include TMRK for industry and MVBV as the "hidden value". 
The alignment of director and shareholder objectives may increase as 
the director's shareholding increases; such an alignment may potentially reduce 
agency costs. Governance mechanisms may be applied to enhance 
accountability and transparency. This model introduces dummy variables to 
control for the influence of DIRSHS on VDIC. The dummy variables are 
established at significant percentage shareholdings, 3%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50% 
and 50%+ as illustrated in Appendix 2C. 
Models I to III have established size as a significant determinant of 
VDIC whether measured by SALES, TA or MV, thus Model IV eliminates size 
from the selected variables consistent with the model construction as illustrated 
in section 3.2.4. As indicated in Chapters 4 to 6, non-normally distributed data 
is transformed by square roots and logs following Cooke (1998); 
transformations are applied before regression tests. The choice of approach to 
accounting for statistical problems associated with non-normal distributions has 
been discussed in Chapter 3. The next section examines the level of association 
of variables included in Model IV. 
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7.2.0. Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Analysis and Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are reported 
in Table 7.1. The results of the univariate analysis are obtained from the partial 
correlation matrix that illustrates the nature, direction and significance of the 
bivariate relationships of WDI and the independent variables; these are reported 
in Table 7.1. In addition, Table 7.1 reports the results of the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between WDI and the independent variables and the bivariate 
statistical correlations between all independent variables. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that on average, equity value exceeds 
book value threefold consistent with the expectation of the content of "hidden 
value"; furthermore, the minimum and maximum values of MVBV indicate 
significant variation between companies, this is also matched by the significant 
variation in the extent of VDIC as illustrated by the dependent variable WDI. 
The descriptive statistics for untransformed variables EXPRCD and DIRSHS 
are not reported in Table 7.1 nevertheless, summary statistics indicate that 40% 
of the board consists of experienced non-executive directors and 8% of the 
company's equity is held by directors. In addition, CNED indicates that 52% of 
chairs are non-executive directors. 
The results of the partial correlation matrix indicate that companies with 
"hidden value", consistent with companies in more complex industries, that 
remunerate both employees and directors equally well, provide substantially 
more IC disclosure. These companies have separate executive roles between 
chair and non-executive director and are characterised by lower director 
shareholding. The expectation of increasing director shareholding to increase 
VDIC has not been realised but the result has proved significant. This research 
proposes that the motivation for management to align goals with those of 
shareholders may take place at a higher shareholding ratio than that currently 
held by the management of companies (8%). Dummy variables introduced as a 
sensitivity test on this variation are summarised in Appendix 2C. VDIC 
increases when the roles of chair and non-executive director are segregated. 
Thus, executive board chairs are associated with higher levels of VDIC. The 
results indicate that although the relationship with EXPRCD is weak the 
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direction of the relationships is consistent with the predicted sign. Furthermore, 
the results of the Pearson correlation matrix are consistent with the results of 
the bivariate findings. 
The presence of the expected bivariate relationships is encouraging as 
these may provide the basis for interpreting the results of the multivariate 
analysis. The relationship amongst the independent variables indicates that 
corporate governance variables EXCREM and EXPRCD are correlated at 5% 
signifying higher directors' remuneration may be associated with board 
composition, when cross directorships are present amongst NONEXEC. 
However, with increasing director share ownership, it appears that executive 
remuneration is suppressed. Similarly, CNED encourages EXPRCD whilst 
restricting DIRSHS. On the other hand, the association between EXPRCD and 
DIRSHS is negative indicating that fewer experienced NONEXEC are 
appointed when DIRSHS is larger, furthermore that EXPRCD control 
employee remuneration. These findings reveal the existence of a low level of 
collinearity amongst the corporate governance variables; The correlation matrix 
identifies the conflicts of interest that exist within the governance function. To 
remain independent EXPRCD are encouraged to hold little or no equity. With 
increasing DIRSHS, conflicts of interest are expected to increase as 
entrenchment policies lead to reduced disclosure. As a non-executive director, 
CNED may be expected to increase the experiences of NONEXEC by 
appointing more EXPRCD. In contrast, an increase in DIRSHS may lead to 
better corporate governance mechanisms with respect to the separation of dual 
roles in CNED. The theoretical approach is adopted from agency theory as 
management may divert resources for self-objectives, shareholders may 
respond by increasing monitoring mechanisms, corporate governance 
mechanisms that may result in increased disclosure. 
Table 7.3 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for Model IV. 
The distribution of governance mechanisms across industries illustrates that 
high rates of executive remuneration can be found in both low and high IA 
resource base companies. Furthermore, there is no significant distinction 
between the resource base and CNED; basic and pharmaceutical industries have 
significantly more CNED than do electrical and retail. There appears to be 
closer relationship between SREXPRCD and the resource base of companies. 
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Pharmaceutical, computer and service companies appoint more EXPRCD than 
do engineering, retail and basic companies. Some industries may require 
directors to be reputable and to hold some technical expertise whereas other 
industries may encourage directors to take up a share in the equity. 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics by industry 
Industry SRWDI EXCREM CNED SREXPRCD SRDIRSHS TMRK 
Group 
Mean 
BASIC 0.510 2292.469 0.629 0.582 0.163 0.000 
CHEM 0.488 2154.764 0.600 0.597 0.213 0.000 
ENG 0.490 1526.328 0.558 0.553 0.123 0.465 
ELEC 0.595 1620.832 0.380 0.581 0.220 0.340 
PHAR 0.700 1629.219 0.615 0.609 0.066 0.769 
RET 0.493 1694.411 0.426 0.564 0.230 0.021 
COMP 0.600 1993.988 0.504 0.626 0.219 0.248 
SERV 0.602 1618.296 0.569 0.600 0.148 0.121 
Standard 
deviation 
BASIC 0.115 1787.529 0.487 0.188 0.209 0.000 
CHEM 0.113 3101.887 0.500 0.235 0.224 0.000 
ENG 0.101 1335.894 0.502 0.256 0.188 0.213 
ELEC 0.117 2725.804 0.490 0.261 0.251 0.479 
PHAR 0.076 1791.161 0.506 0.290 0.078 0.439 
RET 0.096 1343.355 0.500 0.215 0.234 0.146 
COMP 0.103 2895.665 0.502 0.226 0.216 0.434 
SERV 0.101 1733.180 0.500 0.202 0.177 0.329 
Source: Descriptive statistics on research data 
The directors from pharmaceutical companies hold the lowest equity in their 
companies; however, this is the industry with the highest concentration of 
TMRK listed companies. The next section examines the empirical tests derived 
from the hypotheses generated in Chapter 2. 
7.3.0. Multivariate Analysis 
Despite the results of the correlation coefficients illustrating the absence of 
significant collinearity, a certain degree of association may exist given that one 
independent variable may be an approximate linear function of a set of 
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several independent variables. This research therefore applies a sensitivity test 
as an effective test of multicollinearity: the variance inflation factor (VIF). This 
factor is reported in Table 7.3; collinearity does not appear to be a serious 
problem in Model IV as the highest factor does not exceed 10. Consistent with 
Models I, II and III, two tests of collinearity are applied to ensure that no one 
variable may be an approximate linear function of a set of several independent 
variables. The results of the VIF are reported in Table 7.3; collinearity does not 
appear to be a serious problem in Model IV, as the highest factor does not 
exceed 10. Table 7.3 presents Model IV, the regression of WDI and four 
corporate governance variables. A robust linear regression is run on the 
independent variables. The F- statistic 0.16 is significant at I% and R2 is 0.16. 
Overall, the model appears robust; the sample size is large (339 observations). 
This research formulates a one-sided test as a statistical hypothesis in which the 
coefficients for which we can reject the null hypothesis, Ho > 0. This research 
formulates the null hypothesis to determine if Model IV has any explanatory 
power. 
Ho: all coefficients are < "0" 
This research rejects Ho when Fobserved > Feritical. Thus F (. 05,5,439) = 1.96. This 
research therefore rejects the null hypothesis that all the variables jointly have 
no explanatory power in the model. As F> Fcr; dcal, Ho is rejected and this 
research concludes that Model IV has some explanatory power. 
Model IV indicates that additional experience and cross-directorships in 
EXPRCD does not lead to higher levels of VDIC. Nevertheless, the QREG 
model indicates a positive and significant association. The sensitivity test 
applied to DIRSHS overall has no influence on other variables included in the 
model. Both the OLS and QREG model report consistent results in the presence 
of the dummy variables. Furthermore, EXPRCD becomes significantly stronger 
in its association with VDIC. With respect to DIRSHS, dummy variables 
indicate varying results for the respective equity percentages held by directors. 
The relationship is found to be insignificant with respect to directors' 
shareholding greater than 2.9% and equal to or less than 4.8%. With respect to 
the QREG model, generally results are not significant perhaps signifying the 
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lack of sufficient incentives for VDIC. However, the OLS model finds a 
significant negative association at the 2.9% level, but an insignificant 
association between 2.9% and 4.8%. Within the 4.8% to 9.6% equity ownership 
band, the band in which the average sample company falls, director ownership 
suppresses IC attribute disclosure consistent with the beginnings of shareholder 
control conflicts and entrenchment policies. Directors, who own on average 
29.2% to 49% of share equity as represented by DS5, disclose the least amount 
of IC attributes. This level of DIRSHS may be associated with entrenchment 
strategies as the executive board increases control and as private benefits may 
not be available to minority shareholders. In all respects, however the direction 
of the relationship is not consistent with the predicted sign and may reveal the 
existence of management entrenchment policies. The individual results of 
variables included in Model IV are discussed in section 7.3.1 to 7.3.8. The 
normality of the residuals indicates normal distribution above this research- 
defined threshold of 5% confidence for non-normality. 
7.3.1. EXCREM 
Model IV confirms that EXCREM is a significant determinant of VDIC. A high 
EXCREM may indicate the value placed on the executives by management and 
the resultant VDIC may be attributed to signalling theory consistent with 
EMPC, employee remuneration in general. Furthermore, a high ratio may 
indicate reduced financial risk as debt repayments may be low and the conflict 
of interest reduced. The separation of ownership and control may be 
exacerbated by the incidence of asymmetry of information as management 
exploit their information advantage to the detriment of stakeholders. However, 
higher executive remuneration may align director and shareholder goals 
resulting in VDIC. Furthermore, EXCREM may be viewed as a performance 
variable in that companies that pay a higher wage to directors may have the 
incentive to make more VDIC in order to communicate good performance to 
investors (Raffournier 1995). The results confirm the theoretical argument 
based on signalling and the direction of the relationship is consistent with some 
prior studies. Lufti (1989) identified share option schemes as positive and 
significant in influencing voluntary disclosure in UK unlisted companies. This 
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study applied share option scheme as a proxy for remuneration and benefits that 
management may accrue during their employment. Agency theory was applied 
as the theoretical approach suggesting that EXCREM is linked to agency theory 
within disclosure studies. The incidence of agency costs may be reduced in the 
presence of higher remuneration packages that may provide the impetus for 
management to align their goals with those of the company. The need for 
management to ensure continuance in office too, particularly when 
remuneration is tied in to share performance may lead to VDIC, as an increase 
in company value may directly benefit directors. The results indicate that in the 
presence of "hidden value", highly complex service industries characterised by 
low debt levels provide significantly more IC attribute disclosure if their 
employees and executives are well paid for their services. Such remuneration is 
expected to be above market average and therefore sufficient to, not only retain 
employees and directors, but to ensure adherence to prescribed company 
policies and procedures. Model IV indicates that the direction of the 
relationship is positive and significant consistent with explanations based on 
signalling theory. The conclusion for this variable therefore, is that hypothesis 
H6.2: is accepted. 
H6.2: EXCREM is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
7.3.2. Non-executive Chair (CNED) 
The multivariate analysis indicates that non-executive chairs are associated with 
less VDIC, supporting the view that the position of chair and non-executive 
director should be separated. The results are consistent across the partial and 
Pearson correlation matrices, the OLS and QREG models and the variations of 
Model IV with or without dummy DIRSHS variables. Where the roles of chair 
and NONEXEC are separate, increased VDIC may ensue. Alignment of 
shareholder and management objectives by these executive chairs may lead to 
reduced agency costs. However, the CNED does not increase VDIC and 
therefore monitoring costs remain high. Asymmetric information creates 
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additional agency costs. The literature is not consistent with which governance 
system is better. 
No studies have yet investigated this relationship within IC, although 
Ho and Wong (2001) established an insignificant result with dominant 
personality and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) established a negative and 
significant result with independent chair confirming that the roles of chair and 
non-executive director may be better separated, this result is consistent with 
Model IV. The literature indicates mixed results for studies conducted on 
independent board leadership as measured by CNED and executive chair. 
Overall, there appears to be no significant difference in performance between 
executive and non-executive board chairs (Chaganti et al. 1985, cited by Davis 
et al. 1997; and Molz 1988, cited by Davis et al. 1997). Nevertheless, Dahya et 
al. (1996) concluded that the market responds favourably to the separation of 
the roles of chair and chief executive officer (CEO) and that accounting 
performance of companies adopting a "dual CEO" declined subsequent to this 
change. In addition, Dalton and Kesner (1987) and Worrell et al. (1997) argue 
that dual roles compromise board independence and may lead to conflicts of 
interest that may negatively influence shareholder value creation. According to 
agency theory, the combined functions of chair and NONEXEC can 
significantly impair the board's most important role of monitoring, disciplining 
and compensating senior managers Barako et al. (2006). Lack of segregation of 
duties may provide the opportunity for opportunistic behaviour. Forker (1992) 
concluded combined roles in the executive signalled the absence of separation 
of decision management and decision control (Fama and Jensen 1983). The 
results and the literature suggest that the combined role of CNED is likely to 
require increased monitoring, the direction of the relationship is negative and 
significant therefore hypothesis H8.4: is accepted. 
H8.4: The CNED is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
7.3.3. EXPRCD 
Model IV does not confirm the hypothesis of a positive significant relationship 
between VDIC and EXPRCD. The multivariate analysis illustrates that the 
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proportion of EXPRCD is not associated with the level of VDIC. Both 
parametric and non-parametric results indicate a non-significant association. 
The QREG model however, provides better results indicating a positive 
association at 5% for the variation of the model without dummy DIRSHS 
variables and at 1% for the variation of the QREG model, which includes 
dummy DIRSHS variables. The non-parametric results indicate a weaker 
association, although these cross-directorships may be expected to assist in 
making information more transparent following successful implementation in 
other companies and in addition, in providing value relevant information for 
comparability with the knowledge of other organisations (Dahya et al. 1996). 
The results of Model IV are consistent with the approach of Turnbull (1997), 
EXPRCD may not have the intelligence or variety in information control nor 
the inside information to evaluate management. As such, EXPRCD may not 
have firm or industry specific information to add value. Although EXPRCD 
play a crucial role in the wider corporate governance role of limiting managerial 
discretionary behaviour and protecting shareholder interests, this monitoring 
role of EXPRCD is expected to reduce information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders, this expectation has not been realised with 
respect to IC. 
The literature has reported varying results. In the UK, Lufti (1989) 
reported insignificant results on the influence of NONEXEC on voluntary 
disclosure; in the US Malone et al. (1993), reported an insignificant result 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure and proportion of outside 
directors. Both Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) applied 
agency theory and reported insignificant results. Studies in favour of 
NONEXEC' domination on boards includes Kesner and Johnson (1990) and 
Grace et al. (1995); the motivation for these hypotheses is based on agency 
theory and the monitoring role of EXPRCD. Support for a positive association 
is derived from Adams and Hossain (1998) and Chen and Jaggi (2000) who 
found empirical evidence of a positive relation between proportion of 
independent directors and mandatory disclosure. Deakin and Konzelmann 
(2004) however report on the complexity of the monitoring role of NONEXEC. 
They suggest that Enron's NONEXC were as well qualified as any group of 
outsiders could have been to judge the regulatory and business risk that arose 
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from company operations, however their failure to identify these risk places 
questions on corporate governance reformers insistence on independence for 
NONEXEC. This approach is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) who find 
that outside directors reduce corporate disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) suggest 
that one reason for this result is that NONEXEC may be a substitute for 
voluntary disclosure. Another reason put forward is that NONEXEC may not 
be truly independent; EXPRCD may not be truly experienced as cross- 
directorships within similar business cultures may only yield common 
knowledge. 
Malone et al. (1993) find no evidence of the influence of NONEXEC on 
disclosure quality; similarly, Leung and Horwitz (2004) find no support for 
better disclosure attributed to NONEXEC; they suggest that the presence of 
high director ownership mitigates the monitoring role of NONEXEC. 
Consistent with the OLS model that exhibit robust results this research 
concludes that Model IV is not consistent with the expectations generated by 
the theoretical basis. UK DIRSHS at 8% may not be sufficiently large to 
influence the EXPRCD mandate therefore, hypothesis H8.1: is rejected. 
H8.1: The proportion of EXPRCD to total directors is a positive significant 
explanatory variable of the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
7.3.4. Directors' Shareholding (DIRSHS) 
In Table 7.1, the parametric tests indicate a negative significant association at 
1 %. The regression analysis of Model IV suggests that the current share of 
equity held by management is insufficient to motivate management to have 
high levels of VDIC. DIRSHS has indicated that it is negatively associated with 
the extent of voluntary and mandatory disclosure in previous research. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Leftwich et al. (1981) noted that agency costs are 
associated with increasing level of non-owner management in a firm. These 
agency costs arise from the separation of the principals (shareholders) from the 
decision-making function in the firm. 
As agency theorists propose that the level of VDIC is a function of the 
relationship between the principles and the agents, voluntary disclosure is a 
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monitoring mechanism principals employ to cost efficiently scrutinise the 
activities of the agent to ensure their residual claims are not diluted (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). On the other hand, the relationship between managerial share 
ownership and voluntary disclosure is expected to be negative because the 
conflict between shareholders and management increases as managers' share 
ownership decreases (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts 1977, Chow 1982 and 
Dhaliwal et al. 1982). Model IV is consistent with this approach. The literature 
has revealed similar results with Eng and Mak (2003) reporting a negative 
result between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
The results of the dummy variables indicate that irrespective of the 
percentage equity held, directors that hold company shares do not favour VDIC. 
Although, the relationship is negative in all cases, the level of significance 
varies with varying equity held by directors. Between 30% and 50%, results are 
significant; management employ entrenchment policies that utilise information 
asymmetry and reduced VDIC as mechanisms for postponing managerial 
replacement. Agency theory explains manager behaviour commensurate with 
self-serving. In Model IV, DIRSHS is significant in explaining the variation in 
the extent of VDIC however, with reference to IC and to its proprietary costs, it 
may be expected that as managers take on more equity, they become more risk 
averse particularly with respect to competitive losses. It appears that at this 
level of DIRSHS, equity held is not sufficient to motivate management 
behaviour into matching that of shareholders. 
With reference to Leung and Horwitz (2004) who found that voluntary 
segment disclosure increases as director ownership rises from 1% to 25%, 
supporting the approach that alignment of director and shareholder goals leads 
to more disclosure. Nevertheless, further increases resulted in lower disclosure 
due to the shift from agency to minority interest conflicts with shareholders. 
Agency theory explains management behaviour commensurate with self- 
serving interests below a threshold level of beneficial ownership. Management 
and shareholder aims are not aligned. Nevertheless, the results of this research 
indicate that increasing corporate governance mechanism by increasing 
directors' beneficial ownership does not lead to increased VDIC. The results 
may differ from those of Leung and Horwitz (2004) due to DIRSHS in Hong 
Kong being on average 38.6% and in the UK on average 8%. Furthermore, 
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proprietary costs attributed to segmental disclosure may be perceived to be less 
in Leung and Horwitz (2004) or that the signalling benefits of IC are more in 
this research, the nature of the attributes disclosed may be influential. Model IV 
indicates that such ownership in share options and management shareholdings 
has not achieved the desired objective of aligning shareholder and management 
goals. Above the threshold equilibrium point, issues with respect to 
concentrated ownership come into the fore. 
Management share ownership is a direct signal to the market of 
management's confidence to invest in the company. Nevertheless, as directors 
become large shareholders, ownership concentration increases. Hossain et al. 
(1994) find support for low extent of voluntary disclosure with increasing 
ownership concentration. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that increasing 
ownership is associated with increasing control, large shareholders may be able 
to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority 
shareholders. As such, costs associated with the existence of high ownership 
and entrenchment policies may be influential in this disclosure decision. 
Controlling shareholders have an incentive to avoid disclosing detailed IC 
information that may attract close monitoring by minority shareholders and 
mitigate their private benefits as executive board ownership increases (Leung 
and Horwitz 2004). At the extreme end of this scale, Fama and Jensen (1983) 
contend that companies controlled by management are less likely to survive in 
competition consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that 
illustrate a significant association between DIRSHS and firm performance. 
Nevertheless, Stultz (1988) proposes that the likelihood of successful takeovers 
is reduced as management ownership increases, due to the high premium 
demanded by management who hold substantial shares. 
Consistent with the results of the dummy variables in Model IV, 
excessive management ownership exceeding 50% may be counter-productive to 
companies' long-term value. This contention is found in the entrenchment 
theory (Fan and Wong 2002) that predicts higher management interests lead to 
lower voluntary disclosure. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Leung and Horwitz 
(2004) and Fan and Wong (2002) suggest that the controlling owner effectively 
decides on the accounting policies which result in lower voluntary disclosure at 
the detriment of minority shareholders. It may be that the management 
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entrenchment hypothesis could explain the negative association and 
its effects 
could mitigate the effects of agency costs. This approach is consistent with the 
negative association as illustrated in Table 7.1 and 7.3. Model IV indicates a 
significant negative association with VDIC and therefore hypothesis H8.6: is 
rejected. 
H8.6: DIRSHS is a positive significant variable in the variation of the extent 
of VDIC. 
7.3.5. TechMARK Listing 
Companies that have been admitted as members of the TMRK listing are 
associated with higher levels of IC disclosure relative to non-members. The 
results of the association are consistent in the partial and Pearson correlation 
matrices and in the OLS and QREG models. TechMARK listing status provides 
a competitive advantage that is formally acknowledged through third party 
accreditation. TMRK is positively associated with the extent of VDIC in Model 
IV. The conclusion for this variable therefore is that hypothesis H3.1: is 
accepted. 
H3.1: TMRK is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
7.4.0. Conclusion 
Corporate governance mechanisms address the agency problem and the 
separation of ownership and control. The extent to which management disclose 
IC is influenced by the composition and quality of the board of directors. The 
corporate governance variables included in Model IV have returned mixed 
results on their influence on VDIC. The theoretical approach is adopted from 
agency theory as management may divert resources for self-objectives, 
shareholders may respond by increasing monitoring mechanisms, corporate 
governance mechanisms that may result in increased disclosure. 
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There are important connections between VDIC and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Both concepts focus on value creation for 
shareholders; IC leverages a company's IA and corporate governance focuses 
on stakeholder influences that affect managerial decision-making (Weimer and 
Pape 1999). As such, corporate governance is accountable for its traditional role 
with respect to financial and physical capital and in addition for IC. 
Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms are themselves IC, being 
mobilisations of human, culture, innovation, external and internal structure 
capital geared towards achieving company objectives (Keenan and Aggestam 
2001). As such, Model IV confirms that shareholders apply corporate 
governance mechanisms to increase monitoring; these mechanisms assure 
shareholders of a return on their investment. Investors cannot rely on financing 
without corporate governance mechanisms. Further, legal protection of investor 
rights is one essential element of corporate governance mechanisms. 
The system of corporate governance in the UK is dependent on political, 
social and economic factors. These factors may not reflect efficiency 
considerations focused on managing agency problems. As a mechanism that 
evolved over time, the legal framework may be more associated with class 
struggles over the rights and roles of shareholders and employees rather than 
with laws and institutions specifically set out to control agency costs. Fligstein 
and Choo (2005) summarise the empirical literature by concluding that the 
relative advantage of a particular system of corporate governance and its 
governing legal framework, is difficult to pinpoint, even so once discerned, no 
conclusions can be reached as to its dominance over other systems. In as much 
as components of national corporate governance systems work together as a 
system, features such as intellectual property law, financial market regulation 
and labour laws, these same features compliment the existence and review of 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
Within the UK, regulation of IC mandatory disclosure is low. However, 
national systems are effective in motivating VDIC; this self-regulation is in part 
possible through IP rights, copyrights, brands and trademarks that are protected 
within property law; possible through financial markets that are liquid in which 
management replacement is possible and labour laws that protect employee 
rights. Within the context of this environment, the expectation that corporate 
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governance mechanisms facilitates VDIC has been realised given the overall 
positive effect of IC attribute disclosure on title and ownership of SC, liquidity 
of financial markets (RC) and maintenance of HC through employee 
remuneration. In contrast, the critical perspective regards corporate governance 
mechanisms as setting standards that protect the existing status quo. Pesqueux 
(2005) describes these standards as arising from a social game that permits 
dominant interests to impose their positions and that corporate governance 
mechanisms strengthen and legitimise these standards. 
Consistent with this critique, IC disclosure may be one such standard, 
not being embedded in law, VDIC may serve the purpose of protecting an 
exclusive set of companies involved in highly innovative technological 
development. Weak corporate governance and lack of transparency are often 
associated with financial crisis and financial scandals when the dominant 
interests suffer loss. The conclusion of this research, that corporate governance 
mechanisms aid VDIC, is consistent within the wider context. Support from the 
legal structure and financial market renders corporate governance mechanisms 
tools through which shareholders can impose, control and monitor their 
interests. VDIC represents such a monitoring tool as additional disclosure 
reduces agency costs between management and shareholders in addition to 
creating value with respect to disclosure of the "hidden value". 
Furthermore, the separation of executive roles through segregation of 
duties reduces the power held by one individual. The separation of directors 
into executive and non-executive maintains the independence of the monitors 
and reduces agency costs. Consistent with the existence of "hidden value" 
companies providing better financial benefits for their employees both 
executives and non-executives are able to retain HC; corporate governance 
mechanisms advocate transparency and accountability, VDIC provides the 
signalling mechanisms that convey this HC to the markets. The next chapter 
reports on Model V, the Full Model in which the effects of investment in IC, 
accounting risk measures, industry membership and corporate governance 
mechanisms are investigated individually and in aggregate. 
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8.1.0. Introduction 
The objectives of the empirical tests are to establish a relationship between 
VDIC and various IC, risk, industry and corporate governance variables and to 
ascertain the effect of DI and WDI on Model V. 
WDI = , 6o + ß, EXPR 
CD - ßZ GEAR + /33 CNED + /34 EMPC + /35 MVTA + , ß6 S1 C+ /37 TMRK ýg 
+, 68 SIZE +c 
The eight variables introduced are EXPRCD, GEAR, CNED, EMPC, MVTA, 
SIC, TMRK and SIZE. In this model, the size variable is represented by 
SALES although Models I to III indicate that TA or MV may be suitable size 
proxies. SALES is selected due to the inclusion of MVTA ratio as the variable 
that is a measure of "hidden value" and this research approach not to include 
two collinear variables in the same model. Thus, the two measures of IC 
investment introduced examine HC content in the case of EMPC and "hidden 
value" in the case of MVTA. 
Industry has been identified as a control variable that enhances the 
results of regressions by controlling for sector differences. The classification of 
SIC differentiates companies along the lines of IC content and complexity; in 
the case of TMRK, the classification is based on companies that are 
technologically innovative, R&D and IA intensive and those that are not. 
GEAR is introduced as the proxy for financial risk. The focus on risk is based 
on the requirement for financial and liquidity stability sufficient to permit the 
investment in IC to take place. In addition, as illustrated in Table 8.1 
inconsistent results for GEAR in the general literature leads to added interest in 
its association with VDIC. Furthermore, although R&D and IA growth have 
been predicted to increase performance, no research has investigated the 
influence of risk within IC studies and only a few have investigated GEAR. The 
corporate governance mechanisms CNED and EXPRCD represent the HC and 
expertise that manages the company. In addition, these variables examine 
corporate governance mechanisms related to dominant personalities, the 
influence of external advice attributed to cross-directorships, segregation of 
executive roles, separation of executive and non-executive functions and 
222 
00 
xM 
-ý O 
00 Ö 
O 
N Cl ISO kn 
ÖÖÖÖ 
w 
^' OOOO 
ýn O ýO 00 O ÖÖÖ~ 
QOÖ 
kr) 
OO . -+ U) kr) 
ýUý cý o000 
oööö 
Ü 
00 MC 
00 
p^ 'N 
NOO 0 
^- OOOOOO, O 
U0NNN'N N 00 
O 
^' OO 
Oi 
OOOpO, 
cd 
OM- (=> N 
- M '' 
Uö°ö0öö 
o 
o0 
00 
a? ýC d0-" 00 
`r' ö 
off, N 
_NNÖ 03 O rOO '--ý 
ON- 
NO-OOO 
00 ÖNÖ"ÖNÖÖÖ 
ÜOOOOÖ-OOO 
OM 00 MON -- 
N 
__ 
00 MN Lj 
O 
QOO0 
. -. 
Np 'p 
NO O kr) 
MOO 
'tt pC 
C) 
Ln cv 
cn mM- ýo M ýO `O cý Cý N 
QOO-OON d- OO 
Q 
00 -4 E- 
0ý). 
-. 4 9L4 
Z E-ý v) 
E-+ -ý U Qw ; z.., C7 ýcýiýU 
cý 
Cý b 
U 
Fr 
N 
U 
O 
U 
U 
7 
C1, 
U 
N 
Q 
N 
U 
L. 
O 
C/] 
M 
N 
N 
7s c 'd b 
Ö 
0- 4 c0 
0 
cqý 
o- -O 
b 
Uw 
9 
O 
C) GO 
yý cd 
40 
Ö 
bp 
0 ct 
O 
64 
64 
'OUU 
'b OÖ 
03 
O* 'ý -d 03 
ýo 
ä 4- 2 
to It c 
.d () 
U cý Oý 
Cýj 
NOO 
CIO 0* 
cad 
V- 
cd 
Q) 
0 cd 
rp --+ 
X 
V, 
Ncu4, 
:So 4-4 
CID 
03 a- 
0. 
10 
00 .. W Q) 
a) ` C/ý 10 
OV, 
tu 
cä 
cd 
b 
42 
rA rl 
a.. 
r CIO 
cd 
cd 
O 
O 
cd 
N 
cd Ell 
4-+ 
O 
O 
d 
F-' 
O 
O 
O 
aý 
U 
`. V 
cd 
. -r 
bA 
4-. 
r-+ 
"Cý 
bA 
cd 
U 
O 
"Cl 
O 
w c7 
C 0 
aý b 
I 
O 
bA 
U 
U 
O 
N 
O 
N 
10 rl 
. r, 
Ö ß, 
bO 
cd ý 
0 1: 14 
Cýl 
m 
ÖV 
Öc 
111 
b 
"VU 
CO N 
ÖE0 
N 4ý ci 
03 
O ff-4 O 
ÖbU 
cd 
_ 
0 
'L3 Q 15 03 
E-ý vý W 
J 
cd 
O 
U 
U 
4-4 
O 
U 
N 
O 
U 
N 
cý 
b 
cd 
O 
O 
cd 
2 
42 
cd 
cd 
cd 
cd 
«i 
u 
Ei 
rA 
ce 
. r, 
Q 
U 
a k 
w 
. r, cý3 
U 
a) 
U 
iC 
cd 
4 
cd 
O 
r. + U 
a) 
N 
U 
Q? 
0 
cýs 
O 
Cýj 
Izi 
U 
cd 
71 
cd 
cd 
a3 
O 
E O 
O 
U 
. r, 'd 
Q 
W 
z U 
ýi' N 
N 
monitoring role of NONEXEC. CNED is influential in disclosure decisions; in 
addition, expert advice on current practice as a NONEXEC may be invaluable 
in the alignment of management and shareholder objectives. The construction 
of the model achieves the objectives of identifying the combined and individual 
effects of the different focus areas within IC research. This chapter is divided 
into three sections; the first, presents the results of the descriptive statistics, the 
partial and Pearson correlation matrices and the second presents the results of 
the multivariate regression analysis. 
8.2.0. Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Analysis and Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the nature, direction and significance of the 
bivariate relationships of WDI and DI and the independent variables, the results 
of the descriptive statistics and the results of the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between WDI and DI and the independent variables. The results of 
the descriptive statistics on the disclosure indices indicate that there is a wide 
range of variation in the extent of VDIC indicating a wide range of IC 
disclosure practices. 
WDI measures both the construct of existence of an IC attribute (DI) 
and the construct of competitive advantage (WDI) as such this research applies 
WDI as the dependent variable for Models I to IV. In the Full Model however, 
DI is applied as the dependent variable, in addition to WDI as a sensitivity test. 
The results of the descriptive statistics for WDI and DI indicate that at the IC 
attribute and IC category analysis in Table 4.1, management discloses more RC 
than either SC or HC; although, at the individual attribute level the top three IC 
attributes are disclosed from HC category. The results of the descriptive 
analysis of DI and WDI are presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 that illustrate DI 
has a range of 0.09 to 0.86, with a mean of 0.48. The range for WDI is 0.07 to 
0.75 and the mean is 0.33. For both DI and WDI, the mean and median are 
close and the standard deviation is marginal indicating that the content analysis 
methodology was appropriate and reliable in measuring disclosure quality in 
ICCA; results suggest normal distribution for both DI and WDI. As WDI<DI, 
48% of IC attributes were disclosed, whereas only 33% of ICCA attributes were 
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disclosed. This variance indicates that fewer disclosures are competitive 
advantage related. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that data in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 are not 
normally distributed. The literature has indicated that data from disclosure 
studies is seldom strictly normally distributed (skewness = 0). This research 
defines normal distributions when the skewness <2 and kurtosis < 3. Further, 
as summarised by Cooke (1998), normal distributions are not often found in 
disclosure studies, this research is no exception, the descriptive statistics 
indicate that some variables are more skewed than others are, as such 
transformations are applied before regression tests. Data and statistical analysis 
indicates that of the continuous variables, SALES and EXPRCD require 
transformation to achieve research-defined normality. Dichotomous variables 
indicate that 16% of the sample companies are members of the TechMARK 
listing and that 52% of chairs are non-executive directors. MVTA is significant 
as a representative of "hidden value" as is MVBV; companies strive to increase 
shareholder value. The ratio of MVTA is a little over 1 at 1.16, it indicates that 
TA is as representative a proxy for size as is MV. Furthermore, the mean value 
for MVTA indicates that on average the sample MV exceeds TA by 16%. 
However, the minimum and maximum values for MVTA indicate that the 
"hidden value" varies from a fraction of the TA value to over ten times the 
value of TA. The standard deviations in the distribution of EMPC, illustrates 
the variance in distribution of employee remuneration across sectors and 
therefore potentially, the variability attached to the value of HC in these sectors. 
The partial correlation (COR) results illustrate that consistent with the 
predicted sign, variables SALES, MVTA, TMRK, SIC, EMPC and CNED are 
associated with ICCA attributes. Generally, the results of DI and WDI are 
consistent with GEAR being the only variable not associated with VDIC in 
both WDI and DI variations. The partial correlation matrix indicates that large 
companies signal their competitive advantage through disclosure; the "hidden 
value" as represented by MVTA leads to the disclosure of IC that may 
otherwise remain invisible to shareholders and investors. As a representative of 
the investment in IC, EMPC is associated with VDIC as companies signal the 
value of HC in generating competitive advantage. Models II, III and IV indicate 
that GEAR is not a significant component of firm-specific risk within the 
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univariate analysis; nevertheless, its inclusion is significant within the 
multivariate analysis suggesting that it is an important control variable. The 
existence of "hidden value" accompanied by large sales revenue is sufficient 
motivation for companies in high technology and innovative industries to 
disclose IC. It may be that these companies do not rely on debt to finance their 
operations due to the lack of adequate debt security and the specificity and non- 
tradability of their assets. 
Consistent with Table 4.4, industrial trends are determinants of VDIC as 
suggested by the significant association between VDIC and SIC. The positive 
association with TMRK is based on the high IC required for membership that is 
found in technologically innovative and R&D intensive companies. Similarly, 
SIC differentiates companies on a basis of technology content and complexity. 
The variable CNED indicates that VDIC decreases when the roles of chair and 
NONEXEC are combined. The expectation that, additional experience and 
knowledge that may accrue from being a NONEXEC may result in a 
motivation to increase VDIC has not been realised. An association thus exists 
between EXPRCD and WDI, consistent with the monitoring role of NONEXEC 
that is hypothesised to reduce agency costs through IC disclosure. Overall, the 
results indicate that companies with "hidden value" attributed to the existence 
of an IA resource base, consistent with companies in more complex industries, 
that remunerate employees well provide substantially more IC disclosure. 
These companies have separate executive roles between chair and non- 
executive director and favour relative more appointments of EXPRCD. 
The results of the Pearson correlation indicate consistency of results 
with those of the partial correlation matrix for WDI. The results of DI provide 
different results, MVTA, SIC and EXPRCD are not associated with VDIC in 
the Pearson correlation matrix although significant in the partial correlation 
matrix. This result provides further evidence of the quality of WDI as a 
measure of both constructs of existence of IC and competitive advantage in 
ICCA. The results of inter-collinearity between the independent variables, 
indicates that the larger companies are associated with lower levels of "hidden 
value". Furthermore, it is the smaller companies that are associated with 
industries involved in technologically innovative operations as well as more 
complex service orientated activities. The association between size and CNED 
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reveals that larger companies generally separate the executive roles of chair and 
NONEXEC. This choice may be due to the availability of more resources in 
larger companies. Companies that are associated with greater numbers of 
EXPRCD are associated with less remuneration for employees that may be 
attributed to their monitoring and control function. However, EXPRCD may be 
seen to encourage the appointments of chairs who are NONEXEC consistent 
with their own roles as NONEXEC. TMRK listed companies are confirmed as 
having higher levels of "hidden value". Overall, the results of Model V are 
consistent with both WDI and DI and in the partial and Pearson correlation 
matrices. The major finding however is that WDI is more responsive than DI, 
as a quality disclosure index WDI is able to capture the "hidden value" as in 
MVTA, the industry reporting trends in SIC and number of NONEXEC as in 
EXPRCD. Overall, the Pearson correlation matrix illustrates that there is no 
significant correlation between WDI or DI and any of the independent 
variables. The correlations are therefore not sufficiently significant to influence 
the effect of one variable by another due to association. 
Table 8.3 presents the descriptive statistics by industry for Model VI. 
Both DI and WDI indicate that pharmaceutical companies disclose higher 
levels of IC and ICCA attributes; two theoretical approaches are considered in 
this research to investigate this relationship, the RBV and signalling theory. In 
the case of WDI, chemical companies disclose the least ICCA attributes; this 
research has considered that such low disclosure may be due to proprietary 
costs. In the case of DI, retailers have the lowest level of IC disclosures; a low 
IA resource base is considered as the underlying reason for lack of IC 
disclosure for this industry. Nevertheless, the lack of an IA resource base is no 
limiting factor in respect of turnover, basic and engineering companies that 
have the lowest MVTA ratio, have the highest levels of sales. These industries 
have companies that have less IA resources than they do tangible assets. In 
contrast, pharmaceutical and computer industries have comparatively lower 
levels of turnover relative to basic and engineering industries; however, they 
hold the largest "hidden value" that may be attributed to a largely intangible 
assets resource base. The financial risk attributed to engineering and basic 
industries is significantly more than that associated with pharmaceutical 
companies and retailers. Service industries consisting of transport, health and 
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leisure and hotels, have significantly more debt finance than any other 
industries. Companies in these industries invest in tangible resources and may 
thus require debt finance, as is the case with engineering and basic industries. 
Industry variables provide consistent results basic, chemical and retail 
industries that have less IA resources, are not members of the TechMARK 
listing. The highest concentration of these members is found in the 
pharmaceutical and engineering industries. Service and computer companies 
are considered the most complex industries. Nevertheless, employee 
remuneration in pharmaceutical companies is more than in other industries. The 
retailer industry provides the lowest remuneration to employees; companies in 
this industry have the lowest ratio of EXPRCD, however their chairs are 
generally executive directors. In contrast, pharmaceutical companies have a 
high ratio of EXPRCD and a high ratio of CNED. The differences may be 
attributed to the industry resource base that is predominantly intangible in the 
case of pharmaceutical companies and largely tangible in the case of retailers. 
The next section discusses the results of the multivariate analysis. 
8.3.0. Multivariate Analysis 
The next section examines the results of the regression equation of Model V. 
Comparative regression equations are presented, the first with DI as the 
dependent variable in place of WDI and the second is the QREG model that 
investigates the sensitivity of WDI to assumptions of non-continuity. Model V 
includes a further sensitivity test that replaces the selected industry membership 
variables with dummy industry variables in all variations of Model V including 
the OLS and QREG models and variants that include WDI and DI separately. 
Consistent with the approach adopted by this research in accounting for non- 
normality, the dependent variable WDI is transformed by square root, MV is 
transformed into logs, SIC codes are transformed into square roots and 
EXPRCD is transformed into square roots. 
Thus in Model V, the dependent variable is represented by WDI the 
ratio of ICCA attributes disclosed to the total potential ICCA disclosures. 
EXPRCD represents the ratio of experienced non-executive directors to the 
total number of directors; it is obtained from the annual report. This experience 
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refers to cross-directorships or additional appointments as NONEXEC in a 
separate UK listed company. MVTA is taken from DataStream; it represents 
the ratio of value attributed to shareholders to total assets. GEAR is defined as 
the ratio of debt to equity and is obtained from DataStream. CNED is defined 
as a non-executive chair and is obtained from the annual report. EMPC is taken 
from DataStream and represents the ratio of staff cost to number of employees. 
SIC is the industry classification that is based on economic activity. This 
classification is obtained from DataStream, as is TechMARK listing a further 
industrial classification that is based on technologically innovative processes. 
SALES, the proxy for size in this model is defined as gross sales less discounts. 
A robust linear regression is run on the independent variables. The F- statistic 
0.53 is significant at 1% being large this statistics indicates a linear relationship 
overall. The value of R2 is 0.27, is significant within disclosure studies. Overall, 
the model appears robust; the sample size is large (339 observations). This 
research formulates the null hypothesis to determine if Model V has any 
explanatory power. 
Ho: all coefficients are < "0" 
This research rejects Ho when Fobserved > Fcritical. Thus F(05,8,439) - 1.96. This 
research therefore rejects the null hypothesis that all the variables jointly have 
no explanatory power in the model. As F> Fcritical, Ho is rejected and this 
research concludes that Model V has some explanatory power. Model V 
indicates that SALES, MVTA, GEAR, TMRK, SIC, EMPC, EXPRCD and 
CNED are significant determinants of the level of VDIC. Generally, all 
variables are significant in all variants of Model V, WDI and DI OLS and 
QREG models with the exception of SIC which is insignificant only in the 
QREG model applying DI as the disclosure index. These results are consistent 
with the parametric tests of Tables 8.1 and 8.2, GEAR however, which is 
negative in the tests of association, is positive in the regression analysis. The 
results of the influence of the individual variables on VDIC are presented in 
sections 8.3.1 to 8.3.8. Table 8.4 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis 
that introduce the dummy industry variables into the OLS and QREG models 
and WDI and DI variants. Model V has returned significant F-statistics, 
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confirming the existence of a strong linear relationship between WDI and the 
independent variables. Within the OLS model, the mean VIF indicates no 
collinearity and the z-statistics indicates that the residuals are normally 
distributed and within this research-defined threshold of 5% confidence for 
non- normality for both DI and WDI. 
The sensitivity test on the dummy industry variables provides 
interesting results. First, as reported in Table 8.4 the necessary conditions for IC 
disclosing companies are retained in the results of the dummy variables; larger 
companies signal "hidden value" generated by investment in employees and 
generally characterised by lower financial risk. These determinants are 
consistent irrespective of the industry variables applied whether industry 
classifications or dummy industry variables and whether the quantitative index 
(DI) or qualitative index (WDI) is applied. EXPRCD and CNED provide 
weaker support in the weighted index. Nevertheless, the QREG model provides 
a significant result indicating that NONEXEC with experience attained through 
cross-directorships, provide transparency, accountability and monitoring 
through IC disclosure. Companies that have separated the executive roles of 
chair and NONEXEC are characterised by higher levels of IC disclosure. 
Larger companies may have such resources to enable the segregation of these 
functions. Overall, DI provides support for WDI; the results of DI indicate that 
there is a significant difference between the quantitative and the qualitative 
indices in the multivariate analysis; the insignificant result in the OLS model 
and weak association in the QREG model for variables EXPRCD and CNED 
illustrate that disclosure indices are based on different constructs. 
Second, in Table 8.4, industry variables TMRK and SIC are consistent 
in basing their association with VDIC on ascending IC content; TMRK on 
increasing third party recognition of IC content and SIC on increasing service 
activity and complexity. In Table 8.4, both the OLS and QREG models provide 
results consistent with respect to these industry variables; these industry 
reporting trends are mirrored in the results of the dummy variables as reported 
in Table 8.4. Consistent with Model III, coefficients in both the OLS and 
QREG model are consistent in terms of basic industries, engineering and retail 
sectors having the lowest coefficients and computer, services and electrical 
having the highest coefficients. The order of significance is maintained in both 
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the OLS and QREG models consistent with expectation that the more basic 
resources, manufacturing, less complex and retail organisation may be expected 
to disclose less IC than those organisations associated with more processing, 
non-manufacturing activities, more complex and service organisations that are 
characterised by greater VDIC. Table 8.4 illustrates that industries that are 
significant in disclosing the most IC attributes under the OLS and QREG 
models pharmaceuticals, electrical, services and computers are industries 
associated with innovation and technological economic activities. Although 
coefficients of the dummy variables in the QREG model are negative, this 
research examines the order in the size of the coefficients to establish their 
relative positions in their influence on VDIC. All variations of Model V are 
consistent in illustrating that industries with IC content generally disclose more 
IC than those without. In the next, section this research examines the results of 
the individual independent variables in order to confirm the hypothesised 
influence on VDIC. 
8.3.1 Size 
Size as measured by SALES has a positive and significant influence on VDIC. 
This model confirms that large companies provide more VDIC than smaller 
companies. The results are consistent with Model I, II, III and V, the partial 
correlation matrix, the Pearson correlation matrix, the OLS and QREG model 
and in DI and WDI in Model V. The results indicate that SALES is a key 
determinant of VDIC, regardless of which industry classification is applied, 
however the consistency in the direction and differentiation of the industry 
proxies provides the underlying characteristics; non-manufacturing, high 
technology, complexity and high technology service industries are 
characteristics that in the presence of high turnover result in signalling of IC. 
The motivation is derived from the RBV and signalling the "hidden value" that 
drives this large market. Being hidden, the underlying IC may not be visible; 
signalling reduces asymmetric information by providing information on RC, 
responsible for a large market share. The variable MVTA, representing "hidden 
value" is significant and supportive of the above motivation. Size in any 
country, appears to be an important explanatory variable whether measured by 
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TA, SALES (Firth 1979), or MV (Hossain et al. 1994 and Lang and Lundholm 
1993). In the Firth (1979), Cooke (1989), Wallace et al. (1994), Depoers (2000) 
and Naser et al. (2002) studies, the sales figure, as the measure of size, is 
significant with a positive coefficient. The result confirms that both tangible 
and intangible assets contribute to the generation of turnover, SALES is 
therefore included as a measure of size irrespective of the IC intensity of the 
company. Within IC studies, size has been confirmed as positively associated 
with disclosure by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Garcia-Meca et al. (2005), Garcia- 
Meca and Martinez (2005) and Guthrie et al. (2006). Model V confirms that for 
larger companies, the benefits of signalling IC outweigh the potential disclosure 
costs. Being larger and having access to more resources, larger companies may 
be able to institute barriers to imitation. Management behaviour is explained by 
signalling theory as successful management practices are advertised to inform 
markets of the company's competitive advantage. Consistent with the 
disclosure of RC attributes that signal the IC embedded in the processes that 
expand markets, build and maintain customer relations and ensure adequate 
distribution channels. Therefore, this research confirms that SALES is a 
significant positive variable on the extent of VDIC, hypothesis H 1.1: in Model 
V is accepted. 
H 1.1: Size as measured by SALES is a positive significant explanatory 
variable of the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
8.3.2. MVTA 
This research acknowledges the existence of this "hidden value" due to the 
inability of traditional financial statements to report SC, RC and HC. The 
results are consistent in all variants of Model V. Furthermore, in response to the 
measurement problems associated with the denominator in the MVBV ratio, the 
alternative proxy for the "hidden value" MVTA is associated with VDIC. The 
result suggests that as a proxy for IC intensive companies, MVTA is associated 
with VDIC that signals the existence of equity value not accounted for in the 
traditional reporting framework. Management may be expected to provide 
VDIC to bridge the gap created by this difference particularly for IC intensive 
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companies in which the MVTA ratio is larger. Few studies have conducted a 
direct empirical investigation on MVTA and disclosure. Patton and Zelenka 
(1997) found no significant relationship between mandatory disclosure and 
percentage of IA. The motivations for an expectation of a positive association 
are derived from Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) that confirm MVBV as a positive 
significant variable in the voluntary disclosure of presentations to analysts. 
Signalling theory explains that management may be motivated to disclose more 
IC when the MVTA ratio is larger. This explanation is supported as service, 
high technology, R&D and computer and software development companies are 
more disadvantaged by current accounting regulations than are traditional 
tangible assets based companies. Being IC intensive, these companies are 
expected to have a higher MVTA ratio that may proxy for the difference 
between intangible and tangible asset based resources. The proxies for this 
"hidden value" MVTA has been found to be positive and significantly 
associated with VDIC in both the partial and Pearson correlation matrices and 
in both the OLS and QREG models. Therefore, hypothesis H5.4: in Model V is 
accepted. 
H5.4: MVTA is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
8.3.3. Gearing (GEAR) 
Model V indicates that the higher the proportion of debt in a company's capital 
structure, the lower the disclosure of IC. Highly geared companies use debt to 
finance expansion and purchase of long-term tangible assets. The results 
confirm that these companies do not disclose ICCA. The financial risk 
associated with such debt levels does not lead to VDIC. Debt providers may 
demand specific information through alternative channels particularly when the 
level of financial risk increases. The explanation for this negative result may be 
based on agency theory that proposes motivation based on management 
reducing VDIC to facilitate project turnaround tactics that may sustain their 
positions and /or sustain the perception of success. Furthermore, by 
perpetuating this position, increased asymmetric information leads to more 
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agency costs. Generally, tangible asset intensive companies tend to be 
concentrated in manufacturing and less-technological industries that are 
characterised by less VDIC. In addition, tangible asset based companies may 
have the physical assets against which debt may be secured, unlike IC intensive 
companies that may have to rely on internal generated capital or equity finance 
thus rendering their gearing ratios to lower levels. 
Thus, an increase in the gearing ratio (GEAR) increases the probability 
of financial and insolvency risk. As such, highly geared companies may not 
have the financial resources required for investment in IC. Additionally, highly 
geared companies may not have the necessary resources for investment in the 
processes and procedures required to identify, manage and report IC. Debt 
reduces the conflict between shareholders and management (Jensen 1986). Debt 
reduces cash flow available to management as the company is contractually 
bound to repay interest and capital. As indicated by Williamson (1988), debt 
providers might be unwilling to finance projects with high company specificity; 
investments in IC may be regarded as sunk costs, given that these processes and 
services may not be tradable on the open market. Furthermore, R&D is 
negatively related to its debt levels (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993 and Baysinger 
and Hoskisson 1989). This evidence is consistent with R&D as the driver of IA 
growth. 
The literature provides evidence that a higher incidence of agency costs 
is associated with companies with a greater proportion of debt (Leftwich et al. 
1981, p. 56). This is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) who suggest 
that companies with high gearing costs may incur higher monitoring costs. 
Gray and Roberts (1989) found a negative significant result between mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure with gearing in a study conducted in the UK. From 
and international perspective, Meek et al. (1995) and Eng and Mak (2003) 
identified gearing as negatively affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
results are consistent with Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) and Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1989) who find that highly geared companies have less R&D 
investment that may lead to less IC disclosure. The arguments are based on 
agency theory; management may decrease VDIC; by increasing asymmetrical 
information management are able to perpetuate their positions in office. 
Furthermore, with increasing insolvency risk, management may be expected to 
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focus on short-term projects to the exclusion of R&D. VDIC is expected to 
decrease as gearing increases and as the investment in IC decreases. Despite 
both the Pearson correlation and the partial correlation coefficients, returning 
insignificant results the expectation of a negative association has been 
confirmed by both the OLS and QREG models in the multivariate analysis and 
in both WDI and DI. This research concludes that in Model V, hypothesis H4.4: 
is accepted. 
H4.4: Highly geared companies are more likely to provide less VDIC than 
less geared companies are. 
8.3.4. TechMARK Listing 
Companies that have been admitted to the TMRK listing are associated with 
higher levels of IC disclosure relative to non-members. Previous industry 
studies by Bozzolan et al. (2003), Williams (2001) and Cooke (1989,1991 and 
1992) yielded significant results. This variable TMRK is significant at 1 %. The 
understanding is that a listing on the innovation technology index is a result of 
an intensive long-term plan to invest in and maintain investment in IC as such 
the index cuts across all industrial sectors. The company's business growth and 
success must be dependent on technological development or innovation. Such 
companies are involved in innovative business, with new products or services, 
or new methods of business, with existing organic growth in revenue, historic 
and prospective, arising from the innovative business and relevant management 
expertise that has to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the LSE before any 
listing takes place (FTSE 2006). The general trend has been that innovative 
technology companies disclose more than non-innovative and non- 
technological companies do as they signal superior IC potential. 
Analysts and investors associated with these industries may demand 
additional disclosures to clarify the issues arising from the MVBV 
phenomenon. Furthermore, competitive pressures and the need to signal a 
competitive advantage motivate management to a maximum disclosure policy 
as they increase VDIC. The theoretical motivation is derived from the RBV and 
signalling theory. As these high-tec companies may have IP, licenses, patents 
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and brands, the potential disclosure costs are exceeded by the potential benefits 
of increased disclosure of proprietary information. Investment in R&D, 
innovation and technology requires substantial financial investment, skilled 
employees and adequate marketing including listing on the TMRK. These 
innovative technology companies include computer hardware, computer 
servicing, internet, semi-conductors, software, telecom equipment, 
biotechnology, specialist pharmaceuticals, drug delivery and medical 
technology. Management of these companies signal this investment, indicative 
of procedures to accumulate competitive advantage by disclosing ICCA. 
Potential wealth increases are attributed to VDIC whilst competitive costs are 
expected to suppress VDIC. TMRK is positively associated with the extent of 
VDIC in all variants of Model V. The conclusion for this variable therefore is 
that hypothesis H3.1: is accepted. 
H3.1: TMRK is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
8.3.5. SIC 
Model V indicates that SIC is statistically significant at the 1% level with WDI 
in the partial correlation, the Pearson correlation, the OLS model and the 
QREG model. These results are mirrored by the sensitivity test that is based on 
DI; however, the QREG model provides the only insignificant result that 
indicates that TMRK may be sufficient in controlling for industry reporting 
trends. Due to the increasing IC content in ascending SIC code, the expectation 
of a relationship with WDI is confirmed in all other variants of Model V 
including the univariate analysis. Forestry and paper, food producers and 
processors, beverages and tobacco, the most basic industries disclose little 
ICCA whereas the telecommunications, media and entertainment, health, 
leisure and hotels, the more complex service industries disclose more ICCA. 
The motivations are derived from the RBV and signalling theory. Service and 
highly complex companies are expected to apply IA and IC, unique to their 
organisation and therefore not easily replicable. The benefits of disclosure of 
ICCA outweigh the disclosure costs that may be associated with the disclosure 
243 
of proprietary information. These companies may disclose ICCA attributes due 
to the lack disclosure costs, consistent with disclosures in sectors of high 
barriers to imitation. Archambault and Archambault (2003) and Citron et al. 
(2005) find a strong positive association between disclosures and the number of 
SIC codes in the firm indicating that operating in a large number of distinct 
industries may lead to increased disclosure as companies seek to obtain a 
greater set of resources (Zarzeski 1996) or because of increased diversification 
(Verrecchia 1983). Management may increase VDIC to illustrate their 
competitive edge particular in areas where there are no disclosure costs and 
adopt a partial disclosure policy in areas where proprietary costs may be 
mitigated. Furthermore, the more complex service orientated companies may be 
disadvantaged by the current reporting regime that is biased for companies 
whose equity is mostly intangible and therefore not represented in the financial 
statement. VDIC provides the means for such companies to signal their growth 
potential and signal the underlying reality. The conclusion for this variable 
therefore is that hypothesis H3.4: is accepted. 
H3.4: SIC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in the 
extent of VDIC. 
8.3.6. Employee cost (EMPC) 
Model V indicates that increasing remuneration per employee positively 
influences VDIC. Increasing salary cost per employee may be attributed to 
higher levels of education, more experience and highly complex professions. In 
an environment in which measurement of HC is complex, EMPC is a proxy for 
the value of HC in companies or alternatively, the rent required to maintain the 
HC in place. The motivation for this hypothesis is based on signalling theory. 
Proprietary costs are mitigated in the first instance by the perceived benefits of 
signalling and in the second by the disclosure of "better than the worst case 
scenario" that the markets would have assumed. This signalling is consistent 
with investment in training, health insurance and pension plans as employers 
signal their successful investment in HC through VDIC. 
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An additional explanation may be found in employee pressure that 
labour unions may exert on corporations. Trade unions may support employees 
in bargaining, requiring more disclosures from management. The dependence 
of the company on employees as a resource without which the company cannot 
operate and that may not be easily replaced due to specialisation, may mean 
management accede to employee demands for additional VDIC. This variable 
confirms the expectation that companies with high levels of HC content do 
disclose ICCA. Table 4.1 confirms that 70% of companies disclosed 
entrepreneurial spirit and 61% of companies disclosed innovativeness, the two 
most reported IC attributes. The demand for information from this stakeholder 
group may be specific and therefore require more disclosure in particular with 
respect to HC. Such companies are likely to be highly IC service orientated and 
may therefore provide more VDIC to mitigate the MVBV dilemma. Disclosure 
costs include risk of pressure from labour unions and other regulatory bodies. 
Pressure from competitors too, may curb full disclosure due to the mobility of 
employees in some industries. 
The arguments for the association are derived from signalling theory 
and the propensity of companies to disclose their competitive advantage. These 
motivations are expected to outweigh any competitive pressures and labour 
related proprietary costs that are associated with such disclosures. The literature 
has indicated that disclosure is associated with various measures of HC. 
Singhvi (1968) and Wallace (1987) reported a significant relationship between 
management type and mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The results of 
variables that are derived from individuals within management have generally 
been insignificant; these results raise questions as to the influence of individuals 
on the disclosure decision. Ahmed (1996) found no relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure and qualifications of the accounting 
officer. In addition, an insignificant relationship was established by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) between the qualifications of the financial director and voluntary 
disclosure. 
The theoretical explanations are taken from signalling theory, Model V 
indicates that the relationship is significant and positive; higher EMPC may be 
associated with a more skilled work force, therefore companies with higher 
EMPC may be characterised by higher levels of HC content. Such companies 
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are likely to be highly IC service orientated operations and may therefore signal 
ICCA. The expectation of a significant positive relationship is confirmed. 
Effective human resource practices are expected to lead to signals that indicate 
competitive advantage to the markets. The conclusion for this variable 
therefore, is that hypothesis H5.1: is accepted. 
H5.1: EMPC is a positive significant explanatory variable of the variation in 
the extent of VDIC. 
8.3.7. EXPRCD 
Model V confirms the hypothesis of a positive significant relationship between 
VDIC and EXPRCD. The multivariate analysis illustrates that the proportion of 
EXPRCD is significant in explaining the variation in VDIC (Table 8.4). Both 
the OLS and QREG models provide consistent results, in addition the 
qualitative and quantitative indices support the significant association. In Table 
8.4 however, the OLS model provides a weaker result for the dummy industry 
variables; this result indicates that EXPRCD may be insignificant in the 
disclosure decision for electrical, pharmaceutical, computer and service 
companies. Nevertheless, the QREG model provides better results and in both 
the OLS and QREG models, applying DI as the dependent variable returns 
significant results. The association may be attributed to cross-directorships that 
provide experience and expertise. Furthermore, by enhancing transparency 
EXPRCD provide value relevant information comparable to that of other 
organisations (Dahya et al. 1996). The results confirm that EXPRCD has the 
intelligence, variety in information control and inside information to evaluate 
management and firm or industry specific information to add value. Although 
EXPRCD play a crucial role in the wider corporate governance role of limiting 
managerial discretionary behaviour and protecting shareholder interests, this 
monitoring role of EXPRCD is expected to reduce information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, this expectation has been realised with 
respect to IC. 
The literature has reported varying results. In the UK, Lufti (1989) 
reported insignificant results on the influence of NONEXEC on voluntary 
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disclosure; in the US Malone et al. (1993), reported an insignificant result 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure and proportion of outside 
directors. Both Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) applied 
agency theory and reported insignificant results. 
Studies in favour of NONEXEC' domination on boards includes Kesner 
and Johnson (1990) and Grace et al. (1995). The motivation is based on agency 
theory and the monitoring role of EXPRCD. Support for a positive association 
is derived from Adams and Hossain (1998) and Chen and Jaggi (2000) who 
found empirical evidence of a positive relation between proportion of 
independent directors and mandatory disclosure. Deakin and Konzelmann 
(2004) however report on the complexity of the monitoring role of NONEXEC. 
They suggest that Enron's NONEXC were as well qualified as any group of 
outsiders could have been to judge the regulatory and business risk that arose 
from company operations, however their failure to identify these risk places 
questions on corporate governance reformers insistence on independence for 
NONEXEC. 
This approach is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) who find that 
outside directors reduce corporate disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) suggest that 
one reason for this result is that NONEXEC may be a substitute for voluntary 
disclosure. Another reason put forward is that NONEXEC may not be truly 
independent; EXPRCD may not be truly experienced as cross-directorships 
within similar business cultures may only yield common knowledge. Malone et 
al. (1993) find no evidence of the influence of NONEXEC on disclosure 
quality; similarly, Leung and Horwitz (2004) find no support for better 
disclosure attributed to NONEXEC; they suggest that the presence of high 
director ownership mitigates the monitoring role of NONEXEC. 
The results of this research indicate that on average UK DIRSHS is 8% 
and may not be sufficiently large to influence the EXPRCD mandate. Despite 
the inconsistent results in the literature, inconsistent results of the bivariate 
analysis and the insignificant result in the OLS WDI dummy variables variation 
of Model V, this research concludes based on the Full Model (WDI), Model V 
is consistent with the expectations generated by the theoretical basis, therefore, 
hypothesis H8.1: is accepted. 
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H8.1: The proportion of EXPRCD to total directors is a positive significant 
explanatory variable of the variation in the extent of VDIC. 
8.3.8. Non-executive Chair (CNED) 
The multivariate analysis indicates that non-executive chairs are associated with 
less VDIC, supporting the view that the position of chair and non-executive 
director should be separated. The results are consistent across the partial and 
Pearson correlation matrices, the OLS and QREG models and the variations of 
Model V with or without dummy industry variables. Where the roles of chair 
and NONEXEC are separate, increased VDIC may ensue. Alignment of 
shareholder and management objectives by executive chairs may lead to 
reduced agency costs. However, as CNED suppresses VDIC monitoring costs 
remain high. Asymmetric information creates additional agency costs. The 
literature is not consistent with which governance system is better. 
No studies have yet investigated this relationship within IC, although 
Ho and Wong (2001) established an insignificant result with dominant 
personality and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) established a negative and 
significant result with independent chair confirming that the roles of chair and 
non-executive director may be better separated, this result is consistent with 
Model IV. The results obtained from studies on independent board leadership 
as measured by CNED and executive chair have been mixed concluding overall 
that there is no significant difference in performance between executive and 
non-executive board chairs in Chaganti et al. (1985, cited by Davis et al. 1997) 
and Molz (1988, cited by Davis et al. 1997). Nevertheless, Dahya et al. (1996) 
concluded that the market responds favourably to the separation of the roles of 
chair and CEO and that accounting performance of companies adopting a "dual 
CEO" declined subsequent to this change. The results are consistent with 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) and Worrell et al. (1997) who argue that dual roles 
compromise board independence and may lead to conflicts of interest that may 
negatively influence shareholder value creation. 
According to agency theory, the combined functions of chair and 
NONEXEC can significantly impair the board's most important role of 
monitoring, disciplining and compensating senior managers (Barako et al. 
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2006). Lack of segregation of duties may provide the opportunity for 
opportunistic behaviour. Forker (1992) concluded combined roles in the 
executive signalled the absence of separation of decision management and 
decision control (Fama and Jensen 1983). The results and the literature suggest 
that the combined role of CNED is likely to require increased monitoring, the 
direction of the relationship is negative and significant therefore hypothesis 
H8.4: is accepted. 
H8.4: The CNED is a negative significant explanatory variable of the variation 
in the extent of VDIC. 
8.4.0. Conclusion 
The results establish a relationship between VDIC and various IC, risk, industry 
and corporate governance variables. The empirical evidence confirms the 
existence of a relationship between the independent variables and IC disclosure. 
The theoretical approach explains the reason why these relationships exist. 
Furthermore, the results fit the specification of the model. Model V confirms 
that for larger companies, the benefits of signalling IC outweigh the potential 
disclosure costs. The result suggests that as a proxy for IC intensive companies, 
MVTA is associated with VDIC that signals the existence of equity value not 
accounted for in the traditional reporting framework. Highly geared companies 
may not have the financial resources required firstly for investment in IC; 
secondly, highly geared companies may not have the necessary resources for 
investment in the processes and procedures required to identify, manage and 
report IC. The general trend has been that innovative technology companies 
disclose more than non-innovative and non-technological companies do as they 
signal superior IC potential. Service and highly complex companies are 
expected to apply IA and IC, unique to their organisation. The benefits of 
disclosure of ICCA outweigh the disclosure costs that may be associated with 
the disclosure of proprietary information. Higher EMPC may be associated with 
a more skilled work force, therefore companies with higher EMPC may be 
characterised by higher levels of HC content. Such companies are likely to be 
highly IC service orientated and may therefore signal ICCA. The results 
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confirm that EXPRCD have the intelligence, variety in information control and 
inside information to evaluate management and firm or industry specific 
information to add value. Although EXPRCD play a crucial role in the wider 
corporate governance role of limiting managerial discretionary behaviour and 
protecting shareholder interests, this monitoring role of EXPRCD is expected to 
reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders, this 
expectation has been realised with respect to IC. Non-executive chairs are 
associated with less VDIC, supporting the view that the position of chair and 
non-executive director should be separated. According to agency theory, the 
combined functions of chair and NONEXEC can significantly impair the 
board's most important role of monitoring, disciplining and compensating 
senior managers 
In summary, investment in IC is an important aspect in IC disclosure. 
Activities that encompass investment in employees and IP, customer relations 
and other external links, generally regarded as drivers of IC growth lead to the 
generation of "hidden value" that is disclosed as narratives and non-narratives 
in the annual report. Secondly, the high financial risk is not commensurate with 
VDIC. Thirdly, membership of the TMRK listing, technologically innovative 
activities, complex and service industries are characterised by higher levels of 
ICCA disclosure. These industries include companies associated with the 
pharmaceutical, electric, services and computer sectors. Fourthly, segregation 
of executive and non-executive functions and appointment of experienced non- 
executive directors include some of the necessary corporate governance 
mechanism that reduce agency costs through monitoring controls. Investment in 
corporate governance mechanisms adds to the SC of the organisation by 
developing and maintaining the management philosophy, corporate culture and 
management processes. This research identified agency theory, proprietary cost 
hypothesis, RBV and signalling theory as explanatory hypotheses for the 
influence of IC investment, risk, industry membership and corporate 
governance on IC disclosure. 
250 
9. Conclusion 
Contents of Chapter 9 Page 
9.1.0 Introduction 252 
9.2.0 Research Questions 253 
9.3.0 Policy Implications 259 
9.4.0 Limitations of this Research 262 
9.5.0 Areas for Further Research 263 
251 
9.1.0. Introduction 
VDIC is an important area for academic research particularly for innovative and 
technologically advanced companies. Applying the RBV this research has 
confirmed the differentiation between inimitable IA resources and easily 
replicable tangible assets resources. These IA resources are not included in the 
traditional financial reporting model due to their complexity in identification, 
measurement and valuation. Having been set up to allow managers to account 
for shareholders funds, the balance sheet and income statement may not be 
ideal for reflecting the value created by synergies within the company and the 
resultant competitive advantage. The intangible nature of IC makes its valuation 
more complex than traditional tangible assets. Nevertheless, the MVBV 
dilemma provides evidence of "hidden value" within such companies. Given 
that tangible assets are valued, management has the onus to signal IA that are 
not valued. The narratives, diagrams and illustrations provide a framework for 
these disclosures. This research has confirmed that companies with higher 
levels of "hidden value" may signal the existence and performance of these IA 
as they provide competitive advantage. However, proprietary costs have been 
found to lower IC disclosure when companies are involved with higher levels 
of R&D. Markets may not only acknowledge R&D, but may place value on 
successful R&D that may provide competitive advantage. 
This research has examined the influence of market risk and firm 
specific risk on VDIC; it confirms that lower financial risk appears essential for 
the investment and disclosure of IA. In addition, high levels of information 
asymmetry may result in higher levels of VDIC as management reduce market 
risk and that whilst the existence of firm specific risk induces lower levels of 
VDIC due to agency costs and management's self-interests. Corporate 
governance mechanisms ensure that management self-dealing is restricted and 
that adequate monitoring and control is evident. Such accountability and 
transparency through adequate segregation of functions and the existence of 
experienced non-executive directors encourages IC disclosure. Furthermore, it 
may be that such governance functions may adequately manage the 
identification, measurement and reporting of IC. This research confirms that 
governance has a positive influence on IC disclosure. The explanations based 
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on agency theory have been accepted. Directors' shareholdings have not had a 
significant influence on IC disclosure due to the power struggles that take place 
as shareholding increases. IC disclosure may mitigate the risk companies face if 
they do not communicate IA resources. These key drivers of competitive 
advantage may be signalled to analysts and investors as well as to all 
stakeholders to ensure that all value drivers are disclosed. 
This chapter begins by reviewing the research questions and identifying 
the areas in which these objectives have been achieved. This is followed by 
overall conclusions based on the research objectives and practical implications. 
It then summarises the research's limitations and concludes by suggesting areas 
for further study. The development of the context of this research is made 
possible by establishing a VDF, ICF and a TF. The VDF successfully identified 
that only company names are regulated as mandatory within the ICF indicating 
that within the context of the UK, companies are able to exercise their own 
discretion in deciding on the extent of VDIC. The TF provides explanations for 
the possible disclosure outcomes. The hypothesised influence of selected 
independent variables has been confirmed with the exception if DIRSHS and 
R&D that have proved not to be a positive determinants of VDIC. The results 
reveal that various internal and external factors influence management's IC 
disclosure policy. The theoretical approach has been confirmed by the accepted 
hypothesis. The explanations have generally been attributed to signalling 
theory, proprietary cost hypothesis, RBV and agency theory. Overall, the new 
frameworks, models and methods introduced into this research, provide robust 
results and present a significant contribution to accounting research in both 
disclosure studies and in IC research. 
9.2.0. Research Questions 
Companies do use IC attributes to convey their IA, in addition, all IC attributes 
included in the ICF were disclosed by one company or another, furthermore all 
companies disclosed some IC attributes as no company had a DI of "0". As the 
disclosure of IC is intrinsically narrative, the quantity of disclosure is not a 
satisfactory proxy for the quality of disclosure. This quality is dependent on the 
quantity but more importantly, the richness of the content as such WDI has 
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afforded a better result than DI in some cases; in other cases, DI provides 
supporting if not better results than WDI. As such, DI cannot be a substitute for 
WDI nor WDI for DI. Nevertheless, comparatively results are consistent across 
parametric and non-parametric tests. This research was able to identify that the 
most disclosed IC attributes are HC attributes, entrepreneurial spirit, 
innovativeness and know-how. Nevertheless, RC is a category with the most IC 
disclosures overall. It appears that customer relations and marketing strategies 
are more important to management. Copyrights (SC), vocational qualifications 
(HC), franchising agreements (RC), licensing agreements (RC), financial 
relations (SC), patents (SC) and trademarks (SC) have been shown to be the 
least disclosed IC attributes. This research has established a difference between 
WDI and DI as 33% of companies disclose ICCA and 48% disclose IC 
attributes providing further support for the use of dependent variables modelled 
on different constructs. Model V illustrates the importance of having two 
separate indices as the regression results have differed where a different 
dependent variable has been applied. 
Overall, existing theory explains management's disclosure choices. As 
IC is characterised by certain unique elements including competitive advantage, 
ownership issues, barriers to imitation, competitive pressures and political 
costs, the challenge of dealing with IC is compounded in that SC, RC and HC 
are interrelated. The TF addressed the varying circumstances by examining 
explanations based on internal (agency theory), political (signalling), RBV and 
proprietary cost hypothesis. Model I represents IC investment and Model III 
investigates industry membership, both models are associated mainly with the 
RBV and signalling theory; IC content leads to specific IC reporting trends 
within certain sectors, in response to this value creation process management 
signal the existence of this "hidden value" that would otherwise remain 
invisible. Model II confirms the hypothesised influence of accounting risk 
measures on VDIC through agency theory in the case of BETA and GEAR, and 
through signalling theory in the case of LQD. 
In Model IV, the focus is on corporate governance mechanisms the 
motivations of which are derived mainly from agency theory; the model 
confirms that transparency and accountability, separation of executive roles and 
increasing the ratio of EXPRCD to executive directors significantly reduces 
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agency costs through the monitoring function enabled by the various 
components of the executive board. Generally, in all models the results have 
been consistent with the theoretical explanation and with the direction of the 
predicted sign. Additional variants of this Model IV have been conducted to 
ascertain the true association; the use of both the OLS and the QREG models 
and the use of dummy DIRSHS variables have provided sufficient assurance as 
to confirm the negative significant association. It is suggested that 
entrenchment costs may dominate agency costs and mitigate VDIC. The results 
overall, confirm the adequacy of the theoretical approach for the empirical 
investigations conducted in all Models. 
(a) What are the resource attributes that tend to lead to competitive 
advantage reporting? 
In Model I, the results support the hypothesis based on investment in IC 
leading to VDIC. The theoretical approach based on signalling and the RBV is 
confirmed. Non-replicable resources may be disclosed due to their specificity to 
the organisation and therefore lack of proprietary costs. The need to generate 
competitive advantage drives the disclosure of inimitable IA resources; 
companies signal successful investment in IC through voluntary disclosure. The 
results indicate that VDIC by non-manufacturing service, highly complex and 
high-tech companies characterised by high levels of intangible value is greater 
for large companies; nevertheless, the results suggest that R&D activities do not 
necessarily lead to VDIC, consistent with explanations provided by the 
proprietary cost hypothesis. SIZE, R&D, TMRK, MANUF and EMPC 
represent market share (RC), IA generation (SC), IP and technological 
applications (SC) and investment in employees and employee welfare (HC) 
respectively as measures of the investment in IC. R&D provides a weaker 
association under the QREG model but significant in the OLS model. These 
variables extend disclosure studies that have generally considered R&D as the 
only representative of IC in company financial statements. The expectation of 
R&D companies to have high levels of VDIC is rejected. Research has 
indicated the irrelevance of financial statement reporting in illustrating the 
"hidden value"; this leads management to disclose HC as a representative of 
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EMPC, SC as a representative of IP, R&D and TMRK and RC as a 
representative of size of market share. 
(b) What are the market and financial risk characteristics that lead to IC 
reporting? 
In Model II, an empirical relationship is established overall between 
VDIC and risk. All accounting and market measures of risk are significant in 
either the OLS or the QREG model. LQD and GEAR are dominant in their 
association with VDIC whilst BETA presents a weaker association. This 
research has illustrated that the level of systematic and unsystematic risk 
influences the extent of VDIC. The explanations based on agency theory have 
been accepted. Generally, companies exposed to more firm specific risk, 
financial risk and lower levels of liquidity do not disclose IC through narratives, 
non-narratives and illustrations. Disclosure of information is reduced when 
financial and insolvency risk increases, due to the negative impact on 
managerial performance and resultant agency costs as management forestall 
potential replacement. Furthermore, lack of financial resources may hinder IC 
investment essential in shareholder value creation. 
(c) What resource attributes lead to innovative and technological industries 
disclosing more IC? 
Model III indicates that TMRK, MANUF, INDG and SIC are 
significant in explaining the variation in VDIC. Pharmaceutical, electrical, 
services and computers disclose the highest number of IC attributes. These 
results are consistent with companies listed on the TMRK exchange, companies 
associated with service and complex activities and companies characterised by 
non-manufacturing. Basic resource, engineering and retail companies disclose 
the least number of IC attributes. These industries are consistent with 
manufacturing companies, heavy industries and generally tangible assets 
intensive industries. Industry dummies provide assurance as to the reliability of 
the model. Variables SIZE, GEAR and MVTA are determinants of VDIC 
whether the industry classification or dummy variables are applied. As is the 
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case with TMRK at the LSE and the German equivalent, Neuer Markt at the 
Frankfurt Exchange that targets technological companies, some industries may 
require higher mandatory disclosure levels due to the nature of their activities. 
Tayles et al. (2005) suggests that conventional financial reporting for IC 
and intangibles has limited scope particularly in the context of the companies 
whose background and activities move from traditional manufacturing to virtual 
manufacturing. Internally, the organisation's strategy, the reporting practices 
adopted and integrated into this strategy, measurement of successful or 
unsuccessful IC, culture of management towards IC development and human 
resource management of the function may be more important than identifying a 
value for these IA. High levels of IC in an industry do not necessarily lead to 
higher levels of IC disclosure due to disclosure costs. This research concludes 
that IC content within industries is significant in influencing VDIC trends 
within industries and that corporate governance plays an important role in 
transparency and disclosure. 
(d) Which corporate governance mechanisms promote IC disclosure? 
Corporate governance variables included in Model IV provide evidence 
of an association with IC disclosure. Generally, companies with corporate 
governance mechanisms are more likely to disclose IC attributes through 
narratives, non-narratives and illustrations, thus as accountability and 
transparency increase, so too does the level of IC attribute disclosure. 
Corporate governance mechanisms have been confirmed as decreasing 
agency costs through segregation of duties and through appointment not only of 
non-executive directors but also of experienced non-executive directors. 
Consistent with EMPC, higher levels of executive remuneration lead to higher 
levels of VDIC. In contrast, DIRSHS is negative and significant only once total 
executive share ownership exceeds a threshold level; the results indicate that 
the negative association is more significant between 30% and 50% equity share, 
illustrating the existence of entrenchment strategies. Sensitivity tests on 
DIRSHS provide supporting evidence for the negative association found in the 
variable. With increasing equity ownership, management may initially align 
their goals with those of shareholders and then progress to ensure firstly, their 
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minority interests are protected and then with further increases, apply 
entrenchment strategies aimed at exploiting the widening power base; these 
strategies are generally associated with decreased disclosure. 
The regression results of Model V indicate that larger companies from 
technologically innovative, service and complex industries that are 
characterised by low debt levels are able to generate significant "hidden value"; 
this IC is signalled to the markets due to the transparency and accountability 
associated with companies with separate chair and NONEXEC and with a 
significant number of experienced NONEXEC. Investment in HC is important, 
as the presence of suitably qualified and salaried employees is essential for the 
success of IC disclosure. 
The results of the QREG model indicates that WDI is a continuous 
variable and not discrete, furthermore, that the results are consistent in 
influence and direction with the results of the OLS regression. The objectives of 
Model V are achieved in firstly identifying the difference between the un- 
weighted index DI and the weighted index WDI. The results indicate that both 
indices return a high F- statistic 56 and 53 respectively, a high R2 of 0.27 and 
0.27 respectively indicating that there may be little difference between 
weighted and un-weighted indices. 
Nevertheless, variability in the association between DI and WDI and 
selected independent variables, CNED, EXPRCD and SIC may indicate that 
one dependent variable cannot be replaced by another, as such there are benefits 
to be gained from the use of a quantitative and a qualitative disclosure index as 
indicated by Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The second objective in Model V, confirms 
that the combined influence of selected accounting risk measures, IC 
investment measures, industry membership classification and corporate 
governance mechanisms have the greatest explanatory power in the Models I to 
V. These results are enhanced by the application of dummy industry variables 
that report supporting if not better results. These results suggest that SC, RC 
and HC are interlinked; when applied together the individual categories of IC 
provide greater effectiveness and efficiency on VDIC than when applied 
individually. 
Furthermore, the combination of the four focus groups in Model V has 
increased the explanatory power of the regressions providing supporting 
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evidence for the initial selection of these areas as important to VDIC. Overall, 
the results are robust and consistent with the expected sign. Nevertheless, the 
results of rejected and insignificant hypotheses have provided important 
knowledge in the development of empirical work on the variables that influence 
VDIC in particular with respect to R&D and directors' shareholding. 
9.3.0. Policy Implications 
This research has identified that disclosure of IC is not regulated and generally 
governed by market forces. These forces lead to various self-regulatory 
practices. Information asymmetry between management and markets may be 
due to IC information that falls outside the traditional reporting framework. 
Consequently, interest continues to grow with respect to the reporting of such 
IA outside the audited financial statements. The wide range in the disclosure the 
IC disclosure patterns of companies and in the IC attributes and categories 
disclosed are indicative of management's perception that the different types of 
IC attributes are valued differently by the market. The variation in the level of 
IC disclosure throughout the sample companies suggests that some companies 
may require increased disclosure to meet market demands and other companies 
may be disclosing in excess of market requirements. Mandatory regulations 
need to be aimed at a point that benefits both disclosing and non-disclosing 
companies whilst ensuring market information needs are met. 
This research provides a significant and important original contribution 
to the literature. This research has identified the lack of an established 
commonly accepted IC framework as the limitation on IC reporting levels. 
Regulations may encourage more widespread and uniform disclosures that are 
expected to meet at least the minimum market requirements for all companies 
and sectors. However, there is an advantage to not mandating high levels of IC 
disclosure, as there is likely to be cross-sectional variation in the demand for 
this information. As such creating a standard policy may create unnecessary 
costs for some companies. This section therefore summarises the main 
conclusions and implications for policy makers arising from the analysis of the 
current IC disclosure practices of UK listed companies: 
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(a) The definitions of IC attributes should be standardised and 
differentiated between static IC (registered trademark) and active 
IC (R&D activity) 
(b) There should be greater clarity between IC attributes that are 
regulated and those that are voluntary 
(c) There should be greater clarity between audited and un-audited 
IC information in annual reports to ensure that narrative and 
non-narrative disclosures are credible 
(d) Accountants and auditors should involve themselves in the 
development of IC reporting practices as the influence of salient 
measures inherent in IC disclosures has become more 
widespread and therefore more important. Continued adoption of 
accounting standards in their present form exacerbates the 
misconceived idea that a conservative approach is prudent and 
minimises information errors, however the consequences are that 
this stance gives rise to errors of valuation. Whereas accounting 
standards should be aimed at minimising both over- and under- 
statement errors. 
(e) IC attributes, including narratives and non-narratives, words, 
sentences, pictures and diagrams are being increasingly used to 
communicate IA as such, it may be necessary to include training 
and development for all stakeholders involved in annual report 
preparation, review, analysis and audit and in IC regulation 
Important original contributions by this research include the 
introduction of the four focus areas and the identification of the manner of their 
individual effect and aggregate influence on the variation in the extent of 
VDIC. The introduction of a quality signalling approach combined with the 
RBV as the theoretical basis for the hypothesised influence of possession of IA 
resources leading to disclosure of competitive advantage. Furthermore, the 
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introduction of sensitivity tests with respect to variables included in the models 
size, industry and "hidden value", with respect to the dependent variable, WDI 
and DI, with respect to the empirical analysis in the QREG and OLS models 
and in addition with respect to the dummy variables introduced for industry and 
DIRSHS. This contribution is based on those financial measures that have been 
shown to capture the essence and underlying construct of IC found in equities 
and influenced by IC investment, financial and market risk, industry 
membership and corporate governance mechanisms. Additional contributions 
are listed below: 
(a) An up-to-date analysis of the IC reporting practices of 439 UK 
listed companies selected from various industries 
(b) An application of new methods including the development of an 
IC based VDF, an ICF and a TF for the UK context 
(c) An application of new sampling, attribute counting, statistical 
and analytical tools particularly in the development of a measure 
of competitive advantage, the introduction of both a weighted 
and unweighted disclosure indices adds to the development of IC 
management and reporting studies 
(d) New methods are applied in the analysis of qualitative 
statements, discretionary sentences, diagrams and graphs, 
illustrations, non-narratives and narratives in providing the first 
attempt at a methodological recording of the content and style of 
ICCA disclosure 
(e) An introduction of an expansive empirical study in IC studies in 
the scale of this research and have significantly added to 
accounting research (new independent variables have been 
introduced increasing the count from an average of 3 to 8 within 
the IC disclosure literature) 
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(I) The statistical procedures applied in the empirical tests are new 
to IC disclosure studies and provide an important contribution 
through the methodology, methods, quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, data analysis and statistical tests applied. 
9.4.0. Limitations of this Research 
Whilst adding to our understanding of VDIC this research has limitations, 
which should be acknowledged. This research has examined VDIC at the 
corporate and attributes level. A broader approach may have been to examine 
voluntary disclosure at the national level. The fast moving and developing 
nature of IC renders this research time specific as this research is founded on 
data currently available in listed companies for the year 2003/2004. As only 
annual reports were examined, the first limitation is that management provide 
VDIC through other channels such as interim annual reports, press releases, 
conference calls and on-line announcements; other reporting channels could 
have been examined or included in this research. 
The second limitation was encountered in the selection and justification 
of variables to include in the different models. The focus of this research 
provided some direction; generally, industry variables controlled for sector 
differences, other variables of interest included SIZE and GEAR identified in 
the disclosure literature as having a significant influence on disclosure, both in 
mandatory and voluntary studies. The availability of accounting data on IC is 
tied in with this limitation, as few IC measures, representative of SC, RC and 
HC are accounted for in the traditional financial statements. 
The third limitation was the non-normality of the data. Although 
transformations are applied, skewness and kurtosis remained high for certain 
continuous variables. The methodology applied however, successfully 
accounted for these statistical problems as residuals for all models achieved 5% 
for normal distribution. Although the OLS specifications reported non-normal 
residuals, these models were re-specified using the quantile regression. The 
fourth limitation is tied in with the TF and is attributed to the need to identify 
the most appropriate theoretical framework, given the lack of theory in prior 
studies. Overall, the results indicate that the correct theoretical approach was 
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applied. Nevertheless, the results of DIRSHS do not confirm agency theory as 
the basis for the association and the results of R&D do not confirm signalling as 
the correct theoretical basis due to the entrenchment costs associated 
management share ownership and the competitive costs associated with R&D 
respectively. 
The fifth and final limitation relates to the accounting framework and 
the influence of the accounting theory debate and its overall influence on the 
context of this research. Generally, the lack of accounting for intangible value 
has lead to financial statements reporting an ideology rather than reality. As 
long as accounting theory dominates this dilemma, the value of IC will remain 
intangible and is not likely to be included on the balance sheet. Although some 
academics believe that companies should dwell not on the measurement but on 
the process of strategic management of IC to gain competitive advantage, 
internally this process may be relevant for management's valuation purposes 
however in the wider market, measurement, management and reporting will 
remain of paramount importance if equity is to be adequately valued. 
9.5.0. Areas for Further Research 
This research has provided an extensive analysis of the current IC reporting 
practices of UK listed companies however, further areas have been identified, 
areas in which more knowledge can be gained with respect to IC. Future 
research might try the following suggestions by introducing new voluntary 
intellectual attributes not addressed by the current study. These new attribute 
may include reputational capital, corporate image, credibility, status and 
additional corporate governance structures. 
The disclosure indices were constructed by this researcher, an 
alternative approach may involve third parties in developing a weighted index 
by applying a user created hierarchy of IC importance. As a cross-sectional 
analysis, this research was unable to capture the variation of the extent of 
disclosure over time, measuring the level of disclosure longitudinally may 
establish certain associations not identified here as IC is continuously 
developing. Furthermore, changes in management structures from year to year 
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may have an effect on the four focus areas identified in this research 
particularly with respect to corporate governance mechanisms. 
An interesting recommendation for further research would be to 
investigate individual disclosure indices of SC, RC and HC as the dependent 
variables. Such an investigation may reveal different determinants for the extent 
of voluntary disclosure of SC, RC and HC; these respective determinants may 
include identifiable accounting measures i. e. financial measures of patents for 
SC, measurable characteristics of customer capital including brands and 
financial measures of HC including investment in, cost or other accounting 
measure for employee capital. Such an investigation may provide results similar 
to those of Klock and Megna (2000, p. 527-528) in the wireless communications 
industry that indicate that certain specific sources of intangible assets, 
advertising, R&D, radio spectrum licenses and measures of installed customer 
bases explain a statistically significant portion of the variation in Tobin's q. In 
addition, high average q exceeding ten is attributed to the failure of financial 
accounting statements to reasonably value licenses. In this way, areas of closer 
association and areas of less significance may be identified given that this 
research has identified that the level of disclosure of SC, RC and HC is 
different for each company. Furthermore, results of such analysis may develop 
a more structured and theoretical IC framework. 
The risk attached to equities is dynamic and any internal changes may 
be perceived by markets to either increase or decrease risk. Companies are 
becoming increasingly aware of the importance, effectiveness and efficiency of 
investment in IC. This awareness continues to accelerate management's 
development and maintenance of these IA resources to the extent that several 
authors in different countries have identified an increase in IC application and 
reporting. Although the process of disclosure policy change may take place 
over time, future research should continue to assess the rate of change to enable 
application of a longitudinal study when the industry becomes more dynamic 
and the process of change accelerates. This research has extended the results on 
industry from single sector to a multiple industry analysis. The classification of 
these industries has been necessarily IC based. Perhaps the results may have 
been different if a different classification had been applied, or if different 
combinations of industries had been examined. Future research might explore 
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the relative significance of a comparative study between two or three EU 
member countries or further a field, between an EU member country and other 
developed or developing country. Such an investigation may identify the 
influence of developed or developing financial markets on corporate 
governance functions and therefore on IC reporting. 
This research has examined the annual reports as the culmination of 
several processes and procedures applied to communicate IC. A wide variety of 
IC attributes is communicated through words, phrases, sentences, inferences, 
salient messages, pictures and diagrams. This process and procedures may form 
the basis of future studies on annual reports given that their design, collation 
and structure encapsulates a set of audited financial statement, un-audited 
narratives, voluntary and mandatory regulations, views from management and 
increasingly an element of marketing that is provided by external expertise in 
publishing. This alternative approach could examine the actual construction of 
the annual report and identify first hand at each stage the conflicting or 
complimenting forces that lead to a certain level of ICCA disclosure. 
Larger companies operating in high-tech and innovative industries are 
characterised by investment in higher levels of "hidden value" sufficient to 
motivate increased IC disclosure. Reduced firm-specific risk including less 
financial risk, reduced debt and higher levels of liquidity provide the resources 
and the incentives necessary for VDIC; increased market risk is indicative of 
asymmetrical information and disincentives for disclosure although this 
association is found to be weaker. Incentives to disclose are complimented by 
companies' maintenance of adequate governance systems through segregation 
of executive and non-executive duties and to a less extent through the presence 
of experienced non-executive directors on the board. 
Areas for further research may also include the influence of the audit 
profession on VDIC. Are intangibles auditable given the lack of a mandate to 
do so; a move from rules to principles based auditing may require judgement 
that is more professional and skills that are more interdisciplinary. The informal 
view of the IASB is that the current disclosure requirements are out of date, as 
information provided does not always reflect economic conditions, minor 
amendments to existing regulations may not be sufficient to address the 
deficiencies. The IASB's project proposals options include full recognition of 
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IA, measurement and disclosure of intangibles, disclosure only and the 
amendment of parts of IAS 38. These proposals however have been hindered by 
mixed feedback from the user community. The little progress made in 
introducing an intangible asset taxonomy that may lead to mandatory disclosure 
may be indicative of certain stakeholders' preference for non-disclosure of 
intangibles. Analysts, investors and stakeholders may stand to gain by utilising 
the existence of asymmetrical information either through non-disclosure by the 
firm or through the requirement for additional information processing costs. 
However, the current practice in firms lacks adequate procedures to 
collect, manage and report the investment in intangible resources. In general, 
intangible resources have no reporting standards as such there are no IC 
auditing standards and therefore intangibles need an alternative to the 
traditional audit methodology. As such, some practitioners suggest that the 
annual report is irrelevant with respect to intangibles disclosures and that 
management should look at other media, conference calls, web sites, face-to- 
face discussions and other publications to provide up to date IC information. 
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Appendix 2A: Level 6 Industrial Classification 
Level I Market data 
Level 2 Non-financials Non-financials excluding resources 
Resources 
Financials 
Level 3 Resources Basic industries 
Cyclical consumer products 
Non-cyclical consumer products 
Cyclical services 
Non-cyclical services 
Utilities 
Information technology (IT) 
Financials 
Level 4 Comprising 39 sectors based on FTSE 
Actuaries system 
Level 5 Comprising 11 sub-sectors based on FTSE 
Actuaries system 
Level 6 Devised by DataStream where more 
detailed descriptions than those provided in 
level 4 and 5. 
Source: DataStream (2005) 
278 
Appendix 2 B: SIC Industry Codes and Dummy Variables 
202 Basic Forestry and paper 2 
1589 Food producers and processors 18 
1596 Beverages 6 
1600 Tobacco 2 
4521 Construction and bldg materials 34 
Now, 1 
11:: i; in; 
M NOR 
2410 Chemical Chemicals 12 
2463 Personal care and h'hold prods 5 
5212 Household goods and textiles 14 
31 
2840 Engineering Steel and other 2 
2710 Engineering and machinery 24 
3430 Automobiles and parts 10 
3530 Aerospace and Defence 7 
3002 Electrical Info Tech Hardware 17 
3210 Electronic and electrical equip't 16 
4013 Electricity 3 
4100 Utilities (Ex-electricity 8 
5147 Diversified industries 6 
50 
2441 Pharmaceutical Pharmaceuticals and biotech 14 
14 
5211 Retailers General retailers 35 
5211 Food and drug retailers 6 
7222 Computer Software and computer services 31 
7412 Support services 59 
7420 Telecommunication services 12 
7440 Media and entertainment 39 
6340 Services Transport 22 
8511 Health 14 
9210 Leisure and hotels 25 
443 
Source: National Statistics (2003) 
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Basic: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
202,1589,1596,1600 and 4521 and "0" otherwise; 
Chem: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
2410,2463 and 5212 "0" otherwise; 
Eng: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
2840,2710,3430 and 3530 and "0" otherwise; 
Elec: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
3002,3210,4013,4100 and 5147 and "0" otherwise; 
Phar: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
2441 and "0" otherwise; 
Ret: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
5211 and "0" otherwise; 
Comp: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
7222,7412,7420 and 7440 and "0" otherwise; 
Serv: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for companies under SIC code 
6340,8511 and 9210 and "0" otherwise; 
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Appendix 2C: Directors' Shareholding and Dummy Variables 
Shareholding Minimum Dummy Maximum 
variables 
3% 0.00 < DS I < 0.029 
5% 0.029 < DS2 < 0.048 
10% 0.048 < DS3 < 0.096 
30% 0.096 < DS4 < 0.292 
50% 0.292 < DS5 < 0.490 
50% + 0.490 < DS6 < 
Source: Annual Reports 
DS 1: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for directors' shareholding greater 
than zero and equal to or less than 2.9% and "0" otherwise; 
DS2: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for directors' shareholding greater 
than 2.9% and equal to or less than 4.8% and "0" otherwise; 
DS3: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for directors' shareholding greater 
than 4.8% and equal to or less than 9.6% and "0" otherwise; 
DS4: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for directors' shareholding greater 
than 9.6% and equal to or less than 29.2% and "0" otherwise; 
DS5: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for directors' shareholding greater 
than 29.2% and equal to or less than 49% and "0" otherwise; 
DS6: dichotomous variable that scores "1" for directors' shareholding greater 
than 49%. 
281 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ABBOTT, W. F. AND MONSEN, R. J., 1979. On the measurement of corporate 
social responsibility: self-reported disclosures as a method of measuring 
corporate social involvement. Academy Management Journal, 22(3), 501-515. 
ABDELGHANY, K. E., 2005. Disclosure of market risk or accounting 
measures of risk: an empirical study. Managerial Auditing Journal, 20(8), 867- 
875. 
ABDOLMOHAMMADI, M., 2005. Intellectual capital disclosure and market 
capitalisation. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 6(3), 397-416. 
ABERNATHY, W. J. AND CLARKE, K. B., 1995. Innovation: Mapping the 
winds of creative destruction. Research Policy, 14,3-22. 
ABEYSEKERA, I., 2001. A Framework to Audit Intellectual Capital. Journal 
of Knowledge Management Practice [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. tlainc. com/jkmpv2. htm 
[Accessed 15 May 2007]. 
ABEYSEKERA, I., 2006. The project of intellectual capital disclosure: 
researching the research. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 7(1), 61-77. 
ABEYSEKERA, I. AND GUTHRIE, J., 2005. An empirical investigation of 
the annual reporting trends of intellectual capital in Sri Lanka. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 16,151-163. 
ABOODY, D. AND LEV, B. 2000. Information asymmetry, R&D and insider 
gains. The Journal of Finance, 55(6), 2747-2766. 
282 
ADAMS, M. AND HOSSAIN, M., 1998. Managerial discretion and voluntary 
disclosure: Empirical evidence from the New Zealand life insurance industry. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 17,245-281. 
ADREM, A. H., 1999. Essays on disclosure practices in Sweden: Causes and 
Effects. Lund studies in Economics and Management 51. Sweden: The Institute 
of Economic Research, Lund University Press. 
AHMED, K., 1996. Disclosure policy choice and corporate characteristics: A 
study of Bangladesh. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting, 3(1), 183-203. 
AHMED, K. AND NICHOLLS, D., 1994. The Impact of Non-Financial 
Company Characteristics on Mandatory Compliance in Developing Countries: 
The Case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, 29 (1), 60- 
77. 
AKERLOF, G. A., 1970. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism. Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488-500. 
ALCHIAN, A., 1950. Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. Journal of 
Political Economy, 58,211-221. 
ALFORD, A., JONES, J., LEFTWICH, R. AND ZMIJEWSKI, M., 1993. The 
Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosures in Different countries. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 31,183-223. 
ALSAEED, K., 2005. The Association between Firm-Specific Characteristics 
and Disclosure: The Case of Saudi Arabia. Journal of American Academy of 
Business, 7 (1), 310 - 321. 
AMIR, E. AND LEV, B., 1996. Value-relevance of non-financial information: 
the wireless communication industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
22(1-3), 3-30. 
283 
AMIT, R. AND SHOEMAKER, P. J. H., 1993. Strategic assets and 
organisational rents. Strategic Management Journal, 14,33-46. 
ANDREW, B. H., GUL, F. A., GUTHRIE, J. E. AND TEOH, H. Y., 1989. A note 
on corporate social disclosure in developing countries: the case of Malaysia and 
Singapore. British Accounting Review, 21,371-376. 
ANDRIESSEN, D., 2004. IC valuation and measurement: classifying the state 
of the art. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 5 (2), 230. 
APRIL, K. A., BOSMA, P. A. AND DELGON, D. A., 2003. Intellectual Capital 
measurement and reporting: Establishing a practice in SA mining. Journal of 
Intellectual Capital, 4(2), 165-180. 
ARCHAMBAULT, J. J. AND ARCHABAULT, M. E., 2003. A multinational 
determinant test of determinants of corporate disclosure. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 38,173-194. 
ASB, 1989. Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 13: Accounting for 
research and development [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. frc. org. uk/asb/technical/standards/-pub0396. html 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
ASB, 1994. FRS 7. Fair Value in Acquisition Accounting [online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. frc. org. uk/images/uploaded/documents/07%20- 
%20Fair%2OValues%20in%2OAcquisistion%2OAccounting. pdfFR7 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
284 
ASB, 1997. FRS 10: Goodwill and Intangible Assets [online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. frc. oriz. uk/images/uploaded/documents/ 10%20- 
%20Goodwill%2Oand%2Olntangible%2OAssets. pdf 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
ASB, 1998. FRS 11: Impairment of Fixed Assets and Goodwill [online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. frc. org. uk/images/uploaded/documents/FRS 11. pdf 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
ASB, 2003. Operating and Financial Review, ASB Publications, Milton 
Keynes. 
AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY OF CPAs AND THE SOCIETY OF 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANTS OF CANADA, 1999. Knowledge 
Management: issues, practice and innovation. Melbourne, Australian Society 
of Certified Practising Accountants. 
BALAKRISHNAN, S. AND FOX, I., 1993. Asset specificity, firm 
heterogeneity and capital structure. Strategic Management Journal, 14(l), 3-16. 
BALIGA, B. R., MOYER, R. C. AND RAO, R. S., 1996. CEO dominance and 
firm performance: What is the fuss? Strategic Management Journal, 17,41-53. 
BARAKO, D. G., HANCOCK, P. AND IZAN, H. Y., 2006. Factors influencing 
voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan Companies. Corporate Governance, 
14(2), 107-125. 
BARNEY, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. 
Journal of Management, 17(1), 99. 
285 
BARNEY, J. B., 2001. Is the resource-based "view" a useful perspective for 
strategic management research? Yes. Strategic Management Journal, 26(1), 41- 
56. 
BARRETT, M. E., 1977. The extent of disclosure in Annual Reports of Large 
Companies in Seven Countries. International Journal of Accounting, 1-25. 
BAYSINGER, B. D. AND BUTLER, H. N., 1985. Corporate Governance and 
the Board of Directors: Performance effects of changes in Board Composition. 
Journal of Law Economics and Organisations, 1(1). 
BAYSINGER, B. D. AND HOSKISSON, R. E., 1989. Diversification Strategy 
and R&D Intensity in multi-product firms. Academy of Management Journal, 
32,310-332. 
BEATTIE, V. AND JONES, M. A., 2001. A six-country comparison of the use 
of graphs in annual reports. International Journal of Accounting, 36,195-222. 
BEATTIE, V., McINNES, W. AND FEARNLEY, S., 2004. Through the eyes 
of management narrative reporting across three sectors. London: ICAEW. 
BEATTIE, V. AND THOMPSON, S. J., 2006. Lifting the lid on the use of 
content analysis to investigate intellectual capital disclosures. Edinburg: 
School on Management and Languages, Heriot-Watt. 
BEAVER, W. H., KETTLER, P. AND SCHOLES, M., 1970. The association 
between market-determined and accounting-determined risk measures. The 
Accounting Review, 45(4), 654-682. 
BEAVER, W. H., CLARKE, R. AND WRIGHT, W. F., 1979. The association 
between unsystematic security returns and the magnitude of earnings forecast 
errors. Journal of Accounting Research, 17(2), 316-340. 
286 
BELKAOUI, A. AND KAHL, A., 1978. Corporate Financial Disclosure in 
Canada. Research Monograph No. 1 of the Canadian Certified General 
Accountants Association. Vancouver, Canada: Canadian Certified General 
Accountants Association. 
BENSTON, G. J., 1986. The benefits and costs to managers of voluntary 
disclosure -A discussion of. "Current cost disclosers and non disclosers: 
Theory and Canadian Evidence". Contemporary Accounting Research, 3(1), 
35-44. 
BERG, S. V. AND SMITH, S. K., 1978. CEO and Board chairman: A 
quantitative study of dual vs. unitary board leadership. In: Davis, J. H., 
Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
BERLE, A. AND MEANS, G., 1934. The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. Macmillan, New York. 
BHARADWAJ, S. G., VARADARAJAN, P. R. AND FAHY, J., 1993. 
Sustainable competitive advantage in service industries: a conceptual model 
and research propositions. Journal of Marketing, 57,83-99. 
BONTIS, N., 1996. There is a price on your head: managing intellectual capital 
strategically. Business Quarterly, Summer, 40-47. 
BONTIS, N., 1998. Intellectual capital: an exploratory study that develops 
measures and models. Management Decision, 36 (2), 63-76. 
BONTIS, N., KEOW, W. C. C. AND RICHARDSON, S., 2000. Intellectual 
Capital and business performance in Malaysian Industry. Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 1(1), 85-100. 
BONTIS, N., 2002. World Congress on Intellectual Capital Readings. Boston: 
Butterworth, Heinemann KMCI Press. 
287 
Fý 
BONTIS, N., 2003. Intellectual capital disclosures in Canadian corporations. 
Journal of Human Resource Costing and Accounting, 7(1-2), 9-20. 
BOTOSAN, C., 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The 
Accounting Review, 72 (3), 323-350. 
BOZZOLAN, S., FAVOTTO, F. AND RICCERI, F., 2003. Italian annual 
intellectual capital disclosure: An empirical analysis. Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 4(4), 543-558. 
BRADBURY, M. E., 1992. Voluntary disclosure of financial segment data: 
New Zealand evidence. Accounting and Finance Journal, 32(1), 15-26. 
BRENNAN, N., 2001. Reporting intellectual capital in annual reports: 
Evidence from Ireland. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 14 (4), 
423-436. 
BRICKLEY, J. A. AND JAMES, C. M., 1987. The takeover market, corporate 
board composition and ownership structure: The case of banking. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 30. 
BROOKING, A., 1996. Intellectual capital, core assets for the third millennium 
enterprise. London: International Thompson Business Press. 
BROOKING, A. AND MOTTA, E., 1996. Taxonomy of intellectual capital and 
a methodology for auditing it. In: Proceedings of the 17th Annual national 
Business Conference. Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University. 
BUKH, P. N., LARSEN, H. T., MOURITSEN, J., 2001. Constructing 
intellectual capital statements. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 17(1), 
87-108. 
288 
BUZBY, S. L., 1972. An empirical investigation of the relationship between the 
extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports and two company 
characteristics. Doctoral dissertation. Pennsylvania State University. 
BUZBY, S. L., 1974. Selected Items of Information and Their Disclosure in 
Annual Reports. The Accounting Review, 49(3), 423-435. 
BUZBY, S. L., 1975. Company size, listed versus unlisted stocks and the extent 
of financial disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 13 (1), 16-37. 
CADBURY COMMITTEE, 1992. Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: Professional Publishing. 
CAMFFERMAN, K. AND COOKE, T. E., 2002. An analysis of disclosure in 
the annual reports of UK and Dutch companies. Journal of International 
Accounting Research, 1,3. 
CAMPBELL, D. J., 2000. Legitimacy theory or managerial reality construction? 
Corporate social disclosure in Marks and Spencer plc corporate reports, 1967- 
1997. Accounting Forum, 24(1), 80-100. 
CAROLL, G. R. AND YANGCHUNG, P. H., 1986. Organisational task and 
institutional environments in ecological perspective: findings from the local 
newspaper industry. American Journal of Sociology, 91,838-873. 
CERF, R. A., 1961. Corporate Reporting and Investment Decisions. Berkeley, 
CA. The University of California Press. 
CHAGANTI, R. S., MAHAJAN, V., AND SHARMA, S., 1985. Corporate 
board size, composition and corporate failures in retail industries. Journal of 
Management Studies, 22,400-417. In: Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and 
Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of 
Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
289 
CHAN, L. K. C., LAKONISHOK, J. AND SOUGIANNIS, T., 2001. The stock 
market valuation of research and development expenditures. The Journal of 
Finance, 56(6), 2431-2456. 
CH'ANG, S. AND YASTREBOFF, M., 2003. Intellectual Property Auditing: 
A Road to Riches. Journal of Research and Practice in Information 
Technology, 35(3), 169-177. 
CHANDRA, G., 1974. A Study of the Consensus of Disclosure among Public 
Accountants and Security Analysts. Accounting Review, 49 (4), 733-42. 
CHATZKEL, J., 2002. Intellectual capital. UK: Capstone. 
CHEN, C. J. P. AND JAGGI, B., 2000. Association between non-executive 
directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 19,285-310. 
CHENG, C. S., HOPWOOD, W. AND MCKEOWN, J. C., 1992. Non-Linearity 
and Specification Problems in Unexpected Earnings Response Regression 
Model. Accounting Review, 67,579-598. 
CHENEY, G. AND CARROL, C., 1997. The person as object in discourses in 
and around organisations. Communication Research, 24 (6), 593-630. 
CHIA, R., 2002. The production of management knowledge: Philosophical 
underpinnings of research design. In: Partington, D. (ed. ), Essential skills for 
management research, London: Sage. 
CHOON, H., SMITH, M. AND TAYLOR, S., 2000. What do Australian annual 
reports say about future earnings? Australian Accounting Review, 10(1), 17-25. 
CHOW, C. W., 1982. The Demand for External Auditing: Size, Debt and 
Ownership Influences. Accounting Review, 57(2), 272. 
290 
CHOW, C. W. AND WONG-BOREN, A., 1987. Voluntary financial disclosure 
by Mexican corporations. The Accounting Review, 433-541. 
CITRON, D., HOLDEN, J., SELIM, G. AND OEHLCKE, F., 2005. Do 
voluntary intellectual capital disclosures provide information about firm's 
intangible assets? In: A paper presented at the 9`h Financial Reporting and 
Business Communication Conference, Cardiff Business School, 7&8 July, 
Cardiff. 
CLARKSON, P. M., KAO, L. L. AND RICHARDSON, G. D., 1994. The 
Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD &A Section of Annual Reports. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 11,1- 30. 
CLULOW, V., GERSTMAN, J. AND BARRY, C., 2003. The resource-based 
view and sustainable competitive advantage: the case of a financial services 
firm. Journal of European Industrial Training, 27(5), 202. 
COFF, R. W., 1997. Human assets and management dilemmas: Coping with 
hazards on the road to resource-based theory. Academy of Management Review, 
22,374-402. 
COLES, J. L., LOEWENSTEIN, U. AND SUAY, J., 1995. On equilibrium 
pricing under parameter uncertainty. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 30(3), 347-364. 
COMPANIES ACT, 1989. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
COOKE, T. E., 1989. Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Companies. 
Journal of International Financial Management Accounting, 2,171-195. 
COOKE, T. E. 1991. An assessment of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 
Japanese Corporations. International Journal of Accounting, 26 (3), 174-189. 
291 
COOKE, T. E., 1992. The impact of size, stock market listing and industry type 
on disclosure in the annual reports of Japanese listed corporations. Accounting 
and Business Research, 229-237. 
COOKE, T. E., 1993. Disclosure in Japanese Corporate Annual Reports. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 20,521- 535. 
COOKE, T. E., 1996. The influence of the keiretsu on Japanese corporate 
disclosure. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 
191-214. 
COOKE, T. E., 1998. Regression analysis in accounting disclosure studies. 
Accounting and Business Research, 28(3), 209-224. 
COPELAND, R. M. AND FREDRICKS, W., 1968. Extent of Disclosure. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 6 (1), 106-113. 
COURTIS, J. K., 1976. Relationships between Timeliness and Corporate 
Reporting and Corporate Attributes. Journal of Accounting and Business 
Research, 7,45-56. 
CRASWELL, A. Y. AND TAYLOR, S. L., 1992. Discretionary Disclosure of 
Reserve by Oil and Gas Companies: An economic analysis. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 19(2), 295-308. 
DAHYA, J., LONIE, A. A. AND POWER, D. M., 1996. The case for separating 
the role of Chairman and CEO: An analysis of stock market and accounting 
data. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 4(2), 71-77. 
DAILY, C. M. AND DALTON, D. R., 1994. Bankruptcy and corporate 
governance: The impact of board composition and structure. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37,1603-1617. In: Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and 
Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of 
Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
292 
DALTON, D. R. AND KESNER, I. F., 1987. Composition and CEO duality in 
boards of directors: An international perspective. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 18,33-42. 
DARLING, M., 1996. Building the knowledge organization. Business 
Quarterly, Winter. 
DARROUGH, M., 1995. Discussion of disclosure of predecision information in 
a duopoly. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11(2), 861-872. 
DATASTREAM, 2005. DataStream Advanced version 4.0. SP5B, Thompson's 
database [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //extranet. DataStream. com 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
DAVIS, J. H., SCHOORMAN, F. D. AND DONALDSON, L., 1997. Toward a 
stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 
20-47. 
DAVISON, J. AND SKERRATT, L., 2007. Words, Pictures and Intangibles in 
the Corporate Report. Edinburg: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland. 
DEAKIN, S. AND KONZELMANN, S., 2004. Learning from Enron. 
Corporate Governance, 12(2), 134-142. 
DEEGAN, C. AND HALLAM, A. 1991. The voluntary presentation of value 
added statements in Australia: a political cost perspective. Journal of 
Accounting and Finance, June, 1-21. 
DEL MONTE, A. AND PAPAGNI, E., 2003. R&D and the growth of firms: 
empirical analysis of a panel of Italian firms. Research Policy, 32 (6), 1003. 
293 
DEMB, A. AND NEUBAUER, F. F., 1992. The Corporate Board: Confronting 
the Paradoxes. Oxford University Press. 
DEMSETZ, H AND LEHN, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: 
Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93,1115-1177. 
DENG, Z., LEV, B. AND NARIN, F., 1999. Science and Technology as 
Predictors of Stock Performance. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(3), 20-32. 
DEPOERS, F., 2000. A cost-benefit study of voluntary disclosure: some 
empirical evidence from French listed companies. European Accounting 
Review, 9(2), 245-263. 
DHALIWAL, D. S., SALMON, G. L. AND SMITH, E. D., 1982. The effect of 
owner versus management control on the choice of accounting methods. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 4,41-53. 
DIAMOND, D. W. AND VERRECCHIA, R., 1991. Disclosure, liquidity and 
cost of capital. The Journal of Finance, 66,1325-1355. 
DIERICKX, I. AND COOL, K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and 
sustainability of competitive advantage. Management Science, 35(1), 1504- 
1511. 
DONALDSON, L. AND DAVIS, J. H., 1989. CEO governance and shareholder 
returns: Agency theory or stewardship theory. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Academy of Management, Washington, DC. In: Davis, J. H., 
Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
294 
DONALDSON, L. AND DAVIS, J. H., 1991. Stewardship theory or agency 
theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of 
Management, 16,49-64. In.. Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L., 
1997. Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management 
Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
DRUCKER, P., 1993. Post-Capitalist Society. New York: Harper Collins. 
DYE, R. A., 1985. Disclosure of Non-proprietary information. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 23(1), 123-145. 
DYE, R. A., 1986. Proprietary and Non-Proprietary Disclosures. Journal of 
Business, 331-366. 
DZINKOWSKI, R., 1999. Intellectual capital: what you always wanted to 
know but were afraid to ask. Journal of Accounting and Business Research, 
2(10), 22-24. 
DZINKOWSKI, R., 2000. The measurement and management of intellectual 
capital: An Introduction. Management Accounting: Magazine for Chartered 
Management Accountants, 78(2), 32-36. 
EASTMAN, B., 1984. Interpreting Mathematical Economics and 
Econometrics. London: Macmillan. 
ECONOMIST (February 11', 2006). Economics focus beyond irrelevance, 86. 
EDVINSSON, L. AND MALONE, M., 1997. Intellectual Capital: The Proven 
Way to Establish your Company's Real Value by Measuring its Hidden Brain 
Power. Piatkus, London. 
EDVINSSON, L. AND SULLIVAN, P., 1996. Developing a model for 
managing intellectual capital. European Management Journal, 14(4), 356-364. 
295 
EDVINSSON, L., 2002. The New Knowledge Economics. Business Strategy 
Review, 13(3), 72-76. 
ENG, L. AND MAK, Y., 2003. Corporate Governance and Voluntary 
Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22,325-345. 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1978. Fourth Council Directive for 
coordinating of National legislation regarding the annual accounts of limited 
liability companies. Brussels: EEC. 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1983. Seventh Council Directive 
on Consolidated Accounts. Brussels: EEC. 
FAMA, E. F. AND JENSEN, M. C., 1983. Separation of Ownership and 
Control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325. 
FAN, J. P. H. AND WONG, T. J., 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the 
informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 33(3), 401-425. 
FARRAR, D. AND GLAUBER, R., 1967. Multicollinearity in Regression 
Analysis: A Problem Revisited. Review of Economics and Statistics, 49(1), 92- 
107. 
FARRELLY, G. E., FERRIS, K. R. AND REICHENTEIN, W. R., 1985. 
Perceived risk, market risk and accounting determined risk measures. The 
Accounting Review, 60(2), 278-288. 
FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 2001. FAS 142, Goodwill 
and Other IA. Federal Accounting Standards Board, Norwalk, CT. 
296 
FEIWAL, G. R., 1975. The Intellectual Capital of Michal Kalecki: A Study of 
Economic Theory and Policy. Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee 
Press. In: Hudson, W. J., 1993. Intellectual capital: how to build it, enhance it 
and use it. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
FERGUSON, M., LAM, K. AND LEE, G., 2002. Voluntary disclosure by state 
owned enterprises listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, 13(2), 125-152. 
FIELD, A., 2000. Discovering Statistics: Using SPSS for Windows. SAGE, 
London. 
FRC, 2003. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance. London: FRC. 
FTSE TechMARK All-Share Index (2006). Version 2.2 January 2006 Ground 
Rules for the Management of the FTSE TechMARK Indices [online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. ftse. com/Indices/FTSE_TechmarkIndexSeries/Downloads/techm 
ark indexrules. pdf 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 2000. The listing rules. London: 
FSA. 
FINKELSTEIN, S., 1992. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, 
measurement and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35,505-538. 
FINKELSTEIN, S. AND D'AVENI, R. A., 1994. CEO duality as a double- 
edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and 
unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37,1079-1108. In: 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stewardship 
theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
297 
FIRER, C. AND METH, G., 1986. Information disclosure in annual reports in 
South Africa. Omega, 5. In: Meek, G. K. and Gray, S. G., 1989. Globalisation of 
Stock Markets and Foreign Listing Requirements: Voluntary Disclosures by 
Continental European Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 315-338. 
FIRTH, M., 1978. A study of the consensus of the perceived importance of 
disclosure of individual items in corporate annual reports. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 14(1), 57-70. 
FIRTH, M. A., 1979. The Impact of Size, Stock Market Listing and Auditors on 
Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports. Accounting and Business 
Research, 9(36), 273-280. 
FIRTH, M., 1984. The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual 
Reports and its Association with Security Risk Measures. Journal of Applied 
Economics, 16,269-277. 
FLAMHOLTZ, E. AND AKSEHIRLI, Z., 2000. Organisational success and 
failure: an empirical test of a holistic model. European Management Journal, 
18(5), 488-498. 
FLAMHOLTZ, E. AND HUA, W., 2003. Searching for Competitive 
Advantage in the Black Box. European Management Journal, 21(2), 222-236. 
FLIGSTEIN, N. AND CHOO, J., 2005. Law and Corporate Governance. 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 1,61-84. 
FORKER, J. J., 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting 
and Business Research, 22(86), 111-124. 
FOSTER, G., 1978. Financial Statement Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- 
Hall. 
298 
FOSTER, M. A., 1986. Financial Statement Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
FRANKEL, R., McNICHOLS, M. AND WILSON, P., 1995. Discretionary 
disclosure and external financing. The Accounting Review, 70,135-150. 
FREEMAN, J. AND HANNAH, M. T., 1983. Niche width and the dynamics of 
organisational populations. American Journal of Sociology, 88,1116-1145. 
GARCIA-MECA, E. AND MARTINEZ, I., 2005. Assessing the quality of 
disclosure on intangibles in the Spanish capital market. European Business 
Review, 17(4), 305-313. 
GARCIA-MECA, E., PARRA, I., MARTINEZ, I. AND LARRAN, M., 2005. 
The explanatory factors of intellectual capital disclosure to financial analysts. 
European Accounting Review, 14(1), 63-94. 
GARSOMBKE, H. P., 1979. The relationship between corporate disclosure and 
firm risk. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 53-70. 
GELB, D. S. AND SIEGAL, P., 2000. Intangible Assets and Corporate 
Signalling. Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting, 15(4), 307-323. 
GELB, D. AND ZAROWIN, P., 2000. Corporate disclosure policy and the 
informativeness of stock prices. Working paper. New York: New York 
University. 
GIROUX, G. A., 1989. Political Interests and Governmental Accounting 
Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 8(3), 199-217. 
GOH, P. C. AND LIM, K. P., 2004. Disclosing intellectual capital in company 
annual reports: Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 5 (3), 
500-510. 
299 
GOODSTEIN, J., GAUTUM, K. AND BOEKER, W., 1994. The effect of 
Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change. Strategic Management Journal, 
15(3) 
GOULD, J. P., 1977. Discussion of municipal accounting maze: an analysis of 
political incentives. Journal of Accounting Research, 15(Supplement), 145-150. 
GRACE, M., IRELAND, A. AND DUNSTAN, K., 1995. Board Composition, 
Non-Executive Directors' Characteristics and Corporate Financial Performance. 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting, 2,121-137. 
GRAHAM, J. R., HARVEY, C. AND RAJGOPAL, S., 2005. The economic 
implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 40,3-73. 
GRANT, R. M., 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17,109-122. 
GRAY, S., 1988. Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of 
accounting systems internationally. Abacus, 24(1), 1-15. 
GRAY, R., 2002. The social accounting project and accounting organisation 
and society - privileging engagement imaginings, new accountings and 
pragmatism over critique. Accounting, Organisation and Society, 27,687-708. 
GRAY, R. AND HASLAM, J., 1990. External reporting by UK Universities: 
An explanatory study of accounting change. Financial, Accountability and 
Management Journal, 6(1), 51-72. 
GRAY, S. J. AND ROBERTS, C. B. 1989. Voluntary information disclosure and 
the British Multinationals: Corporate perceptions of costs and benefits. In: A. G. 
Hopwood, ed. International Pressures for Change. Hemel Hempstead: 
Prentice-Hall. 
300 
GRAY, R. H., KOUHY, R. AND LAVERS, S., 1995. Corporate social and 
environmental reporting: a review of the literature and a longitudinal study of 
UK disclosure. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 8(2), 47-77. 
GRAY, S. J., MEEK, G. K. AND ROBERTS, C. B., 1995. International Capital 
Market Pressures and Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures by U. S. and U. K. 
Multinationals. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 6(l), 44-68. 
GREENBURY REPORT, 1995. Directors' Remuneration: Report of the Study 
Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury. London, Gee. 
GRILICHES, Z. AND REGEV, H., 1995. Firm productivity in Israeli industry 
1979-1988. Journal of Econometrics, 65(1), 175-203. 
GRINBLATT, M. AND TITMAN, S., 1989. Portfolio Performance Evaluation: 
Old Issues and New Insights. The Review of Financial Studies, 2,393-416. 
GROSSMAN, S., 1981. The Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about 
Product Quality. Journal of Law and Economics, 4(3), 461-483. 
GROSSMAN, S. AND HART, 0., 1988. One share-one vote and the market 
for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,175-202. 
GU, F. AND WANG, W., 2005. Intangible assets, information complexity and 
analysts earnings forecasts. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32(9- 
10), 1673-1702. 
GUL, F. AND LEUNG, S., 2004. Board leadership, outside directors' expertise 
and voluntary corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 
23(5), 351. 
GUO, R-J., LEV, B. AND ZHOU, N., 2004. Competitive cost of disclosure by 
biotech IPOs. The Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 319-355. 
301 
GUTHRIE, J. 2001. The Management, measurement and reporting of 
Intellectual Capital. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 2(1), 27-41. 
GUTHRIE, J. AND MATHEWS, M. R., 1985. Corporate Social Accounting in 
Australia. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 7,251-77. In: 
ABEYSEKERA, I. AND GUTHRIE, J., 2005. An empirical investigation of 
the annual reporting trends of intellectual capital in Sri Lanka. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 16,151-163. 
GUTHRIE, J. AND PARKER, L. D., 1990. Corporate social disclosure practise: 
a comparative international analysis. Advances in Public Interest Accounting, 3, 
157-175. 
GUTHRIE, J., PETTY, R., FERRIER, F. AND WELL, R., 1999. There is no 
accounting for intellectual capital in Australia: Review of annual reporting 
practices and the internal measurement of intangibles within Australian 
organisations. In. A paper presented at the International Symposium Measuring 
and Reporting Intellectual Capital: Experiences, Issues and Prospects, 9-10 
June, Amsterdam. 
GUTHRIE, J. AND PETTY, R., 2000. Intellectual capital: Australian annual 
reporting practices. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 1 (3), 241-51. 
GUTHRIE, J., PETTY, R., YONGVANICH, K. AND RICCERI, F., 2004. 
Using Content Analysis as a research method to enquire into intellectual capital 
reporting. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 5 (2), 282-293. 
GUTHRIE, J., PETTY, R. AND RICCERI, F., 2005. External intellectual 
capital reporting: Evidence from Australia and Hong Kong. Research 
monograph. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland: Edinburgh. 
302 
GUTHRIE, J., PETTY, R. AND RICCERI, F., 2006. The voluntary reporting 
of intellectual capital: comparing evidence from Hong Kong and Australia. 
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 7(2), 254-271. 
GUO, R., LEV, B. AND ZHOU, N., 2004. Competitive Costs of Disclosure by 
Biotech IPOs. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 319. 
HACKSTONE, D. AND MILNE, M. J., 1996. Some determinants of Social and 
Environmental Disclosures in New Zealand Companies. Auditing, Accounting 
and Accountability Journal, 9(1), 237-256. 
HAIR, J. F., ANDERSEN, R. E., TATHAM, R. L. AND BLACK, W. C., 1995. 
Multivariate Data Analysis 4th Ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
HALL, B. AND MAIRESSE, J., 1995. Exploring the relationship between 
R&D and productivity in French Manufacturing firms. Journal of 
Econometrics, 65,263-293. 
HANIFFA, R. M. AND COOKE, T. E., 2002. Culture, corporate governance and 
disclosure in Malaysian corporations. Abacus, 38(3), 317-349. 
HANSEN, G. S. AND HILL, C. W. L., 1991. Are institutional investors myopic? 
A time series study of four technological driven industries. Strategic 
Managerial Journal, 12,1-16. 
HASSELDINE, J., SALAMA, A. I. AND TOMS, J. S., 2005. Quantity vs. 
quality: the impact of environmental disclosures on the reputations of UK plcs. 
The British Accounting Review, 37,231-248. 
HAYTON, J. C., 2005. Competing in the new economy: the effect of 
intellectual capital on corporate entrepreneurship in high technology new 
ventures. R&D Management, 35(2), 137-155. 
303 
HEALY, P. M., HUTTON, A. P. AND PALEPU, K. G., 1999. Stock 
performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in 
disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(3), 485-520. 
HEALY, P. M. AND PALEPU, K. G., 1993. The effect of firms' financial 
disclosure strategies on stock prices. Accounting Horizons, 1-11. 
HEALY, P. M. AND PALEPU, K. G., 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate 
disclosure and the capital market: A review of the empirical disclosure 
literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31,405-440. 
HERMALIN, B. E. AND WEISBACH, M. S., 1991. The Effects of board 
composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Management, 20,101-112. 
HICKEY, A., 1986. An Introduction to Statistical Techniques for Social 
Research. New York: Random House. 
HO, S. S. M. AND WONG, K. S., 2001. A study of corporate disclosure practice 
and effectiveness in Hong Kong. Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, 12(1), 75-102. 
HOLSTI, O. R., 1969. Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities, 
Reading, M. A: Addison-Wesley. 
HOPWOOD, A. G., 1989. International pressure for accounting change. 
Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall. 
HOSKISSON, R. E., JOHNSON, R. A. AND MOESEL, D. D., 1994. Corporate 
Divesture Intensity in Restructuring Firms: Effects of Governance, Strategy and 
Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37,1207-1251. 
304 
HOSSAIN, M., TAN, L. M. AND ADAMS, M., 1994. Voluntary disclosure in 
an emerging capital market: Some empirical evidence from companies listed on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The International Journal of Accounting, 
29(4), 334 
HOSSAIN, M., PERERA, M. H. B. AND RAHMAN, A. R., 1995. Voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports of New Zealand Companies. Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, 6 (1), 69-85. 
HUANG, C. C., LUTHER, R. AND TAYLES, M., 2007. An evidence-based 
taxonomy of intellectual capital, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Under Review. 
HUDSON, W., 1993. Intellectual Capital: How to build it, enhance it and use 
it. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
HUGHES, J. J., 1996. The Greenbury report on directors' remuneration. 
International Journal of Manpower, 17(l), 3. 
IMAN, R. L. AND CONOVER, W. J., 1979. The Use of the Rank Transform in 
Regression. Technometrics, 21(4), 499-510. 
IMHOFF, E. A., 1992. The Relation between Perceived Accounting Quality 
and Economic Characteristics of the Firm. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 11,97-118. 
INCHAUSTI, B. G., 1997. The influence of company characteristics and 
accounting regulation on information disclosed by Spanish Firms. European 
Accounting Review, 6(l), 45-68. 
INSTITUTE OF CHARTERD ACCOUNTANTS OF ENGLAND AND 
WALES, 2003. New Reporting Models for Business. ICAEW, London. 
305 
IASC. 1998. IAS 36 Impairment of Assets [Online], 
Available from: 
- http: //www. iasb. org/NR/rdonl3Lres/A288C781-7D39-4988-BA71 
9AB77A263BA0/0/IAS36. pdf 
[Accessed 15 May 2007]. 
IASC. 1998. IAS 38 Intangible Assets [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. iasb. or R/rdonlyres/149D67E2-6769-4E8F-976D- 
6BABEB783D90/0/IAS3 8. pdf 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACCOUNTANTS, 1998. The 
Measurement and Management of Intellectual Capital: An Introduction Study. 
IFAC: New York. 
JAGGI, B. AND LOW, P., 2000. Impact of culture, market forces and legal 
system on financial disclosures. The International Journal of Accounting, 
35(4), 495-519. 
JENSEN, M. AND MECKLING, W. H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3,305-360. 
JENSEN, M. C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and 
takeovers. American Economic Review, 76,323-329. 
JUDGE, G. G., GRIFFITHS, W. E. AND HILL, R. C., 1985. The Theory and 
Practice of Econometrics. New York: John Willey & Sons. 
JUNG, W. O. AND KWON, Y. K., 1988. Disclosure when the Market is unsure 
of Information Endowment of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 146- 
153. 
306 
KAPLAN, R. S. AND URWITZ, D. G., 1979. Statistical Methods of Bond 
Ratings: A Methodological Enquiry. The Journal of Business, April, 231-261. 
KEENAN, J. AND AGGESTAM, M., 2001. Corporate Governance and 
Intellectual capital: some conceptualisations. Corporate Governance, 9(4), 259- 
275. 
KESNER, I. F. AND JOHNSON, R. B., 1990. An Investigation of the 
relationship between board composition and shareholder suits. Strategic 
Management Journal, 11(4). 
KLEINBAUM, D. G., KUPPER, L. L. AND MULLER, K. E. 1988. Applied 
Regression Analysis and Other Multivariate Methods. Boston, Mass: PWS- 
Kent. 
KLOCK, M. AND MEGNA, P., 2000. Measuring and valuing intangible 
capital in the wireless communications industry. The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 40(4), 519-533. 
KOCHANEK, R. F., 1974. Segmental Financial Disclosure by Diversified 
Firms and Security Prices. The Accounting Review, 49,245-258. 
KOSNIK, R. D., 1987. Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate 
governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32,163-185. 
KREN, L. AND KERR, J. L., 1997. The effects of independent NEDS and 
board shareholdings on the relationship between the chief executive 
compensation and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Business 
Research, 27,297-309. 
KRIPPENDORFF, K., 1980. Content analysis: An introduction to its 
methodology. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. 
307 
LANG, M. AND LUNDHOLM, R., 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of 
analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31, 
246-271. 
LANG, M. AND LUNDHOLM, R., 1996. Corporate Disclosure Policy and 
Analyst Behaviour. Accounting Review, 71(4), 467-492. 
LANG, M. H. AND LUNDHOLM, R. J., 2000. Voluntary disclosure and equity 
offerings: Reducing information asymmetry or hyping the stock? 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 17(4), 623. 
LEE, J. AND SHIM, E., 1995. Moderating effects of R&D on corporate growth 
in U. S. and Japanese hi-tech industries: An empirical study. Journal of High 
Technology Management Research, 6(2), 179. 
LEFTWICH, R., WATTS, R. L. AND ZIMMERMAN, J. L., 1981. Voluntary 
corporate disclosure: The case of interim reporting. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 19,50-77. 
LEUNG, S. AND HORWITZ, B., 2004. Director Ownership and Voluntary 
Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence. Journal of International Financial 
Management & Accounting, 15 (3), 235-260. 
LEUZ, C. AND VERRECCHIA, R. E., 2000. The economic consequences of 
increased disclosure. The Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (Supplement 
Studies on accounting information and the economics of the firm), 91-124. 
LEV, B., 2001. Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press. 
LEV, B. AND SOUGIANNIS, T., 1996. The capitalisation, amortisation and 
value-relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21(1), 107- 
138. 
308 
LEV, B. AND SOUGIANNIS, T., 1999. Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black 
Box: the R&D Effect. Journal Business Finance and Accounting, 26(3) and (4). 
LEV, B. AND STEFANO, Z., 2003. Intangibles and intellectual capital: an 
introduction to a special issue. European Accounting Review, 12(4), 597. 
LEV, B. AND ZAROWIN, P., 1999. The boundaries of financial reporting and 
how to extend them. Journal ofAccounting Research, 37(2), 353-385. 
LIBERTY, S. E. AND ZIMMERMAN, J. L., 1986. Labour union contract 
negotiation and accounting choices. Accounting Review, 692-712. 
LOVELL, A., 2005. Ethics in business: a literature review. Edinburgh: Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. 
LUFTI, R., 1989. Unlisted securities market and the disclosure of financial 
Information. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow. 
MACE, M., 1991. Directors: Myth or reality. Harvard University Press. 
MAK, Y. T., 1996. The voluntary use of outside directors by initial public 
offering firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 4(2), 94-106. 
MALONE, D., FRIES, C. AND JONES, T., 1993. An empirical investigation 
of the extent of corporate financial disclosure in the oil and gas industry. 
Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, 249-273. 
MARCH, J. G., 1965. Handbook of Organisations. Chicago: Rand McNally, 
451-533. 
MARR, B. AND ADAMS, C., 2004. The balanced scorecard and intangible 
assets: similar ideas, unaligned concepts. Measuring Business Excellence, 8(3), 
18-27. 
309 
MARR, B. AND CHATZKEL, J., 2004. Intellectual capital at the crossroads: 
managing measuring and reporting of IC. Journal of Intellectual Capital, Guest 
Editorial 5(2), 224-229. 
MARR, B., GUPTA, 0., PIKE, S. AND ROOS, G., 2003. Intellectual capital 
and knowledge management effectiveness. Management Decision, 41(8), 771- 
781. 
MATHEWS, M. R., 1997. Twenty-five years of social and environmental 
accounting research - is there a silver jubilee to celebrate? Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal, 10(4), 481-531. 
MAUTZ, R. K. AND MAY, W. G., 1978. Financial Disclosure in a Competitive 
Economy: Considerations in Establishing Financial Accounting Standards. A 
research study and report prepared for the Financial Executives Research 
Foundation, New York: Ernst & Ernst. 
MCKINNON, J. L. AND DALIMUNTHE, 1993. Voluntary disclosure of 
segment information by Australian diversified companies. Journal of 
Accounting and Finance, 33-50. 
MCNALLY, G., ENG, L. H. AND HASSELDINE, C. R., 1982. Corporate 
financial reporting in New Zealand: An analysis of user preferences, corporate 
characteristics and disclosure practices for discretionary information. 
Accounting and Business Research, 13,11-20. 
MEEK, G. K. AND GRAY, S., 1989. Globalisation of stock markets and 
foreign listing requirements: Voluntary disclosures by continental European 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 20(2), 315-336. 
MEEK, G. K., ROBERTS, C. B. AND GRAY, S., 1995. Factors influencing 
voluntary annual report disclosures by US, UK and continental European 
multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 26,555-572. 
310 
MIDGLEY, D. F., 1981. Towards a theory of product life cycle: explaining 
diversity. Journal of Marketing, 45,109-115. 
MILGROM, P., 1981. Good news and bad news: Representation Theorems and 
applications. Bell Journal of Economics, 12,380-391. 
MILNE, M. J. AND ADLER, R. W., 1999. Exploring the reliability of social and 
environmental disclosures content analysis. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 12(2), 237-256. 
MITCHELL, J. D., CHIA, C. W. L. AND LOH, A. S., 1995. Voluntary disclosure 
of segment information: Further Australian evidence. Accounting and Finance, 
35(2), 1-16. 
MOLZ, R., 1988. Managerial domination of boards of directors and financial 
performance. Journal of Business Research, 16,235-249. In: Davis, J. H., 
Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
MORRIS, R. D., 1987. Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy 
Choice. Accounting and Business Research, 18(69), 47-59. 
MOURITSEN, J., 1998. Driving growth: Economic Value Added versus 
Intellectual Capital. Management Accounting Research, 9,461-482. 
MUELLER, F., 1996. Human resources as strategic assets: an evolutionary 
resource-based theory. Journal of Management Studies, 33(6), 757-786. 
MYERS, S. C., 1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 4,147-175. 
MYERS, R., 1990. Classical and modern regression with Applications 2nd ed., 
Boston, MA: Duxbury. 
311 
NACHMIAS, C. AND NACHMIAS, D. 1976. Research Methods in Social 
Sciences. London: Edward Arnold. 
NASER, K., ALKHATIB, K. AND KARBHARI, Y., 2002. Empirical 
Evidence on the Depth of Corporate Information Disclosure in Developing 
Countries: The Case of Jordan. International Journal of Commerce & 
Management, 12 (3/4), 122-34. 
NASER, K. AND NUSEIBEH, R., 2003. User's perception of corporate 
reporting: evidence from Saudi Arabia. British Accounting Review, 35(2), 129- 
153. 
NATIONAL STATISTICS, 2003. SIC of Economic Activities, 2003 [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. statistics. gov. uk/methods_guality/sic/contents. asp 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
NG, E. J. AND KOH, E. C., 1993. Compliance with Non-Mandatory Accounting 
Pronouncements: The Singapore Experience. Singapore Management Review, 
15(1), 41-54. 
NIXON, B., 1997. The accounting treatment of research and development 
expenditure: views of UK company accountants. European Accounting Review, 
6(2), 265-277. 
NONAKA, I., 1991. The knowledge creating company. Harvard Business 
Review, 69,96-104. 
O'DONNELL, D. AND O'REGAN, P., 2000. The structural dimensions of 
intellectual capital: emerging challenges for management and accounting, 
Southern African Business Review. Special Issue on Information Technology, 
4(2), 14-20. 
312 
OLSSON, B., 2001. Annual reporting practices: information about human 
resources in corporate annual reports in major Swedish companies. Journal of 
Human Resource Costing and Accounting, 6 (1), 39-52. 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 1976. International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises: Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member Countries. 
Paris, OECD. 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 1976. Revised, 1979. International investment and 
multinational enterprises. Guidelines for multinational enterprises. Paris: 
OECD. 
O'SULLIVAN, N., 2000. The impact of board composition and ownership on 
audit quality: evidence from large UK companies. British Accounting Review, 
32(4), 397-414. 
OWUSU-ANSAH, S., 1998. The impact corporate attributes on the extent of 
mandatory disclosure and reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 33(5), 605-631. 
PARTINGTON, D., 2002. Essential skills for management research. Cranfield 
School of Management, London: Sage, 1-20. 
PATTEN, D. M., 1991. Exposure, Legitimacy and Social Disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting & Public Policy, 10 (4), 297-308. 
PATTON, A. AND BAKER, J. C., 1987. Why won't directors rock the boat? 
Harvard Business Review, 65(6). 
313 
PATTON, J. AND ZELENKA, I. 1997. An Empirical Analysis of the 
Determinants of the Extent of Disclosure in Annual Reports of Joint Stock 
Companies in Czech Republic. The European Accounting Review, 6 (4), 605- 
31. 
PEARCE, J. A. AND ZAHRA, S. A., 1992. Board composition from a strategic 
contingency perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4). 
PENROSE, E. T., 1959. The theory of growth of the firm. Wiley: New York. 
PETERAF, M. A., 1993. The cornerstone of competitive advantage: a resource- 
based view. Strategic Management Journal, 14,179-191. 
PESQUEUX, Y., 2005. Corporate Governance and accounting systems: a 
critical perspective. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 16(20), 797-823. 
PETTIGREW, A. M. AND MCNULTY, T., 1995. Power and influence in and 
around the boardroom. Human Relations, 48(8). 
POURTIER, F., 1996. La politique de communication sectorielle des groupes. 
Revue du financier, 105,49-59. 
PRENCIPE, A., 2004. Proprietary costs and determinants of voluntary segment 
disclosure: evidence from Italian listed companies. European Accounting 
Review, 13(2), 319. 
RAFFOURNIER, B., 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure 
by Swiss Listed Companies. The European Accounting Review, 4 (2), 261-278. 
RECHNER, P. L. AND DALTON, D. R., 1991. CEO duality and organisational 
performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12,155- 
160. In: Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a 
stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 
20-47. 
314 
RICHARDSON, 2001. Discretionary disclosure: a note. Abacus, 37 (2), 233- 
47. 
RICHARDSON, A. J. AND WELKER, M., 2001. Social disclosure, financial 
disclosure and the cost of capital. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 26(7- 
8), 597-616. 
ROBB, S. W. G., SINGLE, L. E. AND ZARZESKI, M. T., 2001. Non-financial 
disclosures across Anglo-American countries. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 10 (1), 71-84. 
ROBBINS, W. A. AND AUSTIN, K. R., 1986. Disclosure Quality in 
Governmental Financial Reports. Journal of Accounting Research, 24,412-421. 
ROBERTS, R., 1992. Determinants of Social Corporate Responsibility 
Disclosure: An application of stakeholder theory. Accounting, Organisations 
and Society, 17(6), 595-612. 
ROBERTS, C. B. AND GRAY, S. J. 1988. Information disclosure by 
multinationals: An empirical study of the British Response to the U. N. and 
OECD recommendations. The Sixth International Conference on Accounting, 
Education and Research, Kyoto, Japan. In: Meek, G. K. and Gray, S. G., 1989. 
Globalisation of Stock Markets and Foreign Listing Requirements: Voluntary 
Disclosures by Continental European Companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Journal of International Business Studies, 20(2), 315-336. 
ROMANO, R., 1996. Corporate law and corporate governance. Oxford 
University Press. 
ROOS, J., ROOS, G., EDVINSSON, L. AND DRAGONETTI, N. C., 1997. 
Intellectual capital: Navigation in the new business landscape. Macmillan 
Press Ltd., London. 
315 
ROOS, J., ROOS, G., EDVINSSON, L. AND DRAGONETTI, N. C., 1998. 
Intellectual capital. Navigation in the new business landscape. New York: New 
York University Press. 
RUMELT, R., 1984. Toward a strategic theory of the firm. In: LAMB, R., (ed. ), 
Competitive Strategic Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 556- 
570. 
SAINT-ONGE, H., 1996. Tacit knowledge: the key to the strategic alignment 
of intellectual capital. Strategy and Leadership, 24 (2), 10-15. 
SENGUPTA, P., 1998. Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The 
Accounting Review, 459-474. 
SHAPIRO, S. S. AND WILK, M. B., 1965. An analysis of variance test for 
normality. Biometrika, 52(3), 591-9. 
SHLEIFER, A. AND VISNY, R. W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. 
The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783. 
SIEGEL, S., 1956. Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
SINGHVI, S. S., 1968. Characteristics and implications of inadequate 
disclosure: A case of India. The International Journal of Accounting Education 
and Research, 3(2), 29-44. 
SINGHVI, S. S. AND DESAI, H. B, 1971. An empirical analysis of the quality 
of corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review, 46, (1), 129-138. 
SKINNER, D., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 32,38-60. 
SKINNER, D., 1997. Earnings disclosure and stockholder lawsuits. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 23,249-283. 
316 
SOFIAN, S., TAYLES, M. AND PIKE, R., 2005. The impact of human capital 
management on management accounting practices and corporate culture: A 
study of Malaysian companies perspective. In: A paper presented at 
International Conference on Knowledge Management (ICKM) 7-9 July 2005- 
05-30 Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lampur, Malaysia. 
SPENCE, M., 1973. Job market signalling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
87,29-30. 
SPENCER, A. C., 1983. On the edge of the Organisation: The role of outside 
director. John Wiley. 
SPENDER, J-C., 1989. Industry recipes: The nature and sources of managerial 
judgement. Oxford: Blackwell. 
SPERO, L. L., 1979. The extent and causes of voluntary disclosure of financial 
information in Three European Capital Markets: An exploratory study. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Graduate School of Business, Harvard 
University. 
STARBUCK, W., 1965. Organisational growth and development, In: March, 
J. G. (ed. ), Handbook of Organisations, Chicago: Rand McNally, 451-533. 
STEWART, T., 1997. Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Nations. 
London: Nicholas Brealey. 
STEWART, T. A., 2001. The Wealth of Knowledge. Intellectual capital and the 
21st Century Organization. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. 
STIGLER, G., 1958. The economies of scale. Journal of Law and Economics, 
1,54-71. 
317 
STIGLER, G. J., 1971. The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Sciences, 3-21. 
STULTZ, R. M., 1988. On takeover resistance, managerial discretion and 
shareholders' wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1 &2), 25-54. 
SUBBARAO, A. V. AND ZEGHAL, D., 1997. Human resources information 
disclosure in annual reports: an international comparison. Journal of Human 
Resource Costing and Accounting, 2(2), 53-73. 
SULLIVAN, L. H., 1999. The Global Sullivan Principles of Corporate Social 
responsibility [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. thesullivanfoundation. org/gsp/default. asp 
[Accessed 15 May 2007]. 
SVEIBY, K. E., 1997. The New Organisational Wealth: Managing & 
Measuring Knowledge Based Assets. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler. 
TASKER, S. C., 1998. Technology company conference calls: A small sample 
study. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis, 4(1), 6-14. 
TAYLES, M., BRAMLEY, A., ADSHEAD, N. AND FARR, J., 2002. Dealing 
with the management of intellectual capital: The potential role of strategic 
management accounting. Working Paper, Bradford University School of 
Management, 02/16,1-13. 
TAYLES, M., WEBSTER, M., SUGDEN, D. AND BRAMLEY, A., 2005. 
Accounting "gets real" in dealing with virtual manufacturing. Journal of 
Intellectual Capital, 6(3), 322 - 338. 
TEECE, D., 1980. Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise 
Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1(3), 223-247. 
318 
TEECE, D., PISANO, G. AND SHEUN, A., 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management. Strategic Management Journal, 18,509-33. 
THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, 2000. 
The Global Reporting Initiative Sustainable Reporting Guidelines. 
Johannesburg: GRI Steering Committee: 
THE RUTTERMAN REPORT, 1994. Internal Control and Financial 
Reporting: Guidance for Directors of Listed Companies Registered in the UK. 
London: Rutterman Group. 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, 2002. Corporate Governance and 
Operational Risk. Pub. L. No. 107-204,116 Stat. 745. 
THE TURNBULL REPORT, 1999. Internal Control: Guidance for Directors 
on the Combined Code. London: Turnbull Committee. 
THE UNITED NATION'S GLOBAL COMPACT, 1999. Principle 10 Anti- 
Corruption: The promotion and adoption of initiatives to counter all forms of 
corruption, including extortion and bribery [Online], 
Available from: 
http: //www. unglobalcompact. org/ 
[Accessed 15 May 2007] 
TOMS, S., 2002. Firm resources, quality signals and the determination of 
corporate environmental reputation: some UK evidence. The British Accounting 
Review, 34(3), 257-282. 
TRICKER, R. I., 1984. Corporate governance: Practises, procedures and 
powers in British Companies and Their Boards of Directors. Gower Publishing. 
TRUEMAN, B., 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings 
forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8,53-72. 
319 
TSENG, C. AND GOO, Y. J., 2005. Intellectual Capital and Corporate Value in 
an Emerging Economy: empirical study of Taiwanese manufacturers. R&D 
Management, 35(2), 187-201. 
TURKEY, M. I. A., 1985. Measuring the Extent of Disclosure Requirements in 
the Financial Reports of Saudi Corporations. Working Paper, Administration 
Sciences College, King Saudi University. 
TURNBULL, S., 1997. Corporate Governance: Its scope, concerns and 
theories. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5(4), 180-205. 
TUSHMAN, M. L., VIRANY, B. AND ROMANELLI, E., 1985. Executive 
succession, strategic reorientation and organisation evolution: the minicomputer 
industry as a case in point. Technology in Society, 7,297-313. 
UNERMAN, J., 2000. Methodological issues reflections on quantification in 
corporate social reporting content analysis. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 13(5), 667-680. 
USEEM, M., 1993. Executive Defence: Shareholder Power and Corporate 
Reorganisation. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
USOFF, C. A, THIBODEAU, J. C. AND BURNABY, P., (2002). The 
Importance of Intellectual Capital and its effects on performance measurement 
systems. Managerial Auditing Journal, 17(1), 9-15. 
VAN DER MEER-KOOISTRA, J. AND ZIJLSTA, S., 2001. Reporting on 
Intellectual Capital. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 14(4), 
456-476. 
320 
VANDEMAELE, S. N., VERGAUWEN, P. G. M. C. AND SMITS, A. J., 2005. 
Intellectual capital disclosure in the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK: A 
longitudinal and comparative study. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 6(3), 417- 
426. 
VERGAUWEN, P. AND VAN ALLEM, F., 2005. Annual report IC 
disclosures in the Netherlands, France and Germany. Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 6 (1), 89-104. 
VERRACCHIA, R. E., 1983. Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 5,174-194. 
VERRECCHIA, R. E., 2001. Essays in disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 32(1-3), 97-180. 
WALLACE, R. S. O. 1987. Disclosure of accounting information in developing 
countries: A case study of Nigeria. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Exeter 
University. 
WALLACE, R. S. O., NASER, K. AND MORA, A., 1994. The Relationship 
between the Comprehensiveness of Corporate Annual Reports and Firm 
Characteristics in Spain. Journal of Accounting and Business Research, 25 (97), 
41-53. 
WALLACE, R. S. O. AND NASER, I. K., 1995. Firm-specific determinants of 
the comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports 
of firms listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. Accounting and Public 
Policy, 14,41-53. 
WALSH, J. P. AND SEWARD, J. K., 1990. On the efficiency of internal and 
external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15, 
421-458. 
321 
WATTS, R. L., 1977. Corporate Financial Statements: A product of the market 
and political process. Australian Journal of Management, 53-75. 
WATTS, R. L. AND ZIMMERMAN, J. L., 1978. Towards a positive theory of 
the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112- 
134. 
WATTS, R. L. AND ZIMMERMAN, J. L., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
WEBSTER, E., 1999. The economics of intangible investment. UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited. 
WEIMER, J. AND PAPE, J., 1999. A Taxonomy of systems of corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance, 7(2), 152-166. 
WEISBACH, M. S., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 20(2). 
WHITE, H., 1980. A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a 
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48,817-838. 
WHITTRED, G. P., 1980. The timeliness of Australian annual report: 1972- 
1977. Journal ofAccounting Research, 18(2), 623-628. 
WHITTRED, G., 1987. The derived demand for consolidated financial 
reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 259-285. 
WHITTRED, G. AND ZIMMER, I., 1990. Financial accounting, incentive 
effects and economic consequences. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Sydney. 
WILLIAMS, S. M., 2001. Is intellectual capital performance and disclosure 
practices related? Journal of Intellectual Capital, 2 (3), 192-203. 
322 
WILLIAMSON, O. E., 1988. Corporate finance and corporate governance. 
Journal of Finance, 43,567-591. 
WISEMAN, J., 1982. An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in 
corporate annual reports. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 7(1), 53-63. 
WORRELL, D. L., NEMEC, C. AND DAVIDSON III, W. N., 1997. Research 
notes and communication-one hat too many: Key executive plurality and 
shareholder wealth. Strategic Management Journal, 18(6), 499-507. 
WRIGHT, P. M., MCMAHAN, G. C. AND MCWILLIAMS, A., 1994. Human 
Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage: A Resource-based 
Perspective. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 5,301- 
326. 
ZAHRA, S. A., OVIATT, B. M. AND MINYARD, K., 1993. Effects of 
corporate ownership and board structure on corporate social responsibility and 
financial performance. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, 336- 
340. 
ZARZESKI, M. T., 1996. Spontaneous harmonisation effects of culture and 
market forces on accounting disclosure practices. Accounting Horizons, 10(1), 
18-37. 
ZEGHAL, D. AND AHMED, S. A., 1990. Comparisons of social responsibility 
information disclosure by Canadian media firms. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 3(1), 38-53. 
323 
